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AND THE “LIMIT” OF JUDGMENT
R
On 17 October 1962, the fragmented and partially indecipherable 
manuscript of Salmen Lewenthal, a Polish Jew, was unearthed at the 
site where the crematoria of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination 
camp once stood. Although he died before the camp’s liberation, Lewen-
thal had included in his testimony the following passage:
We were shamed of one another and we dared not look one another in the 
face … […] I admit that I, too, … […] it appeared that my actions, too, […] 
were […] … the truth is that one wants to live at any cost, one wants to live 
because one lives, because the whole world lives. And all that one wishes, 
all with what one is, if only slightly, bound […] is bound with life fi rst of all, 
without life […] such is the real truth.1
Lewenthal had been a member of the Sonderkommando (“special squad”) 
forced to work in Birkenau’s gas chambers and crematoria.2 The tasks 
of these prisoners, the vast majority of them Jews, involved using decep-
tion to keep order among those about to be gassed; sorting their confi s-
cated belongings; hosing down the corpses; cutting hair and extracting 
teeth from the bodies; burning the corpses in the furnaces or on outdoor 
pyres; crushing the remaining bone fragments; and disposing of the 
ashes, which were used as fertilizer or insulation, or were scattered on 
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the Vistula River. Men were chosen for the Sonderkommandos upon ar-
rival at the camp or, less commonly, as a form of punishment. In return 
for their cooperation, members of the Sonderkommando had access to 
clothing, bedding, food, cigarettes, and alcohol, all taken from newly ar-
rived “transports.” Lucie Adelsberger, who survived as a prisoner doctor 
in Auschwitz, writes that the members of the Sonderkommando “were 
well paid for their labours. They were allowed to take whatever they 
wanted from the booty, including cigarettes and brandy. On the other 
hand, they had their own death sentence in their pocket.”3 There were 
thirteen successive “special squads” in the Birkenau extermination 
camp, as each group was routinely executed after approximately four 
months. Any refusal to cooperate was answered with immediate death. 
Survival invariably came down to chance.
The members of the Sonderkommandos belonged to the important 
category of so-called “privileged” Jews—the central focus of this book. 
In addition to referring to crematorium workers such as Lewenthal, the 
term “privileged” is used here to refer to the camp inmates who held 
positions as prisoner-functionaries, such as the supervisors of prisoner 
barracks and Kapos (“heads”) of labor squads. The term is also under-
stood here to refer to inhabitants of the ghettos who were members of 
the Judenräte (“Jewish councils”) and Ordnungsdienst (“order service,” 
or Jewish police), who are also viewed as having held “privileged” posi-
tions.4 The ethical dilemmas encountered by this group of victims have 
proven very problematic for Holocaust survivors, scholars, writers, and 
fi lmmakers alike in their attempts to understand and represent such 
experiences. Jews suffered unprecedented persecution in the camps and 
ghettos, places where the normal concepts of “choice” and “responsibil-
ity” were radically undermined. When confronted with the traumatic 
circumstances of “privileged” Jews, the practice of passing judgment 
over their actions becomes highly contentious. The complexities in-
volved in approaching this issue are revealed most clearly in an essay 
written by the infl uential Holocaust survivor Primo Levi entitled “The 
Grey Zone,” the central text from which this study arose. 
Levi’s paradigmatic concept of the “grey zone” directly addresses the 
issue of “privileged” Jews and is of particular importance due to its en-
gagement with the problem of how their extreme situations are to be 
understood. A crucial part of Levi’s fi nal book, The Drowned and the 
Saved (fi rst published in 1986), “The Grey Zone” raises fundamental 
questions regarding the treatment of liminal fi gures by those who repre-
sent the Holocaust.5 Subjected to extreme levels of coercion, these “priv-
ileged” victims were compelled to act in ways that have been judged as 
both self-serving and harmful to fellow inmates. Indeed, “privileged” 
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was a term commonly used by other prisoners to describe these individ-
uals.6 A crucial, often overlooked, aspect of the Holocaust, the issue of 
“privileged” Jews concerns victims who, in order to prolong their lives, 
were forced to behave in ways that have often been interpreted as con-
tributing in some way to the killing process. As Susan Pentlin argues in 
her essay “Holocaust Victims of Privilege,” in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of the Holocaust and its ethical implications, one must 
listen to the “voices from the grey zone” and explore the often taboo 
issues of “position and privilege.”7 Levi writes similarly that the grey 
zone of “prisoners who in some measure, perhaps with good intentions, 
collaborated with the authority, was not negligible, indeed it constituted 
a phenomenon of fundamental importance.”8
Drawing on his experiences in Auschwitz, Levi engages with the prob-
lematic of not judging “privileged” Jews. In his essay he is chiefl y con-
cerned with Kapos, members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommandos, and 
the controversial Jewish “elder” Chaim Rumkowski of the Lodz Ghetto. 
While he unequivocally holds the perpetrators of the Holocaust respon-
sible for their actions, he warns that one should abstain from judging 
their victims. In the case of the Sonderkommandos, Levi declares that 
“our need and ability to judge falters” and that any moral evaluation of 
them must be “suspended.”9 Likewise, he asserts that the same impo-
tentia judicandi “paralyses” us when considering Rumkowski’s behav-
ior. While we should not condemn Rumkowski, Levi writes, we cannot 
“absolve him on the moral plane” either.10 At the same time, Levi argues 
that praising the morally ambiguous behavior of “privileged” Jews is 
also inappropriate, as he feels that “not all their acts should be set forth 
as examples.”11 In short, he contends that “privileged” Jews should not 
be judged for their actions in extremis—that negative and positive moral 
evaluations of their behavior should be suspended. Levi’s meditation on 
the grey zone poses a number of questions: If “privileged” Jews are not 
to be judged for their behavior in situations beyond their control, can 
judgment be suspended in the representations of their experiences? And 
while passing judgment on “privileged” Jews may be impossible, is it 
not also inevitable? 
Primarily a work of cultural criticism, this book takes an interdisci-
plinary approach to examine how moral judgments of “privileged” Jews 
are conveyed in representations of the Holocaust. In investigating this 
issue, I adopt what might be called a “metaethical” perspective. John K. 
Roth defi nes “metaethics” as a refl ection on judgments that have al-
ready been made, which “seek[s] to understand more fully how those 
judgments work as well as what limits they face and problems they en-
tail.”12 The focus of this book is on how judgments of “privileged” Jews 
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are constructed; the separate, but intrinsically related, question of why 
judgments of these liminal fi gures may be inappropriate is secondary. 
Nonetheless, this chapter and those that follow will also unavoidably 
refl ect on the latter question, particularly when considering the often 
controversial ideas that historical and cultural representations of “priv-
ileged” Jews communicate to their audiences.
While numerous studies have focused on the contribution of Holo-
caust representations to collective memory, identity, and knowledge, no 
studies have concentrated specifi cally on the representation of “privi-
leged” Jews and how this involves making moral judgments. A consen-
sus has formed among those who have engaged with the events of the 
Holocaust in one form or another that capturing the “reality” of the 
tragedy—in writing, fi lm, or any other medium—is impossible. Taking 
this idea further, many scholars argue that some or all representations 
trivialize the Holocaust through “simplifi cation.” Signifi cantly, Levi’s 
anxiety over this phenomenon was an important driving factor in his 
exploration of the issue of “privileged” Jews. Not only did he raise the 
question of whether judgment can be suspended, by pointing to histori-
ans and fi lmmakers as being particularly predisposed to making judg-
ment, but his own representation of “privileged” Jews in “The Grey 
Zone” can itself be seen to entail certain judgments. Going forward, the 
proceeding chapters of this book explore the possibilities for portraying 
“privileged” Jews in different representational modes or genres.
Taking Levi’s concept of the grey zone as a point of departure, the 
chapters that follow provide a close analysis of representations of “privi-
leged” Jews in important examples of Holocaust writing and fi lm. De-
tailed attention is given to how judgments are revealed in Levi’s own 
writings, the highly infl uential work of Raul Hilberg, and several docu-
mentary and fi ction fi lms. Many of the specifi c representations to be ex-
amined have been selected in part because of their prominent status in 
the fi eld of Holocaust studies. Levi’s testimonies, Hilberg’s scholarship, 
and the major fi lms examined, including Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah 
(1985) and Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993), are consistently 
highlighted for their “canonical” infl uence on Holocaust consciousness.13 
Tor Ben-Mayor and Dan Setton’s less well-known documentary Kapo 
(1999) and Tim Blake Nelson’s fi ction fi lm The Grey Zone (2001) take 
considerably different approaches to representing the behavior of “privi-
leged” Jews than the approaches taken in the seminal fi lms of Lanz-
mann and Spielberg. An analysis of these representations exposes dif-
ferent modes of judgment vis-à-vis different modes of representation. 
First, however, a book that engages with such a deeply sensitive subject 
as the behavior of “privileged” Jews under Nazi persecution necessi-
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tates some observations in relation to its conception, construction, and 
limitations.
As Geoffrey H. Hartman has remarked, Holocaust studies is a veri-
table “minefi eld,” where “even the words … in which we express our 
thoughts on what happened” are disputable.14 It will already be clear 
from the preceding pages that the problematic implications of judging 
Jewish victims of the Nazis render the term “privilege” a nebulous one. 
Indeed, the phrase is likely to raise some curiosity, if not a degree of 
suspicion. While my research into this area saw several shifts in the 
terminology adopted, I settled on “privileged” due to its common us-
age both at the time of the Holocaust and in its aftermath. It must be 
emphasized that no matter what physical or other benefi ts “privileged” 
Jews may have gained for their cooperation with their persecutors, they 
experienced immense suffering and were, along with all other Jewish 
victims, intended to perish. The use of the term “privileged” therefore 
needs to be understood in the context of the unprecedented conditions 
of the Nazi-controlled ghettos and camps; the term’s positive connota-
tions must be qualifi ed. Indeed, the categorization of a group of Ho-
locaust victims as “privileged” may be viewed as oxymoronic and the 
fraught nature of the term must be constantly kept in mind (hence the 
pervasive inverted commas).
I argue here that moral judgment is inevitable and, furthermore, that 
when one is faced with such a catastrophic event as the Holocaust, moral 
judgment is almost unanimously thought to be essential, if not obliga-
tory. However, as Levi’s essay on the grey zone suggests, when confronted 
with the extreme circumstances of Jews in so-called “privileged” posi-
tions, it may be impossible to pass judgment on them. “Impossibility” 
here does not imply that one is literally unable to pass judgment—far 
from it, as the following chapters reveal. Instead, the “impossibility” 
of judgment refers to the perceived invalidity or inappropriateness of 
any moral evaluation of “privileged” Jews. Yet suspending judgment, 
even of those forced to confront irresolvable ethical dilemmas, is no easy 
task. I come to the study of the Holocaust from a non-Jewish and non-
German background, although I make no claims to any form of “objec-
tivity.” Throughout the researching and writing of this book, my own 
judgments have undoubtedly impacted on the fi nal result. The more I 
engaged with representations of the Sonderkommandos, for example, 
the more I felt I sympathized with them. Other cases perhaps produced 
the opposite effect. This was unavoidable. Even the selection of images 
for a book such as this can be read as implying judgment. I have endeav-
ored in my critical analysis to avoid “judging the judges,” so to speak, 
whenever I disagreed with a judgment made in their representations of 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
6 Judging “Privileged” Jews
“privileged” Jews; nonetheless, my own limitations and the intrinsically 
judgmental nature of language itself mean that my own judgments will 
have impinged on the analysis. The emotionally and morally fraught is-
sue of “privileged” Jews at least necessitates an awareness of this.
In order to map out the terrain to be covered in the subsequent chap-
ters, this chapter includes the following sections, which highlight key 
concepts and debates that inform the book as a whole. First, a more 
detailed explanation of the phrase “privileged Jews” is accompanied by 
a broad account of the experiences of the particular groups of people to 
be the primary focus of analysis. The discourses and controversies that 
have formed around the interrelated problems of judgment and rep-
resentation—problems that remain unresolved in Levi’s writings and 
more widely—are then surveyed, with Lawrence L. Langer’s concept 
of “choiceless choices” providing particularly valuable insights into the 
ethical dilemmas confronted by Holocaust victims. Finally, I explore the 
problems faced by those who attempt to represent liminal fi gures and 
the Holocaust in general by positioning judgment as a “limit” of repre-
sentation, thereby charting a path for an investigation of how “privi-
leged” Jews are portrayed in different genres.
A Matter of Life and Death: The Category 
of “Privileged” Jews
“Privileged” Jews include those in the Nazi-controlled camps and ghet-
tos who held positions that gave them access to material and other 
benefi ts beyond those available to other Jews. This study adopts a very 
specifi c defi nition of “privilege” in order to concentrate on the extreme 
ethical dilemmas that many victims faced, although the term has also 
been used at times to categorize Jews in Germany whose deportation 
was postponed due to prior military service, marriage to non-Jews, and 
so on, or Jews in the ghettos who held a higher socio-economic status 
than others. Indeed, the use of the term “privileged” in relation to vic-
tims in the ghettos and camps has been far from consistent. For example, 
Marlene Heinemann’s analysis of camp inmate relations in Holocaust 
testimonies is partly divided into refl ections on “privileged” and “less 
privileged” prisoners.15 Levi himself implies a similar distinction (or 
“spec trum”) when he separates the categories of “privileged” prison-
ers at issue in this book from both the “unprivileged” prisoners and 
the “picturesque fauna” of “low-ranking functionaries,” who included 
“sweepers, kettle washers, night-watchmen, bed smoothers … check-
ers of lice and scabies, messengers, interpreters [and] assistants’ assis-
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tants.”16 Setting the ambiguities of the term aside, it is the victims who 
held the particularly controversial—and frequently condemned—roles 
of Kapos and crematorium workers in the camps or Jewish leaders and 
police in the ghettos with whom I am primarily concerned here. In ad-
dressing the crucial issue of “privileged” Jews, therefore, it is essential 
to understand—to what extent possible—the unprecedented situations 
in which victims became “privileged.”
A common theme running throughout survivor testimony is the ex-
treme dehumanization experienced by Jews in the ghettos and camps 
and the moral compromises they were forced to make in order to sur-
vive (or at least to prolong their lives). Part of the Nazi system of dehu-
manization involved the creation of a complex network of “privileged” 
prisoners to be responsible for aspects of the administration of, and dis-
cipline within, the numerous camps and ghettos.17 Conditions in these 
settings varied markedly, both geographically and temporally, thus it is 
diffi cult to generalize.18 Isaiah Trunk’s detailed study of the Judenräte 
demonstrates that although there were extensive differences between 
ghettos, in every one a façade of “ghetto autonomy” was used by the 
Nazis to disguise “the satanic purpose of using the victim himself [sic] 
to assist the hangman in his work.”19 Exposed to widespread starvation, 
disease, slave labor, and random executions, tens of thousands of Jews 
died in the ghettos even before deportations to extermination camps 
commenced. As one survivor has noted, “You can’t apply any normal 
criteria to the ghetto. I didn’t wonder about what was moral and what 
was immoral.”20 
The ethical dilemmas that “privileged” Jews confronted in the ghet-
tos are epitomized in the establishment of the Jewish councils and police 
forces. Being part of these organizations had the potential to prolong 
one’s life and the lives of one’s family members through the provision of 
extra food, freedom of movement, exemptions from searches and evic-
tions, and (at least initially) immunity from deportation; however, it is 
crucial to keep in mind that the establishment of the ghettos was only 
to be a temporary measure. In the end, most “privileged” Jews did not 
survive the Holocaust.
The role of the Judenräte has been the subject of intense debate, as 
will be discussed later in the chapter. The councils were comprised of 
up to twenty-four men, who were directly responsible for carrying out 
Nazi policies and overseeing the daily operation of the ghettos.21 Super-
vised and often abused (verbally and physically) by the Nazi administra-
tion, Jewish leaders were made responsible for registering and housing 
the ghetto population; distributing life-prolonging work permits; orga-
nizing health, education, and sanitation services; rationing the always-
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inadequate food supply; and providing law enforcement and the required 
number of Jews for forced labor. Faced with massive unemployment, 
overcrowding, hunger, and epidemics, Judenrat offi cials found them-
selves in an impossible situation. After 1941, some council members 
were forced to draw up lists of people demanded by the Nazis for depor-
tation to “the East,” although due to their captors’ efforts at secrecy, it 
was rarely clear that this meant certain death. Indeed, many Judenräte 
were established before the total physical annihilation of the Jews was 
decided upon. Furthermore, while a position on a council generally be-
stowed signifi cant “privileges,” the vast majority of Jewish leaders died 
before the war ended, having been deported to various camps,22 shot 
by killing squads, or, in some cases, dying by their own hand.23 While 
councils were supposed to consist of the prewar Jewish community 
leaders, the degree of continuity varied, and there were some instances 
where the SS chose ordinary civilians. In any case, the ethical dilemmas 
Judenrat offi cials confronted were beyond anything they had encoun-
tered previously. The councils were formed and governed, metaphori-
cally speaking (and often literally), at gunpoint. This may be also said of 
the Ordnungsdienst (Jewish police).
Figure 0.1. The senior offi cer of the Krakow Ghetto police (Ordnungsdienst) 
straightens the cap of one of his men during roll call (#06224). Courtesy of 
USHMM Photo Archives
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Figure 0.2. A member of the Jewish police and a German soldier direct pedes-
trian traffi c across the main street dividing the two parts of the Lodz Ghetto. 
The sign reads: “Jewish residential area, entrance is forbidden” (#37316). 
Courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives
Figure 0.3. Leon Rozenblat, the controversial chief of the Lodz Ghetto police 
(left), and other members of the Ordnungsdienst pose with a newlywed couple 
(#63000). Courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives.
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Jews became members of the Ordnungsdienst by volunteering, hav-
ing advantageous contacts, or being randomly conscripted by the Nazi 
authorities. Armed with truncheons and sometimes whips, Jewish po-
lice were charged with keeping order in the ghettos; enforcing Nazi reg-
ulations; guarding fences and Judenrat institutions; collecting property 
the SS ordered to be confi scated; and, most controversially, escorting 
fellow Jews to the trains bound for extermination camps, sometimes 
even through violent means. Jewish police often had to arrest a daily 
quota of people for deportation, lest they suffer the same fate. While 
some ghetto police forces were independent of their Judenrat, they were 
often directly supervised by armed Germans or collaborators to ensure 
that they undertook the tasks expected of them and that they behaved 
with the required brutality. Signifi cantly, holding these “privileged” po-
sitions could also benefi t or protect one’s family. The testimony of Calel 
Perechodnik, one of the few fi rsthand accounts by a member of the Jew-
ish police, recalls his trauma in helping the SS assemble 8,000 Jews 
for deportation to Treblinka. The Nazis had deceitfully promised excep-
tions would be made for Perechodnik’s wife and daughter, along with 
the families of other ghetto police, although as soon as the police had 
Figure 0.4. Jewish police escort a group of Jews in the Lodz Ghetto who 
have been rounded up for deportation (#10055). Courtesy of USHMM Photo 
Archives
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done what was required of them, their families were deported anyway. 
Dying before the war’s end, Perechodnik wrote in the opening lines of 
his memoir, which is fi lled with loathing for himself and his fellow “priv-
ileged” Jews: “Please consider this my deathbed confession. … I don’t 
ask to be absolved.”24 While self-reproach is perhaps understandable 
under the circumstances, it might be argued that such remorse is the 
result of the coercive actions of the Nazi perpetrators and no cause for 
moral condemnation on Perechodnik’s part.25 Importantly, many Jews 
in the ghettos (and some Jews who did not experience persecution in 
this setting) were subsequently incarcerated in the camps, where Nazi-
enforced hierarchies also saw a proliferation of “privileged” positions.
Prisoners in the concentration camps were subjected to primitive liv-
ing conditions, constant fear, rampant disease, long hours of meaningless 
manual labor, roll calls in extreme weather, limited access to sanitary and 
medical facilities, and random physical beatings. In the various camps 
that made up the Auschwitz complex in particular, Jews (along with a 
number of other groups of prisoners) were exposed to an intentional 
policy of starvation and continuous “selections” for the gas chambers. 
Faced with the inverted morality of the univers concentrationnaire,26 
victims were turned against each other in a literal struggle for survival, 
leading to a widespread impression among prisoners that life for one 
meant death for another. Exemplifying this is the German prisoner doc-
tor Ella Lingens-Reiner’s refl ection on the dilemma she faced in trying 
Figure 0.5. Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto board a train for deportation with 
the assistance of Jewish police (#37287). Courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives
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to use her “privileged” position in Auschwitz to help others amidst the 
Nazis’ obsession with numbers: “If I rescued one woman, I pushed an-
other to her doom, another who wanted to live and had an equal right to 
live. … Was there any sense in trying to behave decently?”27 Similarly, in 
discussing the proliferation of coercion, “privilege,” and “compromise” 
in Auschwitz, Levi writes that the Lager was “an excellent ‘laboratory,’” 
and that “the hybrid class of the prisoner-functionary constitutes [the 
camp’s] armature and at the same time its most disquieting feature.”28 
Notably, most of these “privileged” positions were automatically allo-
cated to non-Jewish inmates, particularly criminals and political pris-
oners, although the number of Jewish prisoner-functionaries increased 
toward the end of the war due to a shortage of labor. By having access to 
better shelter, increased rations, and other items for trade, “privileged” 
inmates were less vulnerable to—though not immune from—camp pun-
ishments. For these reasons, Levi writes that “prominents,” or camp 
offi cials, along with other “privileged” prisoners, including doctors, mes-
sengers, musicians, interpreters, kitchen hands, shoemakers, and so on, 
comprised the majority of survivors.29 In terms of “privileged” prisoners 
in the camps, this book is primarily concerned with the Sonderkomman-
dos (described earlier) and the Kapos.
The behavior of Kapos, who generally served as supervisors of forced-
labor squads, is a particularly controversial topic. Kapos are infamous 
in survivor literature for their brutal treatment of their subordinates, 
with some even taking part in the decision-making of the “selections” 
for the gas chambers. Although not all Kapos are demonized by survi-
vors, positive portrayals are generally the exception to the rule. The 
behavior of Kapos often included the intimidation or abuse of some of 
the prisoners “beneath” them, while favoring or even rescuing others. 
The motivations behind the behavior of Jewish Kapos in particular are 
fi ercely contested and inherently diffi cult to evaluate. Signifi cantly, Ka-
pos were subject to punishment by Nazi guards for any problems arising 
from the prisoners they were responsible for, and Jewish Kapos were ar-
guably under more pressure to keep their positions through violence.30 
The most crucial distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish prisoners, 
whether “privileged” or not, is that from late 1941 onward the Nazis 
intended to kill every Jew.31 Any reprieve was only temporary.
Importantly, the focus of this book on (some) Jewish experiences 
in (some of) the ghettos and camps should by no means be viewed as 
representative of the Holocaust, as Nazi persecution also occurred at 
mass-shooting sites, in deportation trains, during the death marches 
toward Germany at the end of the war, and through a variety of other 
means. Equally, just as the experiences of Jews varied in a number of 
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settings and over a number of years, the situations, experiences, and 
behaviors of “privileged” Jews were incredibly diverse, with important 
differences existing between the groups of prisoners outlined above and 
within these groups themselves. On the other hand, emphasizing such 
differences too strongly often means passing clear-cut moral judgments 
on some victims over others, in effect constructing a “moral spectrum,” 
the likes of which will be highlighted at different stages in the forthcom-
ing chapters. In any event, the extreme situations of “privileged” Jews 
during the Holocaust has placed large, if not insurmountable, obstacles 
in the path of moral judgment, raising the question of whether or not 
such judgment should be (if at all possible) suspended. By placing “privi-
leged” Jews within what he calls the “grey zone,” this suspension of 
judgment seems to be what Levi recommends.
Primo Levi’s “Grey Zone” and the Problems 
of Judgment and Representation
Levi’s infl uential essay entitled “The Grey Zone” highlights the interre-
lationship between judgment, representation, and the category of “priv-
ileged” Jews. Indeed, Levi’s writings constantly draw attention to the 
problems faced by those who seek to represent the Holocaust. In his fi rst 
memoir, If This Is a Man (1947), Levi emphasizes the immense physical 
and moral degradation experienced by Jews in Auschwitz, arguing that 
“our language lacks words to express this offence, the demolition of a 
man [sic].”32 Subsequently, in his essay on the grey zone, published just 
one year before his suicide, Levi expands on the obstacles to represen-
tation. Here he stresses not only the incomprehensibility of the suffer-
ing of the victims, but also the problem of moral judgment. His sober, 
questioning, and self-refl exive analysis offers some invaluable lessons 
on how one might perceive and portray the Holocaust.
Levi’s “grey zone” is in the main a metaphor for moral ambiguity, 
a conceptual realm with “ill-defi ned outlines which both separate and 
join the two camps of masters and servants. It possesses an incredibly 
complicated internal structure, and contains within itself enough to 
confuse our need to judge.”33 This in itself highlights the way in which 
Levi’s concept problematizes judgment, as his characterization of the 
grey zone could be (and often has been) interpreted to involve a merg-
ing, if not a blurring, of the fundamental categories of persecutor and 
victim. However, Levi stresses elsewhere in his essay, and for good rea-
son, that “to confuse [perpetrators] with their victims is a moral disease 
or an aesthetic affectation or a sinister sign of complicity; above all, 
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it is precious service rendered (intentionally or not) to the negators of 
truth.”34 Accepting the inherent diffi culties in judging “privileged” pris-
oners, Dominick LaCapra reiterates that “one may judge quite harshly 
and with little qualifi cation Nazis who were instrumental in creating 
the situation that gave rise to the grey zone.”35 In short, the distinction 
between victim and perpetrator must be maintained.36 Here then is the 
crux: how are distinctions between groups of victims—those with “privi-
leged” positions and those without—to be drawn without undermining 
the crucial separation of victims from their persecutors?
Levi’s effort to impress on his readers the precariousness of address-
ing such a complex and sensitive issue is of critical importance. Meditat-
ing on the unprecedented situations that “privileged” Jews faced works 
toward exposing the horror and degradation of the Holocaust experience 
for its victims, helps to avoid falling into stereotypes that simplify or 
trivialize the event, and arguably leads to a deeper understanding of the 
Holocaust. Levi’s concept of the grey zone is particularly valuable as it 
destabilizes clear-cut moral distinctions, such as those between “good” 
and “evil,” and warns against hasty judgment—or, in some cases, calls 
for it to be suspended. For these reasons, an acknowledgment of the grey 
zone poses signifi cant obstacles to representation, which Levi shows to 
be strongly related to judgment. Commenting on the human need or 
desire for “simplifi cation” early in his essay, Levi writes:
[T]he network of human relationships inside the Lagers [camps] was not 
simple: it could not be reduced to the two blocs of victims and persecutors. 
In anyone who today reads (or writes) the history of the Lager is evident the 
tendency, indeed the need, to separate evil from good, to be able to take sides, 
to repeat Christ’s gesture on Judgment Day: here the righteous, over there 
the reprobates.37
The notion that simplifi cation results from passing moral judgment in 
and through representation is evident in this passage. Indeed, Levi opens 
his essay by stressing the prominent, even necessary, place of simplifi ca-
tion in human affairs: “What we commonly mean by ‘understand’ coin-
cides with ‘simplify’: without profound simplifi cation the world around 
us would be an infi nite, undefi ned tangle.”38 To state the problem Levi 
evokes briefl y: understanding requires representation, which involves 
making moral judgment and, inevitably, results in simplifi cation.
Signifi cantly, part of the reason Levi felt compelled to refl ect on the 
grey zone was due to his concern about historical and fi lmic representa-
tions that he felt trivialized the complexity of Holocaust experiences. 
Levi singles out popular histories, the history taught in schools, and 
fi lms as particularly predisposed to the simplifying trend he identi-
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fi es—the “Manichean tendency which shuns half-tints and complexi-
ties” and resorts to the black-and-white binary opposition(s) of “friend” 
and “enemy,” “good” and “evil.”39 Levi’s skepticism toward history and 
fi lm highlights the problems of judgment and representation in relation 
to “privileged” Jews, and it is partly for this reason that historical and 
fi lmic representations of these fi gures have been chosen for analysis in 
this book. Indeed, in a highly critical essay on Schindler’s List, Bryan 
Cheyette argues that “the ethical uncertainty at the heart of Levi’s writ-
ings is the necessary critical yardstick by which one ought to under-
stand present-day fi lms and novels, many of which glibly assimilate the 
Holocaust in a breathtakingly untroubled manner.”40 Refl ecting on his 
impetus to write about the grey zone, Levi himself proclaims:
From many signs, it would seem the time has come to explore the space 
which separates … the victims from their persecutors, and to do so with a 
lighter hand, and with a less turbid spirit than has been done, for instance, 
in a number of fi lms.41
In the more than twenty years that have passed since Levi’s essay was 
published, hundreds of Holocaust-related fi lms have been made. Nel-
son’s representation of “privileged” Jews in his fi lm The Grey Zone, dis-
cussed in chapter 4, engages directly with Levi’s ideas, and therefore I 
examine the relevance of Levi’s aversion to the medium of fi lm to con-
temporary Holocaust cinema. 
As noted earlier, Levi argues that one should abstain from passing 
positive and negative judgments when representing “privileged” Jews. 
One way in which Levi’s concept of the grey zone suggests judgment 
should be suspended is to dispose of ethical Manicheanisms and “heroic” 
discourses. The extreme situations of “privileged” Jews reveal tradi-
tional notions of heroism to be highly problematic. In his literary analy-
sis of the “anti-heroic” in Levi’s writings, Victor Brombert observes: 
“Heroic models and heroic expectations are shown to be illusory and 
misleading. Offended by any rhetoric that might present the victim as 
hero, Levi is interested rather in what he calls the ‘gray zone’ of moral 
contamination.”42 While the need to avoid demonizing perpetrators is 
the chief concern of Ronnie Landau’s contention that “one must seek 
to guard against grotesque oversimplifi cation and debasement of Ho-
locaust terminology and imagery,”43 rejecting stereotypical representa-
tions of Jews as passive victims, heroic martyrs, or complicit traitors is 
arguably just as important. Finding the language to describe the severe 
ethical dilemmas faced by victims, a task with which survivors them-
selves invariably struggle, is immensely diffi cult. While the distinction 
between perpetrators and victims must be upheld, an abandonment of 
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a Manichean perspective and any related heroic discourse is essential 
in order to highlight the complexity of the situations that “privileged” 
Jews faced. Nonetheless, avoiding black-and-white stereotypes alone 
does not guarantee that all judgment is suspended when representing 
the impossible scenarios that confronted these liminal fi gures.
The ethical dilemmas encountered by “privileged” Jews render is-
sues of agency—and thus accountability—highly problematic, as with-
out choice and subsequent responsibility, the faculty of moral judgment 
is threatened. While the wider philosophical debate over free will and 
determinism lies outside the scope of this book, it is clear that evaluat-
ing Jewish experiences during the Holocaust relies on the existence of 
choice.44 This problem is exemplifi ed in what the infl uential Holocaust 
scholar Lawrence L. Langer terms “choiceless choices,” which scholars 
have frequently connected to Levi’s grey zone.45 In his study Versions 
of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit (1982), Langer char-
acterizes “choiceless choices” as “crucial decisions [that] did not refl ect 
options between life and death, but between one form of abnormal re-
sponse and another, both imposed by a situation that was in no way of 
the victim’s own choosing.”46 Heavily infl uenced by Levi’s early writ-
ings, Langer states:
Choiceless choices are perversions of power and will; they proclaim the impo-
tence of the victim, who contaminates his [sic] future by the very compulsion 
to survive in which his oppressors seek to drown his moral nature.47 
Due to their unresolvable quality, Langer argues that choiceless choices 
do not even involve deciding between a “greater” or “lesser” evil and 
can thus be seen to have existed in an environment constructed by the 
perpetrators not of immorality, but of “non-morality,” an environment 
“beyond good and evil.”
Persecuted Jews’ “decisions”—if they can be called that—were made 
under extreme duress, and the notions of intent or volition, which are 
central to most concepts of justice and judgment, are therefore impos-
sible to evaluate. “Privileged” Jews have often been said to have acted at 
the expense of fellow prisoners in various ways, for various reasons, and 
under varying levels of coercion. However, at such a distance of time and 
experience (and arguably even without this distance), it is problematic 
for anyone to evaluate the consequences, motivations, and personal au-
tonomy that were in play during the events in question. If it is the case 
that, as Slavoj Žižek briefl y puts it, “only a free choice is morally bind-
ing,”48 then Levi’s imperative to suspend judgment of Jews in extremis 
seems to hold some weight. As Levi writes in If This Is a Man, “In the 
Lager there are no criminals nor madmen; no criminals because there is 
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no moral law to contravene, no madmen because we are wholly devoid 
of free will, as our every action is, in time and place, the only conceivable 
one.”49 Nonetheless, a reliance on conventional notions of choice and 
free will has still been infl uential in many conceptualizations of victim 
behavior during the Holocaust.
Some scholars optimistically argue that Auschwitz is “capable of 
showing us essential aspects of the human spirit, and hence of bringing 
our knowledge of good and evil into sharper focus.”50 The link between 
an affi rmation of choice and a moral judgment of the victims of the 
Nazis is clear in Victor Frankl’s statement that “man” is “ultimately 
self-determining”:
What he becomes—within the limits of endowment and environment—he 
has made out of himself. In the concentration camps … we watched and wit-
nessed some of our comrades behave like swine while others behaved like 
saints. Man has both potentialities within himself; which one is actualised 
depends on decisions but not on conditions.51
Likewise, Bruno Bettelheim condemns what he views as the passive sub-
mission of inmates, pondering why millions of prisoners marched “will-
ingly” to the gas chambers rather than rebelling and dying “like men.”52 
Such views simplify the complex pressures on, and responses of, victims. 
While Terrence Des Pres devotes much attention to the “excremental 
assault” on camp prisoners, he maintains that survival depended, above 
all, “on forms of social bonding and interchange, on collective resistance, 
on keeping dignity and moral sense active.”53 In the case of “privileged” 
inmates in particular, this view is problematic. The victims who are the 
subject of this book did not survive through what might be readily de-
scribed as “heroic” means—if, indeed, they survived at all.
Langer argues that the ethical dilemmas engineered by the Nazis 
render preexisting moral systems an “irrelevant luxury” that cannot 
be used to understand victim behavior.54 In his chapter entitled “Aus-
chwitz: The Death of Choice,” he draws heavily on survivor testimony 
to describe the “optionless anguish of the death camp” and points to its 
implications for judgment and representation.55 Considering choiceless 
choices to be a defi ning feature of the Holocaust, Langer stresses the 
inappropriateness of preexisting categories of morality and represen-
tation when attempting to come to terms with the event. He rejects 
optimistic explanations for survival that draw on conventional notions 
of dignity, courage, sacrifi ce, heroism, and freedom, arguing that these 
concepts, along with “choice,” are part of the long “list of free words that 
died in Auschwitz, leaving no successors.”56 Like Levi’s conceptualiza-
tion of the grey zone, Langer’s discussion of choiceless choices confi rms 
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the desirability of suspending judgment. Refl ecting on the “dismal fate” 
of the Sonderkommandos, forced to perform such ghastly activities be-
fore an inevitable death, Langer declares: “We reserve judgment for the 
authors of that fate, not its victims.”57 Warning against “formulas and 
single truths” when contemplating the Holocaust, Langer contends that 
“those who attempt to generate such truths … sacrifi ce ambiguity for 
the sake of coherence, seeking to construct a possible future from the 
debris of an impossible past.”58
Levi and Langer focus primarily on Auschwitz, although the associ-
ated problems of judgment and representation also apply to the ghettos. 
Zygmunt Bauman states in his study Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) 
that Judenrat offi cials and Jewish police played “a crucial mediating role 
in the incapacitation of the Jews,” although he also emphasizes their 
lack of “choice.”59 Refl ecting the concepts of the grey zone and choiceless 
choices, Bauman stresses the high level of coercion and minimal choices 
created by the Nazi authorities, forcing the Judenräte to partake in the 
“save what you can” game—a game of acting rationally on good inten-
tions that invariably resulted in death for the many and survival (albeit 
temporarily) for the few.60 While Levi writes that all camp inmates were 
engaged in “a desperate hidden and continuous struggle,”61 Bauman de-
scribes a similar situation existing in the ghettos:
The individualization of survival strategies led to a universal scramble for 
roles and positions deemed to be favourable or privileged, and to widespread 
efforts to ingratiate oneself in the eyes of the oppressors—invariably at the 
other victims’ expense.62
Nonetheless, a strong divide has often been constructed between victim 
behavior in the camps and victim behavior in the ghetto environment, 
with philosophers, historians, and other scholars judging the behavior 
of the prewar and wartime Jewish leadership in various European coun-
tries according to clear-cut moral standards. Indeed, the various con-
troversies over the behavior of “privileged” Jews reveal a longstanding 
tradition of passing judgment on them.
In terms of ethical discussions that focus specifi cally on the behavior 
of “privileged” Jews, Levi’s refl ection on the grey zone stands almost 
alone. The few other exceptions include writings by Massimo Giuliani, 
Abigail Rosenthal, and Richard Rubenstein.63 Like Levi, Giuliani and 
Rosenthal conclude that “privileged” Jews should not be judged. On the 
other hand, Rubenstein’s direct response to Levi’s attempt to represent 
Rumkowski as a morally ambiguous fi gure rejects the survivor’s mora-
torium on judgment and concludes that “in Rumkowski the gray zone 
had turned black.”64 Likewise, David Jones argues in his study entitled 
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Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust (1999) that many Jewish leaders 
were “blameworthy” for “collaborating” with the Nazis.65 Also problem-
atic are Ervin Staub’s brief refl ections on the Jewish councils, which 
attempt to classify the “psychological experience” of Jewish leaders by 
examining the possible effects of various contextual factors on the like-
lihood of resistance. Staub concludes that “many Jews must have pro-
gressed along a continuum of victimization and abandoned themselves 
to the currents that invariably led to destruction.”66 Signifi cantly, Ru-
benstein, Jones, and Staub draw heavily on Hilberg’s work (the subject 
of chapter 2), adopting the very negative judgments of Jewish leaders 
that they seem, at times, to be critiquing. The problem of judgment 
that Levi highlights is further evident in the furor sparked by Han-
nah Arendt’s writings on Jewish councils; the controversial treatment 
of former “privileged” Jews in the years following the Second World 
War; and the historiographical debate over Jewish responses to Nazi 
persecution.
In evaluating Jewish behavior, Arendt makes a distinction between 
what she calls the “limited freedom of decision and of action” in the 
ghettos and the utter lack of choice in the camps, which she views as 
having inhibited any possibility of effective resistance.67 Her major 
Figure 0.6. A group portrait of members of the Warsaw Ghetto Jewish police 
(#48568). Courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives
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study, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), stresses the unparalleled 
“total domination” of the prisoners in Nazi camps, including the inten-
tional and systematic erasure of Jews’ legal status, personal identity, 
and moral being. At one point, Arendt describes a situation that to some 
degree refl ects Langer’s concept of a “choiceless choice”:
When a man is faced with the alternative of betraying and thus murdering 
his friends or of sending his wife and children, for whom he is in every sense 
responsible, to their death; when even suicide would mean the immediate 
murder of his own family—how is he to decide? The alternative is no longer 
between good and evil, but between murder and murder.68
Adopting an apparently sympathetic attitude, Arendt suggests that 
there is “no moral problem” regarding Jewish behavior in the camps be-
cause of the extreme situations that confronted the prisoners (although 
ironically, the dilemma she describes above appears to more closely fi t 
the circumstances of the Jewish police in the ghettos).69 On the other 
hand, after attending the Israeli trial of the perpetrator Adolf Eichmann 
in 1961, Arendt published Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which she aggres-
sively censures the activities of the Judenräte and Jewish police. While 
some argue that Arendt never intended to judge the Jewish leaders,70 
her language clearly condemns their actions. Arendt draws heavily on 
Hilberg’s work, arguing that without the “collaboration” of Jewish lead-
ers, “the total number of victims would hardly have been between four 
and a half and six million people.”71 Many critics contest the depth of 
Arendt’s understanding of conditions in the ghettos and her sweeping 
generalizations regarding the Judenräte.72
Criticisms of Jewish behavior began long before the Eichmann trial. 
Indeed, denunciations of the “inaction” of Jews were made during the 
war itself by members of the Jewish resistance. Such criticism is ex-
emplifi ed in the partisan leader Abba Kovner’s oft-repeated declaration 
that the Jews of the Vilna Ghetto must not go to their deaths like “sheep 
to the slaughter.”73 There was also considerable confl ict between the 
Judenräte and resistance groups in the ghettos, and “privileged” Jews 
in the camps were vilifi ed both during and after the war.74 After the 
liberation, a number of Kapos, including Jewish Kapos, were murdered 
as “collaborators” by survivors or executed en masse by Soviet forces.75 
The problem of judgment became a divisive issue in Israel when public 
discoveries and denunciations of former “privileged” Jews led to what 
came to be known as the “Kapo Trials” (1951–1964).76 During the ap-
proximately forty trials that took place, several defendants were acquit-
ted; those found guilty were given light sentences; and the one case of a 
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death penalty was commuted to a ten-year imprisonment.77 Idith Zertal 
suggests that the trials were “purges” motivated by political agendas 
and aimed at “the lowly and the trivial.”78 These problematic trials of 
Jewish “collaborators” serve as the basis of Kapo, one of the documen-
tary fi lms to be analyzed in chapter 3.
A statement in a postwar report by Rudolf Kastner, a former Jewish 
leader in Hungary and the focus of the most prominent legal case in-
volving a “privileged” Jew, closely refl ects Levi’s ideas in its account of 
the situation Judenrat offi cials faced:
Common sense is almost incapable of drawing the line between self-sacrifi ce 
and betrayal. … To judge the Judenräte after the fact, on the basis of testi-
monies, documents and sources—this is a task that is beyond the capacity of 
any human tribunal.79
Lawrence Douglas writes that the demonization of Kastner, who was 
accused by the presiding judge of selling his “soul to the devil,” reveals 
the widespread tendency to examine Jewish behavior in “Manichean 
terms.”80 Later, in the formation of Israel’s national identity, themes of 
resistance and martyrdom superseded criticisms of survivor behavior. 
These developments underline the importance of Levi’s warning against 
ethical Manicheanisms and discourses about “heroism,” which cannot 
encapsulate the complex ethical dilemmas of “privileged” Jews. The his-
toriographical debate over Jewish behavior during the Holocaust has 
also pivoted on the binary opposition constructed by the terms “collabo-
ration” and “resistance,” further bearing out the problem of judgment.
The debate over Jewish responses to Nazi persecution often condemns 
or glorifi es Jews who, depending on the judgment, are labeled “collabo-
rators” or “resisters” respectively. This arguably simplifi es the complex 
infl uences on, and nature of, Jewish behavior and deviates considerably 
from Levi’s warning against employing ethical Manicheanisms. Discus-
sions of “collaboration” fi rst arose in the context of the Vichy regime’s 
relationship with the Nazis in France,81 and the negative connotations 
of the term render its use in relation to “privileged” Jews dubious at 
best.82 In what might align more closely with Levi’s ideas, Yehuda Bau-
er’s refl ection on “privileged” Jews in Rethinking the Holocaust (2001) 
usefully distinguishes between “cooperation,” which he says signifi es 
“unwillingly yielding to superior force,” and “collaboration,” which he 
says stands for “collusion based on identical ideological premises or a 
conviction that the Germans would win the war.”83 Under these defi ni-
tions, Jews seldom, if ever, collaborated with their Nazi oppressors. On 
the other hand, the judgment and representation of the controversial 
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behavior of “privileged” Jews often hinges on the positive appraisal, if 
not glorifi cation, of Jewish “resistance.”
The disagreement between historians regarding what constitutes 
Jewish resistance during the Holocaust has often involved those who 
argue that resistance is characterized only by armed action and those 
who extend the concept to incorporate more passive forms.84 Hilberg 
conceptualizes Jewish resistance as referring exclusively to direct op-
position that impeded the perpetrator, and he is very critical of Jewish 
leaders for not having encouraged this response. Yet there is an exten-
sive literature that disputes claims made by Hilberg in The Destruction 
of the European Jews that resistance was unusual, and which stresses 
the vast array of obstacles to armed resistance in the camps and ghet-
tos.85 Hilberg’s defi nition of resistance is considerably narrower than 
Bauer’s more inclusive defi nition, which includes any conscious ac-
tion—individual or collective, armed or unarmed—that was taken “in 
opposition to known or surmised laws, actions and intentions” directed 
against Jews by Germans and their collaborators.86 Despite disagree-
ments over its defi nition and scope, “resistance” is generally perceived 
as involving clear-cut, virtuous acts that can be portrayed in an unam-
biguous, “heroic” manner. Indeed, Levi’s characterization of the in-
habitants of the grey zone seems to exclude any individuals involved in 
active “resistance.”
Levi writes of those “privileged” political prisoners who were also 
“members of secret defense organisations,” stating that these func-
tionaries “were not at all, or only apparently, collaborators, but on 
the contrary were camoufl aged opponents.”87 In this way, he seems to 
view resistance and the behavior of “privileged” Jews as incompatible, 
separate phenomena. Likewise, Philip Friedman views anything that 
constitutes “non-collaboration” as Jewish resistance.88 I argue that this 
issue is far from clear-cut due to the inherently ambiguous nature of 
some acts of resistance on the part of victims. To be sure, many acts of 
what may be termed “resistance” by “privileged” Jews might also be 
seen to involve an element of “moral compromise.” For example, Gisella 
Perl and Miklos Nyiszli, who were both prisoner doctors in Auschwitz-
Birkenau, saved fellow prisoners from death while simultaneously aid-
ing Josef Mengele in his medical experiments.89 There are also many 
accounts of members of the Jewish police rescuing individual Jews from 
deportation while participating in the process of rounding up others.90 
Such extreme situations not only render judgment problematic, but 
raise considerable challenges for representation. With these interre-
lated problems in mind, judgment is conceptualized here as a “limit” of 
representation.
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Approaching Liminal Figures: Judgment 
as a “Limit” of Representation
Conventional vocabulary limps through a situation that allows no heroic re-
sponse, no acceptable gesture of protest. … This predatory profi le of survival, 
when fear of such death, not affi rmation of a basic human dignity, drives 
men and women to behavior they would not consider under normal circum-
stances, confi rms another moment when reality defeats both a language of 
judgment and a mode of moral behavior.
—Lawrence L. Langer, “The Dilemma of Choice in the Deathcamps”91
Despite highlighting major obstacles to the representation of the Holo-
caust, Levi never intimates that it should not be represented. Indeed, 
in response to Theodor Adorno’s oft-cited proclamation that “after 
Auschwitz, to write a poem is barbaric,”92 Levi ironically commented in 
an interview that “after Auschwitz it is barbaric to write poetry except 
about Auschwitz.”93 There is widespread agreement among scholars 
that the question of if the Holocaust should be represented has given 
way to how it should be portrayed.94 Nonetheless, the paradoxical notion 
of “representing the unrepresentable” is a foundational idea underlying 
the writings of the Holocaust historian Saul Friedländer and many oth-
ers, with the problematic variously termed “speaking the unspeakable,” 
“comprehending the incomprehensible,” and so on.95 The impossibility 
yet inevitability of passing judgment on “privileged” Jews (discussed 
further in chapter 1) may be fi tted in here as well.
While a considerable critical literature has been preoccupied with the 
(un)representability of the Holocaust experience, little explicit atten-
tion has been given to the place of moral judgment in representations 
of Jews, particularly those holding “privileged” positions.96 Friedländer 
points out that the events of the Holocaust are often perceived as “so 
extreme and so unusual that they are considered events at the limits, 
posing unique problems of interpretation and representation.”97 He 
addresses the necessity of both maintaining the memory of the past 
through representation and avoiding its distortion in his introduction 
to the seminal collection, Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism 
and the “Final Solution” (1992). He argues that “there are limits to 
representation which should not be but can easily be transgressed. What 
the characteristics of such a transgression are, however, is far more in-
tractable than our defi nitions have so far been able to encompass.”98 By 
highlighting the intersection between Levi’s writing on the grey zone 
and the notion of “representational limits,” I propose that the ethical 
dilemmas confronting “privileged” Jews may be seen to give rise to a 
“limit” of judgment.99
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The problems or “limits” of representation are crucial, for as Claire 
Colebrook writes in her general study of ethics and representation, 
“Representation marks a limit, a point beyond which knowledge cannot 
go: a recognition of the point of view of knowledge. For knowledge’s very 
possibility lies in perspective, point of view, position and fi nitude.”100 
However, the problems with, rather than possibilities of, Holocaust rep-
resentations are often the sole focus of scholarly refl ection. While the 
obstacles encountered by writers and fi lmmakers when representing 
“privileged” Jews are addressed in this book, the chapters that follow 
also highlight the potentialities for a nuanced representation of these 
fi gures. Many commentators contend that conventional techniques, 
whether literary, historiographical, or artistic, are particularly inade-
quate for representing such a traumatic and incomprehensible event as 
the Holocaust. While it appears that the extreme situations confronted 
by “privileged” Jews should be represented, there are undeniably con-
siderable obstacles to doing so in what might be termed an “authentic” 
manner.
One problem to be considered is that the vast majority of “privileged” 
Jews have left no testimony of their own, which raises the question 
of how others can represent their experiences. For instance, very few 
Sonderkommando members lived out the war, and fewer still have spo-
ken of their experiences or written memoirs.101 Annette Wieviorka sug-
gests that “certain categories of survivors” have tended to abstain from 
recalling their experiences, highlighting “privileged” Jews as a case in 
point.102 Nonetheless, those holding “privileged” positions in the camps 
and ghettos make frequent appearances in survivor testimonies and 
other modes of representation.103 In the fi eld of life-writing, G. Couser 
emphasizes the ethical obligations an author has when “representing 
vulnerable subjects,” who “are unable to represent themselves in writ-
ing or to offer meaningful consent to their representation by someone 
else.”104 These problems may be seen to apply more widely to genres 
other than life-writing and are of particular relevance to the situations 
of “privileged” Jews—situations that arguably contribute to the “empa-
thetic incomprehensibility” of the Holocaust.105 As these liminal fi gures 
invariably perished along with other victims of the Holocaust, it is im-
portant to examine representations of them with a critical eye.
The need to suspend moral judgment of “privileged” Jews, as espoused 
by Levi, can be connected to the infl uential anti-redemptory approach 
taken by some theorists of Holocaust representation. For example, 
James Young identifi es what he terms an “anti-redemptory aesthetic” 
in Friedländer’s writings, which self-consciously exposes “its own limi-
tations, its inability to provide eternal answers and stable meaning,” 
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while “call[ing] for an aesthetics that devotes itself primarily to the di-
lemmas of representation, an anti-redemptory history of the Holocaust 
that resists closure, sustains uncertainty, and allows us to live without 
full understanding.”106 Oren Stier likewise stresses the value of a self-
conscious approach, arguing that “the ideal form of Holocaust memory 
bears within it a sense of its own deconstructive potential.”107 Signifi -
cantly, in his refl ection on the problem of judging “privileged” Jews, 
LaCapra writes that “something like a middle voice that suspended judg-
ment or approached it only in the most tentative terms might be called 
for.”108 Through exploring the use of anti-redemptory and self-refl exive 
discourses by some writers and fi lmmakers, I examine the potential for 
these modes to facilitate a nuanced representation of “privileged” Jews, 
if not the suspension of judgment.
One of the premises of this book is that language is never neutral or 
value-free, and I contend that judgment is inherent in all forms of rep-
resentation. Drawing heavily on the work of the postmodern theorist 
Hayden White, William Guynn writes that unmediated representation 
does not exist and that this applies to “all levels and all units of dis-
course.”109 He states:
There is nothing within discourse, written or fi lmic, which bears infallible 
witness to the “truth” or “falsehood” of a fi eld of reference. We accept “truth” 
or judge it according to signs of truth we fi nd in the text, but these signs 
can be—and in certain realist texts both fi ctional and documentary often 
are—simulated.110
Indeed, if one considers Richard Freadman’s discussion of representa-
tion as narration that goes beyond “mere physical ‘facts’” to involve 
“subjective individual feelings, and interpretations of what various 
‘facts’ mean in historical, moral and other terms,”111 it is perhaps un-
surprising that representations of “privileged” Jews are permeated with 
moral judgments of their behavior. An investigation of Levi’s own writ-
ings provides crucial insights into the simultaneous impossibility and 
inevitability of judgment. A massive literature has focused on Levi’s life 
and writings, reinforcing his status as one of the foremost witnesses to 
the Holocaust.112 However, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the implications of his essay on the grey zone for the issue of judgment, 
and there has been no sustained discussion of his own representation of 
“privileged” Jews.
By invoking the need to suspend judgment, Levi implicitly calls for a 
nuanced representation of “privileged” Jews. However, while at times he 
seems confi dent that judgment of “privileged” Jews can be suspended, 
at other times his writing suggests that it is unclear whether suspend-
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ing judgment of these fi gures is possible. Early in “The Grey Zone” he 
writes: “The condition of the offended does not exclude culpability, and 
this is often objectively serious, but I know of no human tribunal to 
which one could delegate the judgment.”113 This statement seems to 
suggest that while “privileged” Jews are to be blamed and found mor-
ally responsible for their behavior, it might be the case that nobody can 
take such a position. In asserting that “privileged” Jews should not be 
judged, it is evident that Levi’s judgment precedes this. Even in the 
midst of questioning the possibility of judgment, he appears to make 
tentative judgments about the behavior of Jews in extremis, suggest-
ing some form of compulsion to judge. While Levi is highly regarded 
for his sophisticated and unemotional prose, his own representation of 
those he argues should not be judged reveals that he himself struggled 
to suspend judgment. Chapter 1, “La ‘Zona Grigia’: The Paradox of 
Judgment in Primo Levi’s ‘Grey Zone,’” explores the evolution of Levi’s 
concept of the grey zone in order to investigate the origins of his ideas. 
Levi’s grey zone is a multilayered, often contradictory concept, and his 
own portrayal of “privileged” Jews highlights the limit of judgment in 
his testimony.
Friedländer stresses that the “limits of representation” apply to 
all forms of representation but always in different ways.114 Indeed, he 
fully expects that the obstacles to understanding the Holocaust will re-
main “even if new forms of historical narrative were to develop, or new 
modes of representation, and even if literature and art were to probe 
the past from unexpected vantage points.”115 With the “limit” of judg-
ment in mind, this book turns to the ways in which judgment is passed 
in the work of Raul Hilberg, documentaries, and fi ction fi lms. It must be 
stressed here that it is not my intention to formulate value judgments 
regarding which genre best represents “privileged” Jews, but to reveal 
the problems and possibilities of representing their experiences and be-
havior in different modes.
In alignment with Arendt’s argument regarding Judenrat complicity, 
Bettelheim writes: “In retrospect, it is quite clear that only utter non-
cooperation on the part of the Jews could have offered a small chance 
of forcing a different solution on Hitler. This conclusion is not an in-
dictment of Jews living or dead, but an empirical fi nding of history.”116 
Such a statement overlooks the crucial importance of the ways in which 
historians construct the past in their research through their selection, 
arrangement, organization, and analysis of their evidence, and it raises 
the question of how these decisions impact on their representation(s) 
of “privileged” Jews. While stressing that historians should be aware 
of the infl uence of their own personal context and ideological outlook, 
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LaCapra notes that objectivity remains “a goal of professional histori-
ography related to the attempt to represent the past as accurately as 
possible.”117 Signifi cantly, he argues that Hilberg’s “unquestionably im-
portant and groundbreaking” study, The Destruction of the European 
Jews, reveals a marked “insensitivity” toward the Judenräte, portray-
ing them “in a distanced and harshly critical way, largely oblivious to 
the double binds or impossible situations in which Nazi policy placed 
these councils.”118 LaCapra’s criticism of Hilberg’s negative judgment 
of “privileged” Jews necessitates the question of how Hilberg reveals 
this judgment in his publications. Chapter 2, “The Judgment of ‘Privi-
leged’ Jews in the Work of Raul Hilberg,” investigates the ways in which 
Hilberg—who positions himself as aiming to “objectively” reveal how 
the Holocaust was possible—judges Jewish leaders of the time. A close 
analysis of the techniques used in Hilberg’s major text and subsequent 
writings examines whether his work shows any engagement with the 
choiceless choices that confronted “privileged” Jews.
Anna Reading notes that “historical texts are in continual re-articu-
lation with other cultural forms through which the past is also handed 
down,” particularly fi lms.119 An ever-expanding literature on Holocaust 
fi lm has contributed much to legitimizing it as an important fi eld of re-
search;120 however, little attention has been given to the ways in which 
fi lms have represented “privileged” Jews. As noted earlier, Levi’s skepti-
cal attitude toward the medium of fi lm had a particularly strong infl u-
ence on his conceptualization of the grey zone. In relation to the main 
concern of this book, relevant and notable examples of documentary 
fi lms and fi ction fi lms are explored in order to highlight the possibilities 
each genre holds for the representation of “privileged” Jews.
An often neglected aspect of the crucial importance of Hilberg’s work 
and persona can be found in his infl uence on Claude Lanzmann’s semi-
nal fi lm, Shoah, which serves as an ideal bridge between my investiga-
tion of Hilberg’s writings and my subsequent analysis of various other 
fi lms. In Shoah, Lanzmann uses the on-screen fi gure of Hilberg to rep-
resent the Jewish leader Adam Czerniakow in a considerably different 
manner from Hilberg’s scholarly publications. Indeed, Shoah may be 
viewed as challenging the strong dichotomy that has developed between 
discussions of “historical” and “imaginative” Holocaust texts and dis-
courses (frequently at the expense of the latter).121 Some commenta-
tors argue that artistic representations are more capable of revealing 
a historical “essence.” Levi himself states that documentary evidence 
“almost never has the power to give us the depths of a human being; for 
this purpose the dramatist or poet are more appropriate than the his-
torian or psychologist.”122 This book therefore investigates what poten-
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tialities for representing “privileged” Jews are revealed in Lanzmann’s 
fi lm and other Holocaust documentaries. Shoah’s intricate relationship 
with history also highlights the need to distinguish between the genres 
of documentary and fi ction fi lm.
In an attempt to defi ne the specifi city of the documentary form, 
Guynn notes that “the documentarist—or rather the plurality of art-
ists and technicians who produce the fi lm—exclude and order, and form 
the discourse in a continuous succession of operations.”123 However, the 
same may be said of the process of producing a fi ction fi lm. Indeed, the 
boundary between nonfi ction and fi ction is often intentionally blurred 
in the medium of fi lm, and some Holocaust-related productions self-
consciously aim to situate themselves in between the two genres.124 
Nonetheless, while the stylistic features of documentary fi lm invariably 
bear similarities to those of fi ction fi lm, along with the preeminence of 
narrative in both genres, documentary may be defi ned by a reliance on 
a so-called “truth claim.” Keith Beattie identifi es the presence of this 
“truth claim” as “a tacit contractual agreement or bond of trust be-
tween documentary producers … and an audience that the representa-
tion is based on the actual socio-historical world, not a fi ctional world 
imaginatively conceived.”125 Documentary fi lmmakers portray “real” 
historical fi gures in certain ways, often through on-screen interviews 
that have been edited in postproduction. Of course, the possession of 
a truth claim—developed through this and other techniques—does not 
mean that documentaries by nature portray history more “accurately” 
than fi ctional representations (although many documentaries implicitly 
suggest this).
The infl uential theorist of documentary representation, Bill Nichols, 
exposes the strategies, structures, and stylistics of documentaries, show-
ing them to be anything but objective vehicles of historical representa-
tion.126 Reworking Nichols’s contention that all documentaries convey 
“a particular viewpoint” or “argument,”127 Noël Carroll characterizes 
such works as consisting of a “presumptive assertion,” or assertive 
stance, that plays on audience expectations of what is “real.”128 Indeed, 
the fundamental tendencies of documentary fi lm have been identifi ed 
elsewhere as not only to “record,” but to “persuade,” “interrogate,” and 
“express.”129 This reveals the prevalence of implicit (and often explicit) 
ideological positions within documentary work, hence it must be asked 
what implications the use of fi lmic techniques in constructing such “ar-
guments” in Holocaust documentaries might have for the judgment of 
“privileged” Jews. Chapter 3, “Bridging History and Cinema: ‘Privi-
leged’ Jews in Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah and Other Holocaust Docu-
mentaries,” will compare and contrast the representation of “privileged” 
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Jews in Lanzmann’s singular fi lm and in what may be considered more 
conventional Holocaust documentaries, principally Ben-Mayor and Set-
ton’s Kapo. Unlike Shoah, the latter fi lm relies on devices such as narra-
tive voiceover, archival footage, and a musical score. Lanzmann’s fi lm is 
particularly interesting in relation to the notion of a documentary fi lm’s 
“assertive stance,” as at times Lanzmann seemingly eschews a concrete 
position regarding “privileged” Jews. On the other hand, Kapo directly 
engages with the problem of judgment by framing its representation 
with details of Israel’s controversial Kapo Trials.
Like documentaries, fi ction fi lms also have ideological underpinnings, 
although the manner in which these are constructed reveals consider-
able differences between the two genres. First, there is the need to take 
into account the wider dissemination and commercial considerations of 
fi ction fi lms. The release of feature fi lms in cinemas, their availability 
in the form of home (and online) entertainment, and their frequent use 
as educational resources in the classroom attests to their importance 
to collective memories of the Holocaust.130 “Mainstream” fi lms are pri-
marily infl uenced by fi nancial considerations in the form of box offi ce 
receipts. While this acknowledgment does not suggest that fi ction fi lms 
are a subject unworthy of analysis, it is important to take into consider-
ation the money-oriented goals of fi lmmakers within this genre. “Hol-
lywood” fi lms in particular prioritize entertainment and often draw on 
conventions such as action, romance, and sentimentality to attract the 
widest audience possible. In order to do this, Holocaust fi ction fi lms may 
romanticize or universalize Jewish resistance by portraying their pro-
tagonists heroically and ending on a sentimental note of survival, hope, 
and triumph. A fi lmmaker’s employment of an emotive musical score 
and sympathetic characterization of certain fi gures, for example, can 
make strong appeals to audience identifi cation. Such a strategy poten-
tially lends itself to clear-cut moral judgments.
Providing an “accurate” portrayal of the Holocaust is generally not 
the primary concern of fi ction fi lmmakers, although much of the litera-
ture on Holocaust fi lm suggests an “authentic” representation of the 
event is a fi lmmaker’s obligation.131 Fiction fi lms are frequently the tar-
get of virulent criticism. Many descriptors are employed by scholars for 
what they perceive as fi lmmakers’ alleged misuse of the Holocaust, in-
cluding (among others) “trivialization,” “banalization,” “vulgarization,” 
“manipulation,” “simplifi cation,” “falsifi cation,” and “exploitation.” 
This perspective is particularly prevalent in critiques of the “American-
ization” or “Hollywoodization” of the Holocaust, refl ected in Langer’s 
statement that “upbeat endings seem to be de rigueur for the American 
imagination, which traditionally buries its tragedies and lets them fes-
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ter in the shadow of forgetfulness.”132 In response to widespread nega-
tive attitudes toward Holocaust cinema, the analysis of fi ction fi lms in 
the fi nal substantive chapter of this book raises the question of whether 
or not the genre has the potential to provide a nuanced representation 
of “privileged” Jews. In contrast to documentary representations of 
actual historical fi gures on the screen, characters in fi ction fi lms are 
constructed through the use of actors and scripted dramatization. Chap-
ter 4, “Portraying ‘Privileged’ Jews in Fiction Films: The Potential to 
Suspend Judgment?” analyzes two considerably different approaches by 
fi lmmakers in their fi ctional dramatization of “privileged” Jews, begin-
ning with the representation of Jewish police in Schindler’s List. The 
reliance on a redemptory aesthetic in Spielberg’s fi lm is then contrasted 
with a recent trend in Holocaust fi ction fi lms that rejects a number of 
mainstream conventions. By engaging directly with Levi’s ideas on the 
problem of judgment, Nelson’s depiction of members of an Auschwitz 
Sonderkommando in The Grey Zone will be shown to self-consciously re-
sist and respond to Spielberg’s sentimental strategies. Just as an explo-
ration of Levi’s multifaceted concept of the grey zone provides a highly 
valuable framework through which to understand the representation 
of “privileged” Jews in Nelson’s fi lm, the engagement with Levi’s ideas 
within The Grey Zone reveals much about Levi’s concept and its atten-
dant problems (and possibilities) of judgment and representation.
The unease that addressing the subject of “privileged” Jews evokes is 
understandable, perhaps even necessary. Responses to the issue at Holo-
caust and Holocaust-related conferences and other public forums seem 
often to be split between intense dismissals of the subject and sincere 
interest in it. Tentative comments and questions that perhaps reveal 
an anxiety about “saying the wrong thing” are common. When I visited 
the Sydney Jewish Museum in Australia, in 2012, I was told by one 
guide that she dared not raise the issue when talking to students and 
other visitors; it was too diffi cult. On the other hand, when I organized 
a fi lm screening relating to this subject at the Jewish Holocaust Centre 
in Melbourne that same year, the interactive discussion and debate be-
tween the panel of guest speakers and the audience lasted more than 
twice as long as the fi lm itself. My experiences of how the issue is negoti-
ated (or otherwise) in the public domain may be far from representative, 
yet two things seem to me to be abundantly clear: that judgments of 
“privileged” Jews are prevalent and that they are also frequently prob-
lematic. The same may be said of the treatment of these fi gures in Ho-
locaust representations across many (or all) genres. In practical terms, 
given the extreme situations they confronted, where refusal to comply 
with their persecutors meant possible, likely, or even certain death, any 
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condemnation of the cooperation of “privileged” Jews—communicated 
explicitly or implicitly—is equivalent to pronouncing “you should have 
died instead (by your own hand or at the hands of the Nazis).” Such a 
judgment under any circumstances is a controversial one, and in the 
circumstances of Holocaust victims perhaps considerably more so. This 
is one reason why refl ecting on the judgments of “privileged” Jews is of 
crucial importance, something that Primo Levi recognizes fully in his 
writing.
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CHAPTER 1
LA “ZONA GRIGIA”
THE PARADOX OF JUDGMENT 
IN PRIMO LEVI’S “GREY ZONE”
R
Having measured up the meanders of the gray zone and pushed to explore the 
darkest side of Auschwitz, not only for judging but mainly for understanding 
the true nature of humans and their limits, is one of the most inestimable 
contributions made by Levi to any future moral philosophy.
—Massimo Giuliani, Centaur in Auschwitz: Refl ections on Primo Levi’s 
Thinking
Considerable attention has been paid by a number of scholars to 
Levi’s controversial notion of the “grey zone.” The concept proved fun-
damental to his understanding of his Auschwitz experiences and has 
since been appropriated, often uncritically, in the fi elds of Holocaust 
studies, philosophy, law, history, theology, feminism, popular culture, 
and human rights issues relating to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.1 
In spite of this, there has been no attempt to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the infl uences on the concept and its evolution, and little has 
been written on Levi’s moral judgments of “privileged” Jews. Recent in-
terpretations and appropriations of the grey zone often misunderstand, 
expand upon, or intentionally depart from Levi’s ideas. This chapter 
returns to Levi’s original concept in order to investigate how he judges 
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the “privileged” Jews he portrays, namely Kapos, Sonderkommandos, 
and Chaim Rumkowski of the Lodz Ghetto. The analysis reveals that 
even Levi himself could not abstain from judging those he argues should 
not be judged. Paradoxically, it would seem, the conceptualization of the 
grey zone warns against judgment but at the same time requires it.
Infl uences on Levi’s Judgment: 
The Evolution of the Grey Zone
Primo Levi was born in Turin, on 31 July 1919, into a highly assimi-
lated Italian-Jewish family. A prolifi c reader who excelled in school, Levi 
had a withdrawn and self-effacing nature, which remained with him 
throughout his life. He obtained his degree in chemistry in July 1941 
despite the increasing anti-Jewish measures introduced by Mussolini’s 
government, with this persecution contributing to his belated sense of 
Jewish identity.2 Joining an untrained and ill-equipped group of parti-
sans in late 1943, Levi was soon captured and, after revealing his Jewish 
background, sent to the Fossoli concentration camp.3 He was then de-
ported to Auschwitz, where he was incarcerated from 22 February 1944 
to 27 January 1945. Levi was selected for work at the Buna/Monow-
itz subcamp (Auschwitz III), several kilometers from the gas chambers 
of Birkenau. Exposed to harsh and degrading conditions, he endured 
manual labor for many months before obtaining a specialist position in 
a chemical laboratory. Levi survived the Lager due only to a combina-
tion of this “privileged” position, perseverance, outside aid, and luck. 
On his return to Italy, Levi told his story obsessively to all around him, 
compiling two memoirs. He worked as a chemical analyst and manager 
at SIVA, a paint factory, for many years and then devoted his retirement 
to writing and talking, participating in hundreds of interviews and vis-
its to schools, and compiling a multitude of stories, essays, and poems.4 
Amidst frequent bouts of acute depression and other health and family 
problems, Levi continued to write and talk about the Holocaust until 11 
April 1987, when he took his own life.
Publishing his essay on the grey zone less than a year before his sui-
cide, Levi addressed a subject that had troubled him since his libera-
tion. During an interview in 1979, shortly before he began writing The 
Drowned and the Saved, he gave a clear indication of the impetus to 
return to the Lager:
I feel in my stomach, in my guts, something that I haven’t quite digested, con-
nected to the theme of the Lager seen again from thirty-fi ve years’ distance. 
After all the polemic about the identifi cation between victim and oppressor, 
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the theme of guilt, the extreme ambiguity of that place, the grey band that 
separated the oppressed from the oppressors [sic].5
From Levi’s initial memoirs of his wartime experiences through to his 
last essays in The Drowned and the Saved, all of his writings, whether 
concerning chemistry, science fi ction, or the Holocaust, are preoccupied 
with the complex nature of humanity. The question of what constitutes 
a “man” was the central enigma that concerned Levi even before his in-
carceration in Auschwitz. It was the camp, perhaps, that allowed him to 
reach some tentative answers, although his ideas were not always con-
sistent, and to the end of his life he would fl uctuate between optimism 
in humanity’s potential and despair at its fallibility.
Lawrence L. Langer argues that Auschwitz had completely “sabo-
taged the ethical vision that [Levi] cherished as a human being.”6 
Nonetheless, Levi was unable or unwilling to abandon his humanist 
foundations completely. While some commentators have credited Levi 
with establishing a new ethical system,7 others contend he was never 
able to escape the ethical abyss left in the Holocaust’s wake.8 Stanislao 
Pugliese sees in Levi’s testimony not just an effort to “bear witness,” 
but also “to search for an ethical line of conduct and moral reasoning 
based on classical humanism but cognizant of humanity’s changed moral 
status after Auschwitz.”9 Similarly, Bryan Cheyette succinctly outlines 
the “ethical uncertainty” at the heart of Levi’s Holocaust writings. 
Emphasizing “the division between Levi’s renowned scientifi c detach-
ment and his profound uncertainties about the effi cacy of any intellec-
tual or moral system,” along with his “tremendous distrust of words,” 
Cheyette qualifi es the common impression of Levi as the dispassionate 
observer to show him caught between the necessity and impossibility 
of representation.10 Cheyette stresses Levi’s “agony” at contemplating 
the vulnerability of Holocaust representations to succumbing so easily 
to stereotypes, with this agony including his own fear of betraying his 
and others’ experiences.11 In an interview in 1975, Levi explicitly dem-
onstrated his awareness that “a human being is a ‘unique,’ complicated 
object” and that “when that object is reduced to a page, even by the best 
writers, it’s reduced to a skeleton.”12
The problems of judgment and (mis)representation were major dilem-
mas for Levi in many more of his writings than just “The Grey Zone.” 
Ian Thomson’s biography points to Levi’s almost obsessive preoccupa-
tion with this theme from the time of his liberation from Auschwitz:
It is not true that Levi turned to unprecedentedly bleak themes in The 
Drowned and the Saved or, as some romantic critics like to believe, that a 
wave of shame and pessimism had washed over him. Bianca Guidetti Serra [a 
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longtime friend] fi rst heard the words “grey zone” from Levi in 1946. “Right 
from the beginning,” she told me in 1992, “there was always this problem 
of understanding what had happened and why men had behaved in the way 
they did. The Drowned and the Saved could just as easily have been Primo’s 
fi rst book as his last book.”13
After choosing a career in science over literature, Levi always insisted 
he had never seriously considered writing before Auschwitz, although 
he did engage in sporadic creative writing throughout his youth, some 
of which shows a strong interest in the (not always virtuous) nature 
of human beings. According to another of Levi’s biographers, “Uomo” 
(“Man”), an unpublished piece written during the war, tells the story of 
a man searching within himself in an attempt to understand his nature, 
only to fi nd darkness and incomprehensibility.14 While Levi’s experience 
in Auschwitz was the watershed event that triggered his interest in 
what would evolve into the grey zone, the concept arose from numerous 
personal, social, and cultural infl uences. Mapping out the development 
of Levi’s ideas on judgment, representation, and the grey zone over time 
reveals that Levi’s refl ections on the issue of “privileged” Jews grew out 
of much more than a mere retrospective contemplation of his eleven 
months in the Lager.
A number of commentators have discussed at length Levi’s deeply 
ingrained humanist sensibilities,15 yet his wartime experiences funda-
mentally challenged his strong belief in human dignity, rationality, and 
responsibility. Levi found himself in close proximity to moral compro-
mise even before his arrival in the Lager. Vanda Maestro, a Jewish in-
mate he fell in love with at Fossoli, spent the night with the camp’s 
Italian commandant in an unsuccessful attempt to save herself from 
deportation.16 Arturo Foà, a 67-year-old Jewish poet who had fanatically 
praised Fascist ideology, was also deported in the same cattle car as Levi. 
Foà’s fellow occupants undoubtedly felt he had betrayed them, and he 
did not survive the journey, although the reasons for his demise remain 
uncertain. Foà’s relatives believe other prisoners on the train beat him 
to death. Levi never wrote about these episodes, and when he was asked 
about Foà, he either denied the alleged murder had occurred or he broke 
down in tears.17 Describing the journey to Auschwitz in his memoir, Levi 
writes: “Many things were then said and done among us; but of these 
it is better that there remain no memory.”18 This obscure line reveals a 
tension between memory and forgetting, representation and silence, the 
impulse to judge and its inappropriateness. Levi would return to these 
dilemmas in his later work.
The corrupting infl uence of Auschwitz on human beings arguably dis-
turbed Levi most and would eventually be depicted with greatest clarity 
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in “The Grey Zone.” As noted earlier, Levi himself survived partly due 
to the “privileges” he obtained from his position in the Buna chemical 
laboratory during the last few months of his imprisonment. Although 
this position did not involve the kind of “moral compromise” that he 
would write about in The Drowned and the Saved, he nonetheless dwelt 
much on the subject of survivor guilt.19 Levi does not hesitate to admit 
to his “condition of privilege” as a chemical specialist and to having 
“deeply assimilated the principal rule of the place, which made it man-
datory that you should fi rst of all take care of yourself.”20 Levi expressed 
much shame over this, particularly in the later years of his life, even 
though he knew such shame was unjustifi ed.
Eager to observe and understand the world around him, Levi took 
mental notes of everything he could, preserving detailed memories of 
the minutiae of camp life that would form the backbone of his memoirs. 
He commented more than once that Auschwitz had been for him a kind 
of university.21 At the beginning of If This Is a Man, he writes that his 
memoir “has not been written in order to formulate new accusations; 
it should be able, rather, to furnish documentation for a quiet study of 
certain aspects of the human mind.”22 Levi’s astuteness and determina-
tion to analyze rather than evoke hatred or pity, aided by his training as 
a chemist, evolved into a scientifi c and philosophical quest to explain—
both to himself and the world—the phenomenon of the Lager. “The 
Drowned and the Saved,” the central chapter and working title of Levi’s 
fi rst memoir, reveals his preoccupation with the issue of victim behavior 
in the camps. Levi provides case studies of four “privileged” individuals: 
Schepschel, who steals to survive and betrays an accomplice in order to 
gain “privilege”; Alfred L., who cleans the eating pots of Polish workers 
for extra rations and has no pity for any fellow prisoners who cross his 
path; Elias, an “insane dwarf” and deceitful functionary who “insolently 
and violently” supervises other inmates; and lastly, Henri, who survives 
by stealing, cultivating the pity of others, and maintaining a cold in-
difference toward those around him. Rachel Falconer notes the “veiled 
judgment” in Levi’s method of “‘gradating’ the ‘crimes’ committed in 
Auschwitz” in this chapter,23 which is not unlike the moral spectrum he 
delineates in the concept of the grey zone, to be discussed further.
Levi writes that “Henri,” an alias for Holocaust survivor Paul Stein-
berg, was sometimes pleasant to talk to and seemed capable of affection. 
However, Levi’s negative judgment is evident in his portrayal of Henri 
as “intent on his hunt and his struggle; hard and distant, enclosed in 
armour, the enemy of all, inhumanly cunning and incomprehensible like 
the Serpent in Genesis. … I know that Henri is living today. I would 
give much to know his life as a free man, but I do not want to see him 
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again.”24 While Levi wrote in an afterword of his deliberate use of “the 
calm, sober language of the witness” in order to avoid explicit judgments 
of his persecutors (much less his fellow victims), it is clear that elements 
of his representation of “privileged” Jews, not least of all his biblical al-
lusion in the above passage, position them as blameworthy.25
As it happened, Steinberg published his own (aptly titled) memoir, 
Speak You Also: A Survivor’s Reckoning, in 1996. The precariousness of 
the act of passing judgment that Levi engaged in is evident when tak-
ing into account Steinberg’s traumatized narrative of his own desperate 
efforts to stay alive through various “privileged” means. A guilt-ridden 
Steinberg twice interrupts his story with chapters he calls “Digres-
sions” in order to address Levi’s portrayal of him. He notes that he was 
only eighteen at the time (four years younger than Levi had claimed) 
and represents himself as “helplessly kicked around by events.”26 Yet 
Steinberg fl uctuates from self-justifi cation to despair at his own behav-
ior, mournfully conceding that
[Levi] must have been right. I probably was that creature obsessed with stay-
ing alive. … Now I feel a sharp sense of regret. Primo Levi is gone, and I’d 
never realized what he thought of me. … Maybe I could have persuaded him 
to change his verdict by showing that there were extenuating circumstances. 
… Can one be so guilty for having survived?27
The fact that Steinberg at times agrees with Levi’s characterization of 
him complicates matters for the reader even further. Even Levi’s long-
time friend Hermann Langbein challenged his negative generaliza-
tions about political prisoners.28 If This Is a Man contains numerous 
other portraits of morally “compromised” characters, ranging from the 
cruelly indifferent to the savagely violent. Levi’s subsequent writings 
provide many more similar portraits, although his judgments tended to 
shift over time.
Despite feeling he had regained his “humanity” after his return to 
Italy, developments in Levi’s personal and professional life continued to 
impact strongly on the evolution of his thoughts about the grey zone. In 
1978, while holding a frustrating managerial position at SIVA, he came 
under investigation for allegedly involuntarily endangering his work-
ers’ lives following several workplace accidents.29 He subsequently al-
luded to Auschwitz when discussing factory life on several occasions.30 
Indeed, Thomson writes that Levi had found himself in “a diffi cult situ-
ation: the more orders he gave at SIVA, the more he felt uncomfortably 
like an Auschwitz Kapo.”31 Recent biographies also place much em-
phasis on the personal anxieties, frequent depressions, and occasional 
thoughts of suicide that plagued Levi throughout his life.32 His depres-
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sions became particularly acute in the 1970s, and in 1975 he began to 
see a psychiatrist.
In September of 1975, Levi proposed to his publisher that he trans-
late The Night of the Girondists, a semi-fi ctional novel written by the 
Dutch-Jewish historian Jacques Presser. The novel constructs a story of 
a young Dutch Jew who survives in the holding camp of Westerbork by 
loading fellow Jews onto trains headed for Auschwitz. Granted permis-
sion for this foray into the shadowy world of “privilege,” Levi completed 
the translation only after considerable mental anguish. He states in his 
foreword to the translation that he had read the book repeatedly and 
was unable to relinquish its hold on his mind. Levi goes on to write what 
would be repeated in almost identical words a decade later in his essay 
on the grey zone:
It is naïve, absurd and historically inaccurate to maintain that an evil system 
like Nazism sanctifi es its victims: quite the reverse, it leaves them soiled 
and degraded, it assimilates them, and all the more so to the degree that 
the victims are at their disposal, virginally innocent of any political or moral 
constructs.33
Here, Levi’s preoccupation with the behavior of Jewish victims is clear. 
His early engagement with the problem of how this behavior might 
be judged can also be seen in his statement that “a typical feature of 
criminal systems like Nazism is that they debilitate and cloud our judg-
ment.”34 At the same time, Levi’s use of descriptors such as “soiled” and 
“degraded” in the passage above reveals that judgment has already been 
passed.
Levi’s involvement in the late 1970s in a documentary being fi lmed 
about Dr. Eduard Wirths, a controversial SS physician in Auschwitz, 
served to reignite his interest in corruption, “collaboration,” and, plau-
sibly, the grey zone.35 In 1983, Levi’s heaviest depression since the 
1960s coincided with his traumatic translation of Franz Kafka’s The 
Trial, a novel that explores the disparity between legality and morality, 
and the subsequent problems of judgment.36 Levi began to see connec-
tions between Kafka’s dark tale of state-induced self-destruction and 
his own work, commenting in an interview that the Lager’s “distortion 
of the world,” where degradation corrupts persecutor and victim alike, 
is “Kafkaesque.”37 Likewise, Langbein’s refl ection on “those who got 
blood on their hands while wearing the striped garb of the inmates” 
in his study People in Auschwitz also anticipates the kind of problems 
Levi’s grey zone evokes.38 Another text seldom cited as important to 
Levi’s ideas on the grey zone is Ella Lingens-Reiner’s memoir, Prisoners 
of Fear, which Levi quotes in The Drowned and the Saved.39 A German 
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political prisoner deported for helping Jews, Lingens-Reiner served as a 
doctor in the Women’s Camp at Birkenau for twenty-six months. In her 
1947 memoir, Lingens-Reiner argues, like Levi, that prisoners survived 
not by behaving with “exemplary correctness,” but by “break[ing] every 
rule governing civilian life.”40 Indeed, at the beginning of her refl ections, 
Lingens-Reiner contends:
It is the fi nal condemnation of a system when it proves to be destructive and 
evil under the most detached and dispassionate examination, taking all the 
mixed human and social motives into account and transmitting the halftones 
as well as the black or white of the extremes.”41
Other literary infl uences that bear direct connections to Levi’s develop-
ment of the “grey zone” are Alessandro Manzoni’s The Betrothed and 
Dante’s Inferno, to which I will return.42 
The decline of Levi’s mother into senility and the indignities of old 
age, the death of several close friends, and Levi’s own failing physical 
health were major causes of his depressive episodes during the fi nal 
years of his life.43 Throughout all of this Levi was struggling with The 
Drowned and the Saved, which was laboriously written, often no more 
than one page per day, between the years 1980 and 1986.44 On 11 Janu-
ary 1987, only three months before his death, Levi published a review 
in La Stampa of one of his favorite childhood books, Jack London’s The 
Call of the Wild.45 The story follows Buck, a dog deported into slavery, 
who becomes the leader of his team by killing his vicious predecessor. In 
describing the transformation of Buck’s “dignity” through his adjust-
ment to his harsh environment, Levi explicitly identifi es a similarity 
between the protagonist’s situation and that of “privileged” prisoners in 
the Lager. He writes that Buck “has killed the leader of the team, he is 
the new team leader. He will be a chief (a Kapo?) even more effi cient than 
Spitz, better at keeping order.”46 Many commentators have connected 
Levi’s suicide to his experiences in Auschwitz, his conceptualization of 
the grey zone, and his apparent despair at the fallibility of humankind.47 
While such a controversial connection need not be made here,48 it is evi-
dent that the grey zone remained with Levi until the end.
Levi’s reasons for writing his last book were many, yet perhaps the 
most important factor to infl uence the development of “The Grey Zone” 
was the failings he perceived in others’ memories, reception, and rep-
resentations of the Holocaust. In 1987, Levi noted in retrospect that he 
had acted on “an immense need to put things in order, to put order back 
into a world of chaos, to explain to myself and others.”49 In his preface 
to The Drowned and the Saved he wrote of his intention “to contribute 
to the clarifi cation of some aspects of the Lager phenomenon which still 
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appear obscure.”50 The words “know” and “understand” permeate the 
collection, as does a concern over the failure of individual and collective 
memory to grasp the unprecedented horror of the Holocaust. Levi felt 
that this problem of reception was particularly evident in young people, 
and by 1983 his frustrations led him to cease visiting schools.51 Even 
Levi’s own children evaded his past.52 Another factor that strengthened 
his need to acknowledge the “grey zone” of ambiguity and “compromise” 
was a growing anxiety about the misleading infl uence of stereotypes. 
This was undoubtedly triggered in part by Levi’s strong and public op-
position to the controversial military activities of Israel, for which the 
twin images of the “heroic” and universally victimized Jew had been 
appropriated.53
In a passage Levi wrote in his 1975 foreword to The Night of the 
Girondists, which he repeated almost verbatim in “The Grey Zone” 
(quoted in the introduction), he states:
There are enough signs to indicate that the time has come to explore the 
space that divides the victims from their executioners, and to go about it with 
considerably more delicacy and clearsightedness than has been evident, for 
instance, in certain well-known recent fi lms. It would take a Manichean to 
argue that such a space is empty. Empty it is not: it is studded with sordid, 
deplorable or pathetic creatures (occasionally the three at once).54
This not only anticipates Levi’s negative attitude toward the “sordid, 
deplorable or pathetic creatures” of the grey zone, but also highlights 
his suspicion of the trivializing effects of popular representations, par-
ticularly in the medium of fi lm. By the time he wrote his pivotal essay, 
a decade of cinema and the production of many more popular repre-
sentations of the Holocaust had not changed his mind. He condemned 
the Italian director Liliani Cavani’s 1974 psychosexual fi lm, The Night 
Porter, which portrays a tormented postwar sexual relationship between 
a former Nazi offi cer and an inmate he had raped in the camp. In “The 
Grey Zone,” Levi argues that Cavani’s simplistic rhetoric, which claims 
that all people are victims and murderers and accept these roles volun-
tarily, is—like her fi lm—“false.”55
Levi was also skeptical of the preoccupation with the Holocaust in 
the United States. In several articles written about the infl uential NBC 
television miniseries Holocaust: The Story of the Family Weiss (1978), 
Levi accuses the production of being fundamentally fl awed in terms of 
its historical substance and generic conventions.56 In a letter to a friend 
Levi acknowledged the benefi ts of the mass dissemination of the mini-
series, but wrote that “it is, however, sad to think that in order to reach 
the man on the street [sic], history has to be simplifi ed and digested 
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to such an extent.”57 In 1985, Levi had even more reason to question 
Hollywood’s integrity when he was informed that his resistance novel If 
Not Now, When? was unlikely to be made into a fi lm. Bernard Gordon, 
a friend who had initially found Levi a Hollywood agent, wrote to him 
that any work that “attempts seriously to deal with the human condi-
tion is immediately suspect in these precincts.”58 The representation of 
“privileged” Jews in fi lm, a medium Levi looked on with considerable 
suspicion, will be examined in later chapters. First, Levi’s own repre-
sentation of the grey zone—and the “privileged” Jews within it—must 
be analyzed.
The Multifaceted Concept of the Grey Zone
Upon close examination, the “grey zone” defi es a clear-cut defi nition, as 
Levi’s writings on the subject elicit many theoretical tensions, shifting 
meanings, and contradictions. To illustrate the complexity of Levi’s con-
cept, Erna Paris paraphrases Christopher Browning’s characterization 
of the grey zone as “that foggy universe of mixed motives, confl icting 
emotions, personal priorities, reluctant choices, opportunism and accom-
modation, all wedded, when convenient, to self-deception and denial.”59 
At times, Levi restricts his grey zone to the “privileged” Jews focused 
on in this book, while at other times he seems to incorporate all pris-
oners and persecutors within “ill-defi ned outlines which both separate 
and join the two camps of masters and servants.”60 Furthermore, Levi 
and many others argue that the grey zone and the associated problems 
of judgment and representation apply not only to the camps, but to the 
ghettos as well, and perhaps further.61 There is also a constant tension 
in Levi’s writings between the grey zone as a metaphorical concept and 
the grey zone as a physical space with specifi c biopolitical origins. While 
in the most abstract sense the grey zone signifi es the “grey” nature of 
all human behavior, the concept simultaneously refers to the sociologi-
cal product of the unprecedented persecution that was the Holocaust. 
In this way, the concept refl ects the much broader debate over the uni-
versality and “uniqueness” of the event.62 Additionally, the grey zone 
exhibits a tension between being an indecipherable realm and a moral 
spectrum, which gives rise to a paradox of judgment—a paradox that has 
signifi cant implications for Levi’s representation of “privileged” Jews.63
In his essay on the grey zone, Levi is concerned with human behav-
ior that resists a simplistic, black-and-white classifi cation of “good” 
or “evil.” In a similar manner to Tzvetan Todorov’s more recent re-
fl ections on the camps, Levi’s writing portrays the victims as neither 
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“heroes” nor “saints,” and their persecutors as neither “monsters” nor 
“beasts.”64 In Levi’s mind, both perpetrators and victims were capable 
of selfl ess and selfi sh acts. From this perspective, the grey zone can be 
seen as a metaphor for the ambiguities of human nature in general. As 
Levi said in an interview in 1983, “There are good people and less good 
people, each of us is a mixture of good and not so good.”65 Black-and-
white Manichean stereotypes only mislead when human beings are over-
whelmingly “grey.” On various occasions, Levi utilized other linguistic 
variants, such as “grey band,” “grey conscience,” and “grey man.”66 And 
throughout “The Grey Zone” Levi makes various comments regarding 
human nature, not least of all through his use of a pivotal quotation re-
garding the corrupting nature of power from Manzoni’s The Betrothed: 
“Those who provoke or oppress, all those who do any wrong to oth-
ers, are guilty not only of the harm they do, but also of the twists they 
cause in the minds of those they have injured.”67 While Levi’s primary 
focus is “privileged” Jews, at times his discussion of “the fundamental 
theme of human ambiguity fatally provoked by oppression” takes on a 
much broader dimension.68 In a similar vein to Manzoni, Levi frequently 
shifts from observations of individual cases of ambiguous behavior to 
universal generalizations on human nature. Indeed, Levi writes that the 
fi gures of the grey zone are “indispensable to know if we want to know 
the human species, if we want to know how to defend our souls when a 
similar test should once more loom before us.”69 In this sense, the grey 
zone is, in Omer Bartov’s words, “a rumination on the condition of hu-
manity itself.”70
On the other hand, the grey zone possesses an important spatial ele-
ment, with the word “zone” connoting a physical area that is cut off 
from its surroundings. From a literary standpoint the camp is intrinsi-
cally linked in Levi’s writings to the color grey. Throughout If This Is a 
Man he makes numerous connections between greyness and various as-
pects of the Auschwitz environment, including bread, clouds, fog, snow, 
sky, dawn, and, most frequently, the inmates themselves: “Everything 
is grey around us, and we are grey.”71 These references continue in The 
Truce, with the Lager described as “a grey and turbid nothing.”72 How-
ever, while the grey zone is strongly attached to certain physical settings, 
its ultimate focus is on moral compromise in extreme situations. Indeed, 
it was both the unprecedented circumstances and environments—the 
Holocaust’s historical specifi city—that forced prisoners into what Levi 
calls the “grey zone.” As explained in the introduction, Jews obtained 
“privileged” positions through dehumanizing experiences in specifi c set-
tings, namely the Nazi concentration camps and the ghettos of Eastern 
Europe. At times Levi also appears to situate prisoners other than the 
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“privileged” within the grey zone, as if all victims might be seen as hav-
ing in some way committed morally ambiguous acts—large or small, 
frequently or infrequently—in order to prolong their lives. Even in his 
fi rst memoir, Levi argued that “survival without renunciation of any 
part of one’s own moral world” was practically impossible.73
In his essay on the grey zone, Levi stresses the impact of extreme co-
ercion on the behavior of all prisoners in Auschwitz. He gives a detailed 
account of the “entry ritual, and the moral collapse which it promoted,” 
which led to a Hobbesian-like environment permeated by a “desperate 
hidden and continuous struggle.”74 Yet this is counterbalanced by his as-
sertions that many individuals, including many of the “privileged” pris-
oners he discusses, were predisposed to morally ambiguous behavior, 
persecution notwithstanding. Following this line of thinking, Levi re-
verts to the universal, claiming that “it is likely that a certain degree of 
man’s domination over man [sic] is inscribed in our genetic patrimony 
as gregarious animals.”75 In a clear example of the tension between pris-
oners being coerced and predisposed to act “immorally,” Levi writes that 
the majority of those who held positions of power in the Lager were 
“human specimens that range[d] from the mediocre to the execrable.”76 
This ever-present tension between the particular and the universal, be-
tween extreme coercion leading to moral compromise and a preexisting 
human inclination to it, is an unresolved—and unacknowledged—aspect 
of Levi’s grey zone. Another tension in Levi’s writing that reveals judg-
ment underpinning his analysis is the simultaneous characterization of 
the “grey zone” as indecipherable realm and moral spectrum.
In light of Levi’s warning against judging “privileged” Jews, the grey 
zone seems to take on the characteristic of an indecipherable realm of 
ambiguity in which preexisting moral frameworks do not apply. Early in 
his essay, Levi writes: “The world into which one was precipitated was 
terrible, yes, but also indecipherable: it did not conform to any model, 
the enemy was all around but also inside, the ‘we’ lost its limits.”77 In-
deed, even in his fi rst memoir, Levi refl ected on the value of acknowl-
edging one’s lack of a “moral system” in the incomprehensible camp 
environment.78 At other times, however, the grey zone gives the impres-
sion of involving a spectrum of (im)morality that requires close and 
careful deliberation, along which inmates and persecutors alike can be 
situated. His analysis of a brief moment of reluctance on the part of SS 
Oberscharführer Eric Mühsfeldt, who was assigned to supervise the kill-
ing process at Birkenau, concludes that he, too, must be placed, “though 
at its extreme boundary, within the grey band.”79 Further evidence of 
Levi’s formulation of a scale of judgment is visible when he writes that 
the grey zone is made up of prisoners who “collaborate[d] to a varying 
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extent with the Lager authorities.”80 In short, while the grey zone as an 
indecipherable realm entails specifi c, unprecedented conditions in rela-
tion to “privileged” Jews and appears to undermine any moral judgment 
of them, it is equally clear that Levi’s grey zone incorporates a moral 
spectrum that implies the culpability of one’s behavior.81
Signifi cantly, Levi alluded to the idea of a moral spectrum as early 
as 1947, in If This Is a Man. Binary oppositions such as “the good and 
the bad” are far less distinct than is generally supposed, he wrote, and 
human behavior allows for “numerous and complex intermediary gra-
dations.”82 Seldom did individuals inhabit the far extremes, he claimed; 
“saints” or “sadists” were, for Levi, an exiguous minority. Amassed to-
ward one end of the moral spectrum are the victims, including those 
who “compromised” themselves in minor ways, while the perpetrators 
in their darker shades are positioned toward the opposite edge. In Mas-
simo Giuliani’s words, Levi uses the grey zone concept to describe “the 
area between the lowest level of victims and the highest level of Nazi ex-
ecutioners.”83 Levi’s characterization of “privileged” Jews demonstrates 
that he places them somewhere in the middle of these extremes. Briefl y 
moving beyond the camps and refl ecting on the broad reach of the “grey 
zone,” he writes at one point that “within this area must be catalogued, 
with different nuances of quality and weight, Quisling in Norway, the Vi-
chy government in France, the Judenrat in Warsaw, the Saló Republic in 
Italy, right down to the Ukrainian and Baltic mercenaries employed else-
where for the fi lthiest tasks … and the Sonderkommandos.”84 Here Levi 
implies that the Judenräte and Sonderkommandos may be compared to 
and contrasted with collaborators for whom the level of coercion was of 
an entirely different kind, if coercion existed at all (which in some cases 
it did not). Indeed, the fact that the collaborationist Vichy regime in 
France’s unoccupied zone, for example, was motivated by entrenched 
anti-Semitism disqualifi es any comparison with the forced cooperation 
of the Jewish leaders and crematorium workers.85 Paradoxically, Levi 
is caught between the need to suspend judgment and the simultaneous 
inescapability of doing so.
The paradox of judgment is also revealed in Levi’s use of a metaphor 
that underpins all of his Holocaust testimony. Inspired by Dante’s In-
ferno, which also explores the problematic zone between good and evil, 
many of Levi’s refl ections pivot on Dante’s two categories: “I sommersi e 
i salvati”—“the drowned” and “the saved.” The “drowned,” Levi writes, 
consist of the Muselmänner, or “Muslims,” the name given by camp in-
mates to the barely conscious “skeletons” of the camps, those name-
less, voiceless prisoners who merely existed on the threshold of death 
and invariably perished in a short period of time.86 In contrast to the 
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“drowned,” the “saved” are those who were able to survive by obtaining 
some means of “privilege.” In an oft-quoted passage, Levi clearly judges 
these prisoners:
The “saved” of the Lager were not the best, those predestined to do good; the 
bearers of a message … Preferably the worst survived, the selfi sh, the violent, 
the insensitive, the collaborators of the “grey zones,” the spies. It was not a 
certain rule (there were none, nor are there certain rules in human matters), 
but it was, nevertheless, a rule. … The worst survived—that is, the fi ttest; 
the best all died.87
The distinction between “saved” and “drowned” seemingly parallels 
that of the survivors and the dead; however, not all “privileged” Jews 
survived—indeed, most did not.
In another important sense, Levi consigns the “privileged” to the 
ranks of the “drowned.” Giuliani points out that the “drowned”/“saved” 
distinction has a double meaning and that the category of the “saved” 
is intrinsically ambiguous.88 While all those who died in the camps were 
certainly “drowned,” those who “collaborated,” whose “dignity” was de-
graded in a different but no less real way from the Muselmänner, were 
also “drowned,” whether or not they survived until liberation. As Levi 
wrote in If This Is a Man:
The personages in these pages are not men. Their humanity is buried, or they 
themselves have buried it, under an offence received or infl icted on someone 
else. The evil and insane SS men, the Kapos, the politicals, the criminals, the 
prominents, great and small … all the grades of the mad hierarchy created by 
the Germans paradoxically fraternized in a uniform internal desolation.89
According to Levi, very few prisoners were able to preserve their dignity 
and survive; the degrading effects of National Socialism were practi-
cally inescapable. Yet generalizing those who survived as being indel-
ibly “compromised”—indeed, as the “worst” human specimens in the 
camp—unquestioningly attributes blame to “privileged” prisoners, whom 
Levi argues constituted the vast majority of survivors.90 Levi clearly sees 
some parallels between Dante’s nine circles of Hell and Auschwitz, and 
while he recognizes the intertextual irony that Jewish prisoners had 
committed no crime, it is signifi cant that both Levi and Dante share no-
tions of varying levels of culpability along which people can be judged.91 
Levi’s shifting opinions over time regarding the Kapos in the camps 
further reveal the paradoxical tension in his writings between the need 
to judge and the importance of suspending judgment. Indeed, the Kapo is 
an omnipresent fi gure in survivor testimonies, generalized and demon-
ized to such an extent that the psychoanalytical memoir of Elie Cohen, 
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who spent sixteen months in Auschwitz, identifi es the Kapo as “that 
type of man who has completely adjusted himself to the camp, which he 
regards as his defi nitive life, and which he desires nothing more than to 
continue. … The Kapo was cruel, and his cruelty must to my mind be 
explained by his identifi cation with the SS.”92 When revising his initial 
version of If This Is a Man, Levi toned down some of his previous de-
scriptions of camp “prominents.” “Alex,” a character based on one of the 
Kapos who supervised Levi, was initially portrayed as an “ugly, violent 
brute, and treacherous,” a harsh description that was removed from 
later editions. Thomson argues this alteration stemmed from Levi’s fear 
of retribution from survivors, although perhaps a case can also be made 
for a growing acknowledgment by Levi of the grey zone.93 To be sure, 
Levi’s narratives contain numerous references to prisoner-functionar-
ies who, while certainly not allies, were not necessarily repugnant. Ex-
hibiting a desire to distinguish between various kinds of supervisors on 
several occasions, Levi points out that due to language barriers among 
prisoners of different nationalities, the reasons for a Kapo’s beating 
were often ambiguous, as such a beating could be interpreted as an 
almost “friendly” incitement to work, a warning, a punishment, or as 
completely senseless.94
Importantly, the vast majority of prisoner-functionaries whom Levi 
describes in his memoirs are criminals and political prisoners, not Jew-
ish inmates. He refers to this crucial distinction in If This Is a Man, de-
scribing one Kapo as “not a Kapo who makes trouble, for he is not a Jew 
and so has no fear of losing his post.”95 Levi later notes that he is “more 
particularly interested in the Jewish prominents, because while the oth-
ers are automatically invested with offi ces as they enter the camp in 
virtue of their natural supremacy, the Jews have to plot and struggle 
hard to gain them.”96 Due to their low position in the Nazis’ racial hi-
erarchy, Jewish Kapos held their life-prolonging “privileged” positions 
much more tentatively. Although Levi acknowledges this, his judgments 
are foreshadowed by his use of words such as “plot,” “betrayal,” “hate-
ful,” “cruel,” and “tyrannical.” To these descriptors he adds the contro-
versial thesis that a Jewish prisoner-functionary’s “capacity for hatred, 
unfulfi lled in the direction of the oppressors, will double back, beyond 
all reason, on the oppressed; and he [sic] will only be satisfi ed when he 
has unloaded on to his underlings the injury received from above.”97 
In contrast to this negative judgment, some years later, in The Truce, 
Levi constructed a relatively sympathetic portrayal of Henek, the fi f-
teen-year-old Kapo of the children’s block who personally performed the 
“selections” for the gas chambers among his subordinates. Describing 
Henek as a “good companion” who “enjoyed splendid physical and spiri-
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tual health,” Levi blandly recounts Henek’s insistence that he felt no 
remorse for performing the “selections” as he could not have survived 
any other way.98 Restraint is also shown in Levi’s short story “The Jug-
gler,” which narrates an incident when “Eddy,” a criminal prisoner and 
Kapo, discovered Levi writing a letter in Auschwitz and dismissed him 
with a warning rather than a severe punishment.99
While Levi had fl uctuated in his judgment of the Kapos, by the time 
“The Grey Zone” was written, he clearly saw them as to some extent 
blameworthy and positioned them along the moral spectrum. Levi 
writes in his essay that “few survivors feel guilty about having delib-
erately damaged, robbed, or beaten a companion: those who did so (the 
Kapos, but not only they) block out the memory.”100 This, of course, im-
plies that they should feel guilty. Indeed, although Levi distinguishes 
Jewish from non-Jewish Kapos as he had before, at no point does he ex-
plicitly suggest the former should be exempt from judgment, as he does 
for the Sonderkommandos and Rumkowski. He makes certain blanket 
statements about all “privileged” prisoners, such as his declaration that 
“before such human cases it is imprudent to hasten to issue a moral 
judgment … the concurrent guilt on the part of the individual big and 
small collaborators (never likeable, never transparent!) is always diffi -
cult to evaluate.”101 Yet Levi’s bracketed personal opinion again reveals 
the paradoxical bind he fi nds himself in. Even in emphasizing the inap-
propriateness of hasty judgment, he slides into a discourse implying the 
blameworthiness and distastefulness of his subjects. Shortly afterward, 
Levi notes that “if I were forced to judge, I would lightheartedly absolve 
all those whose concurrence in the guilt was minimal and for whom 
coercion was of the highest degree,”102 listing a “picturesque fauna” of 
positions that does not include that of a Kapo. Again, in suggesting that 
neither he nor anyone else should cast judgment, Levi communicates 
his moral evaluation nonetheless.
Levi again evokes the notion of a moral spectrum when he writes that 
“judgement becomes more delicate and varied for those who occupied 
commanding positions.”103 He fi nds the Kapos to be a case in point, then 
reveals his own judgment both when he mentions the possibility of re-
sistance by “privileged” prisoners and when he asserts that Kapos were 
individuals predisposed to certain behavior: “Power of such magnitude 
overwhelmingly attracted the human type who is greedy for power.”104 
Negative judgment is further evident in the list of “infi nite nuances and 
motivations” that Levi claims infl uenced the actions of Kapos: “terror, 
ideological seduction, servile imitation of the victor, myopic desire for 
any power whatsoever, even though ridiculously circumscribed in space 
and time, cowardice, and fi nally lucid calculation aimed at eluding the 
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imposed orders and order.”105 Most of the motives Levi identifi es as the 
driving forces behind Kapo behavior suggest more about the internal 
nature or personality of the individual and their supposed freedom of 
choice than the more obvious factor, that of the extreme coercion Ka-
pos—and particularly Jewish Kapos—were confronted with. In describ-
ing at length the “atrocities” committed by Kapos on fellow inmates, 
Levi does not mask his judgment, stating that “the power of these small 
satraps was absolute.”106
The paradoxical bind Levi fi nds himself in is evident toward the end 
of this section of “The Grey Zone”:
It remains true that in the Lager and outside, there exist grey, ambiguous 
persons, ready to compromise. The extreme pressure of the Lager tends to 
increase their ranks; they are the rightful owners of a quota of guilt (which 
grows apace with their freedom of choice), and besides this they are the vec-
tors and instruments of the system’s guilt. … In reality, in the enormous ma-
jority of cases, their behavior was rigidly preordained.107
This passage reveals the unresolved tensions in Levi’s writing between 
the particular and the universal; the human predisposition to “com-
promise” and the unprecedented pressures determining action; and 
between the moral spectrum where blame increases with free will and 
the indecipherable realm of the Lager that “rigidly preordained” one’s 
behavior, thus ruling out moral responsibility. In the end, the need to 
avoid hasty judgment of those who were nonetheless “rightful owners of 
a quota of guilt” places both writer and reader in a situation where judg-
ment is impossible, but yet inevitable. While Levi concedes that survival 
until liberation ultimately came down to chance,108 it is clear that he 
does judge the Kapos and other “privileged” Jews, even those he explic-
itly argues should not be judged.
Representing Those Beyond Judgment
As late as 1979, Levi had not yet committed himself to his call to sus-
pend judgment, stating in an interview that the oppressed “were more 
or less forced into compromises, sometimes very grave compromises, 
which it is very hard indeed to judge. … But they should be judged, and 
above all we should be aware of them and not ignorant.”109 By the time 
The Drowned and the Saved was complete, however, Levi seems to have 
reached the conclusion that one should not pass judgment on “privi-
leged” Jews. Merging the generic boundaries of a survivor’s account 
with philosophical refl ection, “The Grey Zone” sees Levi tentatively 
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take upon himself the task of testifying to the experiences and behav-
ior of these liminal fi gures. Importantly, survivor testimony, which has 
inspired a considerable critical literature, is a genre made up of texts 
that exhibit a wide range of devices, strategies, and intertextual mean-
ings, with survivor narratives constructed through the use of such de-
vices as chronology, description, characterization, dialogue, metaphor, 
and narrative perspective.110 An analysis of the literary techniques Levi 
employs reveals that he is unable to fulfi ll his own requirement of avoid-
ing judgment when representing the extreme situations of “privileged” 
Jews. His refl ections on the Jewish crematorium workers who made up 
the Sonderkommandos, for whom Levi wrote judgment should be sus-
pended, exemplify this.
Levi’s “Crematorium Ravens”
Levi describes the conception and organization of the Sonderkom-
mandos as “National Socialism’s most demonic crime.”111 He details at 
length the horrifi c duties the Sonderkommandos performed under the 
threat—or better, reality—of imminent death, qualifying his description 
of the material benefi ts their work afforded them with the statement, 
“Here one hesitates to speak of privilege.”112 However, when Levi begins 
to describe the few acts of resistance by the “special squads,” he con-
structs a binary opposition underpinned by judgment. Levi notes the 
exception of a group of four hundred Jews from Corfu who refused to 
undertake the gruesome work and were then subsequently killed. Ad-
ditionally, he praises the twelfth Sonderkommando in Birkenau, which 
undertook an armed revolt in October 1944, destroying one crematorium 
in the process.113 Levi had previously mentioned the Birkenau uprising 
twice in his writings but made little comment on the daily activities of 
the Sonderkommandos. He characterizes the Sonderkommando resist-
ers in If This Is a Man as “helpless and exhausted slaves like ourselves, 
[who] had found in themselves the strength to act, to mature the fruits 
of their hatred.”114 In “Resistance in the Camps,” an article published in 
1966, Levi describes the Sonderkommando revolt as “the most impor-
tant episode of active rebellion against Nazi power in the extermination 
camps,” praising its “desperate boldness.”115
Levi uses similar language in his essay on the grey zone; however, 
here he draws a clear distinction, contrasting the Sonderkommando re-
sisters with “the miserable manual labourers of the slaughter … the 
others, those who from one shift to the next preferred a few more weeks 
of life (what a life!) to immediate death.”116 While Levi immediately fol-
lows this by reiterating, “I believe that no one is authorised to judge 
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them, not those who lived through the experience of the Lager and 
even less those who did not live through it,”117 the implicit judgment 
in Levi’s characterization of these “others” is evident. The binary op-
position between “resistance” and “cooperation” on the part of differ-
ent Sonderkommando members is further revealed in a comment Levi 
made in an interview in 1983, when he pondered whether he would have 
resisted rather than become one of these “others”:
My fi rst reaction is to say that there is no possibility of resilience in the face 
of such violence. I ask myself what I would have done if it had happened to 
me, whether I would have had the courage to kill myself, to let myself be 
killed if I had been offered the task? Perhaps they didn’t understand at fi rst 
what they were being asked to do. There are some cases of people who pre-
ferred to let themselves be killed rather than join the Sonderkommando, but 
there are many who didn’t.118
While Levi cannot defi nitively answer the question he asks of himself, 
his judgment is nevertheless evident when he notes that to prefer im-
mediate death required “courage,” which he appears to consider more 
virtuous than continuing with the work.
Levi’s somewhat negative judgment of the crematorium workers is 
revealed in various ways throughout his essay, such as when he inac-
curately suggests they were “in a permanent state of complete debase-
ment and prostration” due to the alcohol to which they had access.119 
While drinking was used as a coping mechanism in the Sonderkomman-
dos, the prisoners had to be both physically and mentally capable of 
enduring the grueling work, which often lasted twelve hours or longer 
at a time. Levi also makes an arguably disparaging claim regarding the 
Sonderkommando testimonies written amidst the inferno and buried 
for posterity at Birkenau. He asserts that “from men who have known 
such extreme destitution one cannot expect a deposition in the juridical 
sense of the term, but something that is at once a lament, a curse, an ex-
piation, and an attempt to justify and rehabilitate themselves.”120 While 
the memoirs and manuscripts of the Sonderkommandos do sometimes 
contain elements of self-justifi cation, they also provide detailed statis-
tics and descriptions of the extermination process and those involved. In 
any case, Levi’s statement might be seen to suggest that the members of 
the “special squads” need to “justify and rehabilitate” themselves.
Perhaps the most telling indicator of Levi’s judgment of the Sonder-
kommandos is his literary allusion to the monatti of Manzoni’s canonical 
Italian work, The Betrothed. A constant intertextual element through-
out Levi’s writings, Manzoni’s historical novel depicts the city of Milan 
ravaged by plague in the mid-seventeenth century. The fi gures of the 
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monatti are based on the men who removed corpses from the houses and 
streets to mass graves, transported the sick to the lazaretto (contain-
ment area), and burned or fumigated any potentially infected matter. 
Manzoni’s characterization of the monatti is overwhelmingly negative. 
He writes:
The only men who generally took on the work of the monatti … were those 
more attracted by rapine and licence than terrifi ed of contagion or suscep-
tible to natural feelings of revulsion. … They entered houses as masters, as 
enemies, and (not to mention their thieving or treatment of the wretched 
creatures reduced by plague to passing through their hands) they would 
lay those foul and infected hands on healthy people, on children, parents, 
wives, or husbands, threatening to drag them off to the lazaretto unless they 
ransomed themselves or got others to ransom them with money. … [They] 
let infected clothes drop from their carts on purpose, in order to propagate 
and foster the plague, for it had become a livelihood, a reign, a festival for 
them.121
Later in the novel some of these “depraved creatures” are described as 
drinking alcohol while sitting on a pile of corpses, with one exclaiming, 
“Long live the plague, and death to the rabble!”122 While the historical 
parallel with the Sonderkommandos may in some ways seem apt, Levi’s 
intertextual reference also draws on Manzoni’s judgment. 
At one point, Manzoni describes a “fi lthy monatto” as briefl y showing 
“a kind of unusual respect and involuntary hesitation” when faced with 
the body of a young girl killed by the plague.123 It is here that Levi makes 
a connection to a unique incident in Birkenau, when a young girl sur-
vived the gas chamber and was temporarily cared for by the Sonderkom-
mando members who found her. Levi describes these Jews, “debased 
by alcohol and the daily slaughter,” as “transformed” by the survivor’s 
presence, although she was discovered and executed soon after.124 The 
parallel Levi makes between Manzoni’s monatti and the Sonderkom-
mandos seems to involve more than a brief moment of pity, particularly 
when considering Levi’s concluding comment that “compassion and 
brutality can coexist in the same individual and in the same moment.”125 
Employing a rhetorical shift from the particular to the universal, Levi 
seems to suggest that the crematorium workers were in some way pre-
disposed to undertake the work they did. In the words of the poet Mi-
chael O’Siadhail, in Levi’s representation, the Sonderkommandos had 
“fallen beyond his compassion’s greyest zone.”126 While Levi, albeit un-
successfully, stresses that the Sonderkommandos should not be subject 
to moral evaluation, he argues that “the same impotentia judicandi pa-
ralyses us when confronted by the Rumkowski case.”127
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Judging Chaim Rumkowski
Levi concludes his essay on the “grey zone” with a detailed discussion of 
Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski (1877–1944), an elderly, failed Jewish in-
dustrialist who served as the president of the Lodz Ghetto from October 
1939 to August 1944.128 Due to being located in Poland’s most impor-
tant manufacturing region, the fi nancial and material value of the Lodz 
Ghetto to the Nazis helped ensure that it was the longest surviving of all 
the ghettos, although its peak population of approximately 160,000 was 
continuously whittled away by starvation, disease, and deportations. 
The constant vulnerability of Jews in the Lodz Ghetto is indicated by the 
Nazis’ “fi rm promise” to the city administration in mid-1940, just as the 
ghetto was sealed off, that Jews would be “completely removed” from it 
by early October of that year.129 By maintaining the required levels of 
production, the Jewish community’s offi cials believed that even as the 
extermination of Jews was well under way (although the time when this 
became clear to Jewish leaders is diffi cult to evaluate), at least a rem-
nant could be saved. This seems to be the theory that Rumkowski based 
his actions on, and he was not unique among Judenrat leaders in think-
ing this. Appointed Älteste der Juden (“Elder of the Jews”) in late 1939, 
Figure 1.1. Mordechai Chaim Rumkowski, head of the Jewish Council in 
the Lodz Ghetto, and other offi cials pose for a group portrait underneath a 
banner and a large portrait of Rumkowski (#25335). Courtesy of USHMM 
Photo Archives
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the fact that all other members of the Jewish Council were executed and 
replaced soon after, and that he himself later died in Auschwitz, demon-
strates the precariousness of such a “privileged” position.
Rumkowski oversaw the running of the Lodz Ghetto until its liquida-
tion just several months before the end of the war. It has been hypoth-
esized that without the Soviet army’s controversial decision to delay its 
advance into Poland by halting at the Vistula River, little more than 100 
kilometers from Lodz, up to 80,000 Jews may have been saved and Rum-
kowski may have been memorialized as a savior rather than a traitor.130 
It is undeniable that Rumkowski himself suffered persecution at the 
hands of the Nazis. We know that he was physically beaten and that his 
phones were tapped.131 Nonetheless, for various reasons, Rumkowski 
has become the most despised “privileged” Jew in all survivor testi-
mony concerning the Lodz Ghetto. Such is the controversy surrounding 
Rumkowski that Lucille Eichengreen’s memoir, Rumkowski and the Or-
phans of Lodz, is structured around her scathing critique of the Jewish 
leader.132 A frequent point of reference in representations of Rumkowski 
is his so-called “Give me your children!” speech of 4 September 1942, in 
which he reportedly explained the need to “sacrifi ce” those less likely to 
survive in order to save the ghetto’s remaining population.133 In a recent 
memoir, Abraham Biderman describes Rumkowski as a “medieval des-
pot” who “play[ed] poker with the devil.”134 Even Jacob Robinson, who 
vigorously defended the Judenrat offi cials against Hannah Arendt’s po-
lemics, contends that “Rumkowski’s behaviour is open to criticism.”135 
While Levi’s negative judgment of Rumkowski is usually (though not 
always) more subtle than this, his evaluation of the Jewish leader is 
evident throughout “The Grey Zone.”
Levi’s interest in Rumkowski was piqued long before he wrote The 
Drowned and the Saved. Indeed, the analysis he provides in his last 
book is almost identical to his earlier attempt to come to grips with the 
Jewish leader’s behavior described in Levi’s “Story of a Coin,” which 
began as a newspaper article and was eventually published in 1981 in 
Moments of Reprieve.136 The fact that Levi had previously written only 
about “privileged” Jews in settings and situations he had witnessed or 
experienced directly is indicative of his personal compulsion to explore 
the case studies of Rumkowski and the Sonderkommandos. While Levi 
does not seem prepared, at least consciously, to condemn Rumkowski, 
he does write that Rumkowski’s apparent “natural” will to power “does 
not exonerate him from his responsibilities”:
If he had survived his own tragedy, and the tragedy of the ghetto which he 
contaminated, superimposing on it his histrionic image, no tribunal would 
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have absolved him, nor certainly can we absolve him on the moral plane. But 
there are extenuating circumstances: an infernal order such as National So-
cialism was, exercises a frightful power of corruption, against which it is dif-
fi cult to guard oneself. … To resist it a truly solid moral armature is needed, 
and the one available to Chaim Rumkowski … together with his entire gen-
eration, was fragile.137
In this passage Levi seems to suggest that Rumkowski is legally and 
morally guilty (since the absolution that he suggests is inappropriate 
implies guilt). On the other hand, he also points to the ineffi cacy of le-
gal institutions and moral faculties in judging “privileged” Jews. Levi’s 
argument that Rumkowski cannot be judged due to “extenuating cir-
cumstances” is therefore contradicted by his suggestion that the Jewish 
leader had “contaminated” the ghetto, a statement which distracts one 
from the extreme coercion that he and other Jewish council members 
were subjected to. Having already mentioned the production of ghetto 
currency, stamps, and songs that Rumkowski had dedicated to himself, 
Levi reinforces his judgment that the Jewish leader forced “his histri-
onic image” on the ghetto’s inhabitants.138
While conceding that Rumkowski’s position was “intrinsically fright-
ful,” Levi also writes that “the four years of his [Rumkowski’s] presi-
dency or more exactly, his dictatorship, were an astonishing tangle of 
megalomaniacal dream, barbaric vitality, and real diplomatic and orga-
nizational ability.”139 While Levi portrays Rumkowski as demonstrat-
ing a genuine concern for many of his subordinates at times, he also 
characterizes him as possessing an arrogant sense of self-importance 
that proved detrimental to many of the ghetto’s Jews. His representa-
tion of the much reviled Jewish leader is replete with negative descrip-
tors such as “authoritarian,” “renegade,” and “accomplice.”140 Levi also 
links Rumkowski with the moral standards (or lack thereof) that he per-
ceives in the Kapos, describing him as a “corrupt satrap” who displays 
the “identifi cation with the oppressor” condemned earlier in his essay.141 
Indeed, Levi becomes more explicit toward the end of “The Grey Zone,” 
not only drawing a parallel between Rumkowski and “the Kapos and 
Lager functionaries,” but also with “the small hierarchs who serve a 
regime to whose misdeeds they are willingly blind; of the subordinates 
who sign everything because a signature costs little; of those who shake 
their heads but acquiesce; those who say, ‘If I did not do it, someone else 
worse than I would.’”142 By generalizing Rumkowski’s “complicity” in 
this way and making reference to the postwar excuse common among 
captured Holocaust perpetrators, Levi arguably verges on blurring the 
distinction between victim and persecutor, a distinction he had gone to 
great lengths to emphasize several pages earlier.
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Confi dently claiming that Rumkowski “passionately loved authority,” 
Levi positions him as a self-proclaimed “King of the Jews” who “rode 
through the streets of his minuscule kingdom, streets crowded with beg-
gars and postulants.”143 This refl ects the fact that Levi was infl uenced by 
Leslie Epstein’s controversial 1979 novel, King of the Jews, which was 
also initially to be the title of Levi’s “Story of a Coin.”144 By turns scan-
dalous, compassionate, and perverse, the protagonist of Epstein’s fi c-
tionalized narrative develops an almost mythological aspect, fl uctuating 
between dedicated representative and egotistical dictator of the ghetto. 
Levi’s representation also shifts between positive and negative evalua-
tions of Rumkowski’s character, which arguably results in a more nu-
anced portrayal of the Jewish leader than is generally found elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, the precariousness of Levi’s undertaking is evident in the 
manner in which he frequently prefaces his critical comments about 
Rumkowski. When Levi writes that his subject “must have progressively 
convinced himself that he was a Messiah,” that “it is probable that Rum-
kowski thought of himself not as a servant but as a Lord,” and that “he 
must have taken his own authority seriously,” his representation reveals 
certain assumptions underpinning his judgment, despite the extremely 
Figure 1.2. Rumkowski leaves the site of a public demonstration in the Lodz 
Ghetto after delivering a speech to calm the people’s fear and anger about food 
provisioning in the ghetto. Also pictured are Leon Rozenblat (walking with 
Rumkowski) and Shmuel Eizmann (the Jewish leader’s bodyguard, behind 
Rumkowski, to the right) (#63024). Courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives
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complex circumstances at issue.145 In any case, Levi clearly expects that 
the reader will adopt his judgment.
In the same way that Levi implies the Kapos and crematorium work-
ers were to some extent predisposed by nature to morally ambiguous 
behavior, there is a clear sense that he thinks the same of Rumkowski. 
After explicating the addictive and corruptive qualities of “power,” Levi 
writes:
If the interpretation of a Rumkowski intoxicated with power is valid, it must 
be admitted that the intoxication occurred not because of, but rather despite, 
the ghetto environment; that is, it is so powerful as to prevail even under con-
ditions that would seem to be designed to extinguish all individual will.146
Signifi cantly, this is the fi rst time Levi explicitly prioritizes the infl uence 
of the human predisposition to “compromise”—in this case, Rumkow-
ski’s alleged lust for power—over the impact of external factors, namely 
the choiceless choices imposed by the Nazi regime.
Most tellingly of all, when Levi states that Rumkowski “must be placed 
in this band of half-consciences,” he adds that “whether high or low it is 
diffi cult to say.”147 The imagery invoked of a “band” along which “privi-
leged” Jews are situated at various points returns us to the paradoxical 
conceptualization of the grey zone as both an indecipherable realm and 
a moral spectrum. Refl ecting on where Rumkowski should be positioned 
on this moral continuum, Levi alludes to the impossibility of judgment 
through his expression of uncertainty, his acknowledgment that “it is 
diffi cult to say.” Levi’s call for a suspension of judgment is also evident 
in his self-refl exive, rhetorical movements from the particular to the 
universal. The end of his essay, for example, transforms into a general 
digression on the corruptive infl uence of power. Having questioned the 
possibility of judging the Jewish leader, Levi states, “We are all mirrored 
in Rumkowski, his ambiguity is ours.”148 Nonetheless, Levi’s judgment 
is again revealed in his allusion to Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. 
Just as Levi drew on Manzoni’s demonized monatti in his judgment of 
the Sonderkommandos, he explicitly compares Rumkowski with Angelo, 
the devious and hypocritical villain of Shakespeare’s play, who uses his 
position of power for personal gain and attempts to have a man executed 
for a crime he himself committed.149
Levi’s search for a universal lesson in the experiences of “privileged” 
Jews, who are both ostensibly beyond—but at the same time subject 
to—his judgment, is again highlighted in the closing lines of his essay. 
Shifting once more from the particular to the universal, Levi provides 
another self-refl exive, pessimistic extrapolation from the historically 
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Figure 1.3. Rumkowski in conversation with Hans Biebow, head of the 
Gettoverwaltung [German ghetto administration] (#29112). Courtesy of 
USHMM Photo Archives
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specifi c ethical dilemmas confronting “privileged” Jews to a despairing 
social commentary on human nature:
Like Rumkowski, we too are so dazzled by power and prestige as to forget our 
essential fragility: willingly or not we come to terms with power, forgetting 
that we are all in the ghetto, that the ghetto is walled in, that outside the 
ghetto reign the lords of death and that close by the train is waiting.150
Raniero Speelman argues that “this may be the most pregnant of Levi’s 
sayings and the nucleus of his philosophy. These words link the Shoah 
to us, just like we are already linked to the Shoah.”151 In placing us in 
the position of the Jewish leader—or at the very least acknowledging 
the possibility that we may one day be faced with such pressures under 
similar circumstances—Levi makes a genuine, if ultimately unsuccess-
ful, effort to suspend judgment of Rumkowski.
Levi’s essay on the grey zone starkly reveals the limit of judgment 
one confronts when engaging with the unprecedented ethical dilemmas 
of “privileged” Jews. Returning to Levi’s original ideas in relation to the 
grey zone, this chapter has exposed a paradox of judgment underpin-
ning his refl ections, as it would seem to be the case that even if moral 
judgment of “privileged” Jews is inappropriate, it is also inevitable. The 
product of a multitude of personal, social, and cultural infl uences, Levi’s 
attitude toward the problem of judgment and the behavior of “privi-
leged” Jews changed over time. He was strongly infl uenced by what 
he perceived to be misrepresentations of the Holocaust, particularly in 
history and fi lm. Warning of “excessive simplifi cations,” Levi nonethe-
less holds that the grey zone comprises “a phenomenon of fundamental 
importance for the historian, the psychologist and the sociologist,”152 
revealing his belief that modes of representation other than survivor 
testimony should engage with the sensitive issue of “privileged” Jews.
Toward the end of “The Grey Zone,” Levi raises a crucial point that 
cannot be easily set aside: like most “privileged” Jews, the only words 
about Rumkowski that we lack and can never obtain are his own. Levi 
writes that only Rumkowski could clarify his situation “if he could 
speak before us, even lying, as perhaps he always lied, to himself also; 
he would in any case help us understand him, as every defendant helps 
his judge.”153 Faced with this problem, it has been the ongoing task of 
the scholar to piece together the debris of the past to approach a better 
understanding of it. Judgment plays a crucial role in this. By explicitly 
and self-refl exively engaging with this complex issue, Levi invokes the 
need to suspend judgment when representing “privileged” Jews yet is 
himself compelled to judge Rumkowski. As noted in the introduction, 
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the behavior of Jewish leaders has been a subject of considerable con-
troversy. This is particularly evident in the treatment of the Jüdenräte 
in the work of Raul Hilberg, to which I now turn.
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CHAPTER 2
THE JUDGMENT OF “PRIVILEGED” JEWS 
IN THE WORK OF RAUL HILBERG
R
To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own peo-
ple is undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story. It had been 
known about before, but it has now been exposed for the fi rst time in all its 
pathetic and sordid detail by Raul Hilberg.
—Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
The limit of judgment in relation to “privileged” Jews is crucially im-
portant to a consideration of Hilberg’s work, the widespread impact of 
which cannot be underestimated. His seminal study, The Destruction 
of the European Jews, has been praised by many as “the single most 
important work on the Holocaust,” and Hilberg himself has been char-
acterized as “the single most important historian” in the fi eld.1 Fur-
thermore, the above epigraph makes clear that Arendt’s controversial 
arguments regarding Jewish leaders (see the introduction) drew heav-
ily on Hilberg’s pioneering work. This chapter investigates the part of 
Hilberg’s work that deals with “privileged” Jews, in order to provide a 
thematic analysis of the means by which Hilberg passes his overwhelm-
ingly negative judgments on this group of Holocaust victims.
Hilberg’s judgments are conveyed in diverse ways due to the eclec -
tic nature of his publications, in which the subject of the Judenräte—
which has received considerable attention in Holocaust historiography—
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makes frequent appearances. From situating Jewish councils within the 
institutional framework of the Nazi perpetrators to constructing a moral 
spectrum along which individual Jewish leaders are placed, Hilberg’s 
reliance on retrospective evaluations, his selection of sources, and his 
use of emplotment, commentary, irony, and organizational charts repre-
sent “privileged” Jews in an often problematic manner. His arguments 
regarding Jewish passivity have inspired a large number of strong re-
sponses, and Hilberg’s controversial persona has impacted heavily on 
the vigorous debates relating directly or indirectly to the issue of “privi-
leged” Jews.
In The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi places great importance 
on the potential of historians to counter the problems he perceives in 
popular representations of the Holocaust. At one point, he describes “the 
gap that exists and grows wider every year between things as they were 
down there and things as they are represented by the current imagina-
tion fed by approximate books, fi lms and myths.” Levi emphasizes that 
it remains “the task of the historian to bridge this gap.”2 Nonetheless, 
he remained suspicious of the prevalence of misleading ethical Mani-
cheanisms in Holocaust history, and little explicit reference to Levi’s 
ideas is made in Hilberg’s numerous publications. In his contribution to 
a recent anthology inspired by Levi’s concept of the grey zone, Hilberg 
acknowledges Levi’s “command not to make judgments” but does not 
take the opportunity to refl ect upon his own controversial evaluations of 
Jewish behavior.3 Indeed, the notion that one should suspend judgment 
of “privileged” Jews is entirely absent from Hilberg’s work, which rarely 
refl ects on the choiceless choices confronting these liminal fi gures and 
gives little indication of the problematic “area” that Levi identifi ed.
Signifi cantly, Hilberg and Levi’s very different approaches to attempt-
ing to understand the Holocaust were key infl uences on Claude Lanz-
mann’s Shoah (1985), the principal fi lm to be discussed in chapter 3. 
Indeed, key elements of Lanzmann’s fi lm pivot on the on-screen pres-
ence of Hilberg himself. As we will see, Hilberg’s work, particularly his 
preoccupation with the Warsaw Ghetto leader Adam Czerniakow, con-
stitutes an intrinsic part of Shoah’s mode of representation. For these 
reasons, Hilberg’s work and persona occupy a crucial mediatory position 
between Levi’s writings and Holocaust fi lm. A close analysis illustrates 
that the judgment of Jewish leaders in Hilberg’s work differs substan-
tially in nature from Levi’s attempt to suspend judgment. Yet, as in the 
case of Levi, Hilberg’s personal background can be seen to shed some 
light on the processes of judgment he engages in.
Born in Vienna, in 1926, Raul Hilberg was barely an adolescent when 
his country became part of the Third Reich, his parents’ assets were 
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expropriated, and his father was briefl y arrested. This persecution trig-
gered his family’s emigration to the United States in 1939. After a rela-
tively brief and uneventful experience serving as an American soldier 
in Europe, Hilberg learned that much of his extended family had died 
in the Holocaust. In the war’s aftermath, he worked as a member of 
the United States’ War Documentation Project, which gave him access 
to extensive German records. He immersed himself in countless Nazi 
documents for many years, completing his studies and starting work 
in 1948 on a PhD, upon which The Destruction of the European Jews 
(fi rst published in 1961) was based. With something like the feverish im-
pulse of those survivors who feel compelled to testify, Hilberg undertook 
the task of exposing the mechanisms underpinning what he termed the 
“destruction process.”4 Explaining the bureaucratic nature of the Holo-
caust’s implementation became, in Hilberg’s words, “the principal task 
of my life.”5 Hilberg held an academic position as a political scientist at 
the University of Vermont in Burlington from 1956 until his retirement 
in 1991. Throughout his long career, he found himself at the center of 
many disputes regarding Jewish behavior, which will be detailed fur-
ther. Hilberg died in 2007.
Just as several scholars have identifi ed the development of an ethical 
system in Levi’s writings, John K. Roth devotes a complete chapter of 
his volume Ethics During and After the Holocaust (2005) to the “ethical 
insights” in Hilberg’s work, in which he writes:
If one is looking for Hilberg’s ethics in the projects that have occupied his 
life, the task is a complex one of detection because there is a need to consider 
not only what he says overtly and explicitly, but also what is not said but still 
conveyed, what is left in silence but nonetheless voiced, what is pointed at 
but not directly.6
Amidst his discussion of Hilberg’s moods, principles, virtues, and ethi-
cal groundings, Roth only briefl y refers to his subject’s moral judgments 
of Jews. He notes that Hilberg “assesses responsibility where he must, 
but with empathy for the constraints and pressures that faced a Jewish 
leader such as Czerniakow, who led the Jewish Council in the Warsaw 
Ghetto.”7 Hilberg’s strong preoccupation with the role of Czerniakow 
will be discussed further, although considering Roth’s earlier engage-
ment with the diffi cult case of Calel Perechodnik, a member of the Jew-
ish police, and his later discussion of Levi’s grey zone, it is curious to 
note that he does not question Hilberg’s apparent imperative to judge.8 
Roth’s analysis of Hilberg’s ethics identifi es three sources of the histo-
rian’s “moral insight”: his lifelong commitment to Holocaust studies, 
after having been spared from the war himself; his resultant under-
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standing that the Holocaust “reveals an immense moral failure” of or-
dinary people (rather than “bloodthirsty killers”); and his methods of 
research and (by extension) representation.9 These are also the sources 
and products of Hilberg’s judgment in his writings, evident in the de-
vices he uses to portray the Nazis’ persecution of European Jewry. By 
positioning “privileged” Jews as cogs in the “machinery of destruction,” 
Hilberg passes judgment through, to use Roth’s words, “what is not said 
but still conveyed, what is left in silence but nonetheless voiced, what is 
pointed at but not directly.”
Cogs in the Machine: The Place of Jewish Leaders 
in the Destruction Process
Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews, which focuses on the 
step-by-step implementation of the Holocaust by its perpetrators, has 
taken on an almost Whitman-esque evolution, gradually transforming 
through various editions and translations.10 However, from the publica-
tion of the fi rst edition of his book in 1961 to the release of the third 
edition in 2003, the judgments Hilberg makes regarding “privileged” 
Jews remain consistent. In the preface to the fi rst edition, he writes: 
“We shall not dwell on Jewish suffering, nor shall we explore the social 
characteristics of ghetto life or camp existence.”11 While he generally 
held to this guideline, Hilberg’s brief evaluation of Jewish behavior has 
stirred up more controversy than any other aspect of his research. Of 
the more than a thousand pages in Hilberg’s study, little more than a 
few dozen are dedicated specifi cally to the behavior of Jews. These sec-
tions are mostly located in the introductory and concluding chapters, 
which provide a narrative frame for his detailed account of the “destruc-
tion process.” This notable disproportion may be due to Hilberg’s pri-
oritization of an institutional analysis over a refl ection on individual 
responses to the structural mechanisms involved, an analysis that by 
nature is much more speculative and more diffi cult to fi t into an insti-
tutional framework.
The thematic structure of Hilberg’s study can also be seen to con-
tribute to the way in which judgment of “privileged” Jews, namely the 
Jewish leaders in the ghettos of Eastern Europe, is constructed. Dan 
Stone notes that while The Destruction of the European Jews breaks 
with the “conventional narrative form” based on chronological order, 
“it only does so by replacing it with an even more strongly determined 
sociological narrative.”12 Stone adds that since Hilberg “conceives of the 
Holocaust as being ruled by rigid laws of historical logic emplotted in 
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the narrative as a threefold procedure of defi nition, concentration, and 
annihilation, it is odd that Hilberg feels able to judge the actions of the 
Jews.”13 Notably, Hayden White writes in his study Tropics of Discourse 
that “as a symbolic structure, the historical narrative does not repro-
duce the events it describes; it tells us in what direction to think about 
the events and charges our thought about the events with different 
emotional valences.”14 While only a subsidiary theme of Hilberg’s study 
as a whole, his judgment of victims as being in many ways complicit in 
their own demise is communicated using various methods.
By stating in his opening line that “the Jewish collapse under the 
German assault was a manifestation of failure,”15 Hilberg immediately 
makes his position clear, although his moral judgments of “privileged” 
Jews are usually more subtle in nature. Signifi cantly, he uses the word 
“cooperation” rather than “collaboration” to characterize the behavior 
of “privileged” Jews. Hilberg positions himself throughout his study as 
a political scientist who aims to reveal how the Holocaust was possible. 
His explicit focus is the bureaucratic process that enabled the extermi-
nation of European Jewry to take place rather than the reasons why it 
happened and was able to continue. In the second edition of The Destruc-
tion of the European Jews, Hilberg writes that “the ‘how’ of the event is 
a way of gaining insights into perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. … 
The Jewish community, caught in the thicket of [Nazi] measures, will 
be viewed in terms of what it did and did not do in response to the Ger-
man assault.”16 Long after publishing his research, Hilberg wrote: “I 
did not want to deal with the Jewish Councils. … But I could not stop in 
the middle without completely facing the problem which is quite simply: 
how were the Jews destroyed? Not why, but how?’17 It is already clear 
from these statements how diffi cult, if not impossible, it is to divorce 
one’s recounting of how things happened from one’s judgment of why 
they happened—or, importantly, who is to blame for it.
Not only does Hilberg make vast generalizations about members 
of the Judenräte, but these are frequently subsumed under his blan-
ket criticisms of European Jewry as a whole. He begins his explana-
tion of how the Holocaust happened with a chapter on its “precedents,” 
contending that European Jews had become trapped within a “ghetto 
mentality,” which consisted of traditional reactive patterns to persecu-
tion that drew only on strategies of “alleviation” and “compliance.” He 
writes that while “preventive attack, armed resistance, and revenge 
were almost completely absent in Jewish exilic history … alleviation 
attempts were typical and instantaneous responses.”18 This perspective 
refl ects a major facet of Hilberg’s argument regarding Jewish behav-
ior, which he also spoke of in a lecture he delivered in 1988, at which 
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he described “an eighteen hundred year diaspora in which Jewry was 
always helpless.”19 Through several controversial comparisons between 
examples of Jewish behavior under the Nazis and Jewish responses to 
centuries of persecution, Hilberg prioritizes direct “opposition to the 
perpetrator” as the appropriate response to the Nazis.20 This notion of 
direct physical action essentially spells out his defi nition of “resistance,” 
presented in the introduction to be somewhat narrow. By claiming that 
since a Nazi “agency could marshal only limited resources for a par-
ticular task, the very progress of the operation and its ultimate success 
depended on the mode of the Jewish response,”21 Hilberg implies that 
resistance would have been effective in slowing down or even halting 
the Holocaust, a claim that current historiography strongly contests. 
Indeed, at one point Hilberg directly accuses the European Jewish com-
munity (although this was far from a unifi ed group to begin with) of 
“hastening its own destruction.”22
In his extensive critique of The Destruction of the European Jews, 
Nathan Eck labels Hilberg’s argument as “slander,” condemning it for 
ignoring historical facts and being full of contradictions, errors, and un-
supported theories. Listing several Jewish revolts that Hilberg does not 
mention, Eck points out that the behavior of Diaspora Jews over the 
centuries—and during the Holocaust—should be understood in terms 
of the specifi c socio-historical context, or “objective circumstances,” in 
which Jews found themselves, rather than in terms of the “subjective 
qualities” Hilberg prioritizes.23 While providing a comprehensive analy-
sis of Hilberg’s argument, Eck is mainly concerned with Hilberg’s criti-
cism of Jews in general and does not focus specifi cally on the manner in 
which Hilberg judges victims in “privileged” positions. Indeed, Eck does 
not question the appropriateness of judgment, stating that an aware-
ness of the state of Jewish knowledge is essential for “whoever seeks to 
pass judgment on the conduct and reactions of the Jews.”24 Although 
Hilberg passes judgment on all European Jews, the “privileged” mem-
bers of the ghetto councils occupy much of his attention.
In a retrospective contemplation (or justifi cation) of his views on Jew-
ish responses to Nazi persecution, Hilberg writes in his memoir:
I had included the behavior of the Jewish community in my description be-
cause I saw Jewish institutions as an extension of the German bureaucratic 
machine. I was driven by force of logic to take account of the considerable 
reliance placed by the Germans on Jewish cooperation.25
As shown in this passage—which is one of several similar passages—Hil-
berg refers to the content of his major work as a “description.” Inspired 
by the historian Hans Rosenberg’s course on bureaucracy and Franz 
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Neumann’s analysis of the hierarchical organization of the Nazi state,26 
Hilberg’s model of the “machinery of destruction” implies a degree of 
“objectivity” and moral neutrality. Hilberg notes in his autobiography 
that “the methodological literature that I read emphasized objectivity 
and neutral or value-free words. I was an observer, and it was most im-
portant to me that I write accordingly.”27 Similarities can be seen here 
between the linguistic strategies Hilberg uses and Levi’s statement that 
he “deliberately assumed the calm, sober language of the witness” in 
his own writings.28 However, while Hilberg refl ects on his avoidance of 
emotive words such as “murder” and “executions,” he does not consider 
the more subtle mechanisms or techniques through which judgment can 
be passed.
Hilberg frequently makes use of short, sharp sentences that are be-
reft of emotion and superfl uous elaboration. For example, when evaluat-
ing Jewish efforts to buy enough time to live out the war, his judgment 
is left implicit as he simply writes: “The Jews could not hold on; they 
could not survive by appealing.”29 He also blends both brevity and judg-
ment in his conclusion to the “Precedents” chapter early in his study: 
“We see, therefore, that both perpetrators and victims drew upon their 
age-old experience in dealing with each other. The Germans did it with 
success. The Jews did it with disaster.”30 In his concluding chapter, “Re-
fl ections,” in which he returns to addressing “the role of the Jews in 
their own destruction,”31 Hilberg employs repetition and lists to stress 
the complicity of the Judenräte:
The German administration did not have a special budget for destruction, 
and in the occupied countries it was not abundantly staffed. By and large, 
it did not fi nance ghetto walls, did not keep order in ghetto streets, and did 
not make up deportation lists. German supervisors turned to Jewish councils 
for information, money, labor, or police, and the councils provided them with 
these means every day of the week.32
The portrayal of Nazis “turning to” Judenrat offi cials rather than 
forcing them to cooperate arguably positions the reader to judge these 
“privileged” Jews as willing participants. Just as Hilberg contends that 
widespread resistance would have hampered the genocidal goals of the 
Nazis, he implies that a refusal to cooperate on the part of the councils 
(although he would not have defi ned this as resistance) would also have 
made a signifi cant difference.
Hilberg’s frequent use of irony is also intrinsically linked to his moral 
judgment, as in his statement: “It is a fact, now confi rmed by many 
documents, that the Jews made an attempt to live with Hitler. In many 
cases they failed to escape while there was still time and more often still, 
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they failed to step out of the way when the killers were already upon 
them.”33 The repeated use of “failed,” along with the dubious notion of 
Jews being able to “step out of the way,” again refl ects his negative view 
of Jewish behavior. At other times, Hilberg’s tone moves from ironic to 
sarcastic. Mapping what he characterizes as the continuity of the idea 
among European Jews that economic usefulness could serve as a safe-
guard against all-out persecution, he curtly notes: “Among some Jews 
the conviction grew that Jewry was ‘indispensable.’”34 This mocking re-
mark has curious implications. Does Hilberg mean that the Jews should 
have developed and sustained a mentality that told them they could be 
disposed of at any time? Immediately afterward, he links this accusa-
tion of self-righteousness to the mentality of the Jewish leadership but 
only offers one piece of evidence to support this: the 1922 publication of 
Hugo Bettauer’s The City Without Jews, a fantasy novel that seems to 
suggest Jews were an irreplaceable facet of society.35
The nature of Hilberg’s scholarship leads him to focus on human de-
cisions, their implementation and their consequences; hence the issue 
of moral responsibility inevitably arises, even if he does not address it 
explicitly. He uses an abundance of tables, statistics, lists, maps, organi-
zational charts, and fl ow diagrams to document the destruction process, 
all of which reveal the implicit workings of his judgment. In his chapter 
on the Holocaust’s “precedents,” Hilberg employs a simple visual illus-
tration of what he sees as the fi ve categories of Jewish behavior: “Resis-
tance,” “Alleviation,” “Evasion,” “Paralysis,” and “Compliance.” Under 
these terms (which are given this order), Hilberg provides two parallel 
horizontal lines that are joined by groups of vertical strokes of varying 
numbers under each heading, implying that certain Jewish responses 
(i.e. those with more lines accompanying them) were more prevalent 
than others. This image graphically represents, seemingly in a quantifi -
able, authoritative manner, what is essentially Hilberg’s opinion alone. 
The historian offers no explanation for why he allocates ten marks each 
to alleviation and compliance, two marks each to evasion and paralysis, 
and none to resistance (despite later conceding there were several exam-
ples of this during the war). Instead, Hilberg makes the vague comment 
that in his illustration, “the evasive reaction is not marked as strongly 
as the alleviation attempts.”36 While the use of a diagram such as this 
reinforces the sense of accumulated statistics and careful, “objective” 
deliberation, the table is, in short, unquantifi able, and serves only as a 
vehicle for passing judgment.
Just as Hilberg includes numerous tables to show the hierarchical 
structure of the Nazi bureaucracy, he employs similar devices to repre-
sent what he sees as the Jewish leadership’s involvement in events. In 
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his discussion of the “concentration” of German Jews leading up to the 
war, Hilberg uses a large tree diagram to show the position of the Jewish 
“offi cial community,” or Reichsvereinigung, underneath the supervision 
of the Reich Security Main Offi ce. On the next page, the Jewish lead-
ership is depicted in more detail through a list of positions and names 
shown in a table that resembles the many others throughout Hilberg’s 
study that identify Nazis and collaborators involved in the “machinery 
of destruction.”37 Another tree diagram shows the “German Controls 
over Jewish Councils,” and, more signifi cantly, a simple three-way chart 
links the three individuals forming the “Deportation Machinery in Sa-
lonika,” including the president of the Jewish community, Chief Rabbi 
Koretz.38 After visually connecting Koretz’s name closely to the two 
Nazi authorities above him, Hilberg reinforces his judgment of Koretz 
in the written text by describing him as “an ideal tool for the German 
bureaucrats.”39
In one of the few philosophical discussions of alleged Judenräte “com-
plicity,” Abigail Rosenthal summarizes Hilberg’s charges against Jewish 
leaders as consisting of “fatalism”; “anticipatory compliance”; “admin-
istrative and executive support”; “popular opposition to armed resis-
tance”; “self-deception”; “self-aggrandizement”; “corruption”; “class 
privilege”; and “selection.”40 Despite his assertion early in The Destruc-
tion of the European Jews that Jewish leaders could have effectively re-
sisted the Nazis in practical terms, on a few occasions Hilberg seems to 
sympathize with the extreme situations in which they found themselves. 
Toward the end of his study, he even describes them positively as
… genuine if not always representative Jewish leaders who strove to pro-
tect the Jewish community from the most severe exactions and impositions 
and who tried to normalize Jewish life under the most adverse conditions. … 
The councils could not subvert the continuing process of constriction and 
annihilation.41
Immediately following this passage, however, Hilberg alters his view 
somewhat, commenting that the “Jewish councils were assisting the 
Germans with their good qualities as well as their bad.”42 After discuss-
ing the Nazis’ deception of their Jewish victims, which convinced Jews 
at each stage that the worst had already transpired, Hilberg passes judg-
ment by resorting to a sardonic insult that implies their stupidity: “And 
so it appears that one of the most gigantic hoaxes in world history was 
perpetrated on fi ve million people noted for their intellect.”43 He then 
proceeds to claim that the Jews were more victims of self-deception than 
Nazi deception, again expressing negative judgment.
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The manner in which Hilberg judges “privileged” Jews can also be 
seen through his reliance on retrospective evaluations. In writing about 
the “grey zones” in Hilberg’s work, Gerhard Weinberg warns against 
moral judgment through hindsight, arguing that “it makes little sense 
to attack [Judenrat] leaders and members for not knowing what no one 
else on earth knew at the time: precisely how the tide of battle on the 
Eastern Front would shift and when and how the war would end.”44 Af-
ter stressing at one point how limited the information available to Jew-
ish leaders was, Hilberg writes, “Seldom did the councils ask themselves 
if they should go on without reliable indications that everyone would be 
safe.”45 Curiously, he follows this with two specifi c examples of Judenrat 
leaders repeatedly requesting information regarding deportations and 
being lied to. Hilberg’s claim that some Jewish leaders were able to fi nd 
out more than others suggests that situations varied markedly at dif-
ferent times and in different places, although he continues to employ 
far-reaching generalizations. He also blames Jews for adopting, like the 
Germans, the coping mechanism of euphemistic language.46 Hilberg’s 
sounding of an imperative that even Jews in closed ghettos “had to be-
come conscious of a growing silence outside”47 seems somewhat con-
tradictory considering that some of these ghettos were, for all practical 
purposes, hermetically sealed.
Hilberg’s reliance on retrospective judgments raises a crucial issue 
for Holocaust historiography, one that has been explicated in detail by 
Michael Bernstein in his study Foregone Conclusions: Against Apoca-
lyptic History (1994). Noting in particular the Zionist interpretations of 
Jewish persecution that position the Holocaust as the destined result of 
Jewish life in the Diaspora, Bernstein writes:
Every interpretation of the Shoah that is grounded in a sense of historical 
inevitability resonates with both implicit and often explicit ideological impli-
cations, not so much about the world of the perpetrators of the genocide, or 
about those bystanders who did so little to halt the mass murder, but about 
the lives of the victims themselves.48
Bernstein contends that problematic judgments of victim behavior are 
widespread in early historical accounts. He understands these judgments 
through a phenomenon he terms “backshadowing,” through which “the 
shared knowledge of the outcome of a series of events by narrator and 
listener is used to judge the participants in those events as though they 
too should have known what was to come.”49 Bernstein is particularly 
interested in those historical writings, biographies, and novels that 
construct and condemn the “blindness” and “self-deception” of Austro-
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German Jews, who were apparently unwilling “to save themselves from 
a doom that supposedly was clear to see.”50 However, the concept of 
backshadowing can also be utilized when considering assessments of 
“privileged” Jews, not least in the work of Hilberg, whose reliance on 
retrospect leads at least in part to his passing of clear-cut judgments on 
their behavior.51
Further aspects of Hilberg’s methodology reveal how judgment of 
“privileged” Jews is passed in his work. Again on the subject of the 
Judenräte, Hilberg claims that “Jewish effi ciency in allocating space 
or in distributing rations was an extension of German effectiveness,”52 
rather than a method of sustaining Jewish life in the ghettos. This state-
ment not only communicates moral judgment, but reveals the potential 
problems that arise from relying heavily on the sources and perspectives 
of the perpetrators. In his autobiography, Hilberg expresses his convic-
tion that the destruction process needed to be viewed through the eyes 
of the Nazis: “That the perpetrators’ perspective was the primary path 
to be followed became a doctrine for me, which I never abandoned.”53 
As will be discussed further, this caused problems for Hilberg when he 
tried to fi nd a publisher. Hilberg’s footnotes provide several instances of 
his problematic use of Nazi sources to support his judgment of Jewish 
behavior. For example, in his discussion of Jewish “paralysis” (a nega-
tive term in itself), Hilberg seems to take at face value a German’s ob-
servation of “symptomatic fi dgeting” amongst a community awaiting 
death in Galicia. Even more signifi cantly, he appears to accept uncriti-
cally the connection made by Franz Stangl, Nazi commandant of Sobi-
bor and Treblinka, between Jewish victims and “lemmings.”54 Hilberg 
reinforces his judgment of Jewish leaders in particular when he quotes 
a high-ranking SS offi cer who stated that the Jews “had no organiza-
tion of their own at all, not even an information service. If they had had 
some sort of organization, these people could have been saved by the 
millions; but instead they were taken completely by surprise.”55 Hilberg 
introduces this passage with two lines that refl ect his source’s opinion 
at every turn: “On a Europeanwide scale the Jews had no resistance or-
ganization, no blueprint for armed action, no plan even for psychologi-
cal warfare. They were completely unprepared.”56 It would seem that 
the judgments of the perpetrators have infl uenced the historian.
Hilberg is skeptical of the representativeness and usefulness of sur-
vivor accounts, noting that “survivors are not a random sample of the 
extinct communities, particularly if one looks for typical Jewish reac-
tions and adjustments to the process of destruction. … Understandably 
the survivors seldom speak of those experiences that were most humili-
ating or most embarrassing.”57 Hilberg’s distrust of survivor testimony 
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is equally clear in his statement that “I did use survivor testimony, but 
I also had to acknowledge that the Jewish view of what was happen-
ing was extremely limited. How far do you see when you are boxed in 
to a ghetto or a camp? A few hundred yards?”58 Ironically, the lack of 
perspective to which Hilberg alludes can be directly connected to the 
lack of knowledge for which he criticizes Jewish leaders. In his 1971 
volume, Documents of Destruction, Hilberg characterizes the Judenräte 
and their police forces as “agents of the Germans. They continued to 
obey orders and effi ciently produced results. Several million Jews were 
consequently trapped, not only in the Nazi Reich but in their own com-
munities as well.”59 Noting pointedly that the number of “‘Prominent’ 
Jews did not shrink as fast as the ghetto population at large,” Hilberg 
provides several documents that seem to back up his assessment, fur-
ther revealing how his selective use of sources invokes negative judg-
ment of “privileged” Jews.60
While Nazi documents clearly reveal the bureaucratic nature of the 
destruction process, they render the victims anonymous and are unlikely 
to shed more than a superfi cial light on the ethical dilemmas confront-
ing “privileged” Jews in the camps and ghettos.61 Saul Friedländer, who 
incorporates multiple perspectives in his own history of the Holocaust, 
points out that “the victims’ testimony is our only source for the history 
of their own path to destruction. Their words evoke, in their own cha-
otic way, the depth of their terror, despair, apathetic resignation—and 
total incomprehension.”62 Likewise, Israeli historian Dan Diner argues 
that historians can better comprehend the diffi culties in judging the ex-
treme situations of the Holocaust if they adopt the perspective of the 
Judenräte.63
Even if one dismisses the radical strand of postmodern thought that 
rejects all conceptions of “truth” and “reality,” it is nonetheless widely 
acknowledged that historical representation is governed by a scholar’s 
selection, sequencing, and expression of “the facts” and is thus ulti-
mately incapable of an exact mimesis of the past. All that can be achieved 
in recording history is an approximation of what has occurred; “objec-
tivity” in its larger sense does not exist. While The Destruction of the 
European Jews is arguably the most infl uential study of the Holocaust, 
it is evident that the conventions at work in Hilberg’s representation of 
“privileged” Jews in the ghettos reveal strong negative judgment, de-
spite his implicit claims to impartiality. Indeed, in the last paragraph 
of his concluding chapter entitled “Refl ections,” Hilberg’s moral evalu-
ation of Jewish behavior is explicit: “For the fi rst time … the Jewish 
victims, caught in the straitjacket of their history, plunged themselves 
physically and psychologically into catastrophe.”64 As cogs in Hilberg’s 
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“machinery of destruction,” “privileged” Jews could not escape death, 
just as they were unable to escape his judgment. Later, in undertaking 
a more balanced use of archival and testimonial sources, Hilberg ex-
pressed his judgment in a substantially different form.
A “Spectrum” of Behavior: 
Levels of Judgment in Hilberg’s Writing
In contrast to The Destruction of the European Jews, Hilberg’s tripartite 
analysis in Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 
1933–1945, fi rst published in 1992, focuses on individuals and groups of 
people rather than organizations and events. This constitutes a major 
shift in Hilberg’s style, which he bluntly characterizes in his autobiog-
raphy as “an abandonment of political science.”65 His footnotes testify to 
an expansion in his research to include numerous Jewish sources—both 
primary documents in the form of survivor testimony and, owing to the 
time of writing, a more diverse range of historical interpretations—as 
well as material originating with the Nazis. Perhaps in response to 
the criticism of his earlier views, Hilberg acknowledges in his preface 
that Jews “have remained an amorphous mass.”66 Nonetheless, while 
he stresses in his opening paragraph that victims are a distinct, indis-
soluble group not to be blurred with any other,67 his representation of 
“privileged” Jews reveals that he continues to fi nd them culpable for 
their behavior.
Hilberg’s book is divided into three parts of relatively equal length, 
focusing on the Holocaust’s perpetrators, victims, and bystanders re-
spectively. Hilberg essentially invented this taxonomy, which continues 
to exercise considerable infl uence in Holocaust studies and other fi elds 
of inquiry. The fi rst chapter of the section on victims—and, signifi cantly, 
the chapter that immediately follows the section on Holocaust perpe-
trators—deals with the “Jewish leaders.” Providing a general account 
of the numbers employed in the many Jewish councils, how the posi-
tions were fi lled, the pressures their members faced, and the various 
activities they undertook, he notes that all Judenräte were “burdened 
with problems as crushing as any.”68 However, Hilberg soon turns his 
attention to individuals, providing successive representations of sev-
eral Jewish leaders: Rabbi Leo Baeck of Germany; Dr. Josef Löwenherz 
of Austria; Adam Czerniakow of Warsaw; Chaim Rumkowski of Lodz; 
Ephraim Barasz of Bialystok; and Jacob Gens of the Vilna Ghetto. In 
fact, Hilberg describes his book as consisting of “brief descriptions and 
capsule portraits of people, known and unknown.”69 His use of these 
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vignettes results in a very different mode of representation from his 
predominantly institutional analysis in The Destruction of the European 
Jews; thus his judgment takes on a very different form from that which 
appeared in his previous work.
Hilberg’s discussion of “privileged” Jews in Perpetrators, Victims, By-
standers reveals a process of judgment that in some ways resembles the 
moral spectrum represented in Levi’s essay on the grey zone. However, 
while Levi relies on a spectrum of behavior along which various groups 
are situated, Hilberg constructs a spectrum of individuals, with some 
Jewish offi cials implicitly classifi ed as better or worse than others. The 
clearest indication that Hilberg presents a moral spectrum lies in his 
own admission that his case studies reveal a “spectrum of leaders and 
types of leadership, from old offi ceholders to emerging crisis managers, 
and from a traditional superintendency to the aggressive and internally 
unhampered decision making of a dictator.”70 Hilberg characterizes in-
dividual leaders, from Baeck through to Gens, within this framework. 
In doing so, he briefl y sketches each offi cial’s personal background 
along with some of their experiences and actions in their respective 
organizations.
Hilberg is highly selective and concentrates mainly on those Jewish 
leaders he views negatively, particularly those situated on the “darkest” 
end of the spectrum. In this way, the order in which Baeck, Löwenherz, 
Czerniakow, Rumkowski, Barasz, and Gens are progressively discussed 
is signifi cant, as Hilberg creates the impression that each leader was 
more “compromised” than the one preceding. Beginning with Baeck, 
Hilberg initially represents the elderly leader of Germany’s Reichsver-
einigung in a positive light, even implying that he possessed a measure 
of bravery: “Having turned down all opportunities for emigration, he 
was determined to stay at his post as long as ten Jews were left in Ger-
many. Baeck projected reliability and respectability to the remaining 
Jews, and together with his associates he also presented to the commu-
nity a constellation of reassuring faces.”71 While there is perhaps a hint 
of Hilberg’s customary irony present here, suggesting that such reas-
surance was a problem, any judgment of Baeck is far from condemna-
tory. Even when Hilberg notes the increasingly ambiguous actions of the 
Reichsvereinigung, particularly the supervision of the “effi cient conduct 
of the deportations,” he draws on primary documents to portray Baeck, 
who chaired council meetings as “only a shadowy fi gure who did not 
speak.”72
Hilberg’s negative judgment moves up a level when he turns to 
Löwenherz of Austria. Describing an incident in which the Jewish leader 
was slapped by SS Lieutenant Adolf Eichmann, Hilberg makes an ini-
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tial observation that admits to the powerless position of Jewish leaders, 
who were at the whim of the Nazi authorities. However, characterizing 
Löwenherz as “managerial” and “stately,” Hilberg includes him in his 
matter-of-fact assessment of the “diligent assistance of the community 
machinery” in the country’s fatal deportations of 1941–42. In addition 
to his reference to Jewish organizational “machinery,” Hilberg employs 
a strategy often used in The Destruction of the European Jews by para-
phrasing Eichmann’s comment that he “had the Jewish leaders trotting 
along and working diligently.”73 This leaves the perpetrator’s judgment 
of the victims’ behavior unquestioned. Interestingly, Hilberg only de-
votes four sentences to Czerniakow. Nonetheless, the somewhat positive 
nature of Hilberg’s judgment is clear in the selection of only one aspect 
of Czerniakow’s leadership. In one of his trademark short sentences, 
Hilberg writes: “As chairman of the Warsaw Jewish Council he [Czer-
niakow] had harsh words for Jewish leaders who had fl ed or emigrated 
right after the German invasion. He considered them deserters.”74 Such 
a fl eeting portrayal of Czerniakow is considerably different from his pre-
occupation with what he otherwise sees as the Jewish leader’s naivety 
and shortsightedness (to be discussed further).
In Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, Hilberg provides a stark con-
trast between Czerniakow and Chaim Rumkowski (discussed in chapter 
1). He notes that both leaders rose to the position of council president 
due to the emigration of their predecessors, but describes Rumkowski 
as “a deputy of another kind.”75 He goes on to characterize Rumkows-
ki’s transformation from a failed yet honest businessperson who “man-
aged several orphanages with devotion” to an egotistical and immoral 
“autocrat”:
Increasingly self-assured, Rumkowski accustomed himself to power. Now he 
could reward friends and intimidate adversaries. With every step he focused 
attention on his unique position. When he married again, he chose a woman 
less than half his age. When bank notes were printed in the ghetto, they bore 
his likeness. … Rumkowski presided over his community through periods of 
starvation and deportations for almost fi ve years.76
Hilberg’s vignette of Rumkowski’s behavior, which also refers to his oft-
criticized speeches, makes it clear that Hilberg views every aspect of 
the “privileged” Jew’s personal and professional life as leaving much to 
be desired. Hilberg’s preoccupation with judging Rumkowski precludes 
any acknowledgment that he arguably contributed to Lodz’s status as 
the longest surviving ghetto, which was also the closest to being liber-
ated before its total destruction. Instead, his reference to Rumkowski’s 
fi ve-year rule serves only to highlight the length of time the council elder 
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“presided” over Jewish suffering. There is no sign here of the need to 
suspend judgment, as stressed in Levi’s representation of Rumkowski in 
“The Grey Zone.” Similarly, in his brief account of Barasz’s position of 
power in the Bialystok Ghetto, Hilberg draws on a lone Jewish Council 
document to argue that the once “genuine manager of the community 
organization” became the all-encompassing “man in charge.”77
Hilberg portrays the apparent thirst for power on the part of “privi-
leged” Jews as most virulent in his last example, Jacob Gens, who was 
not a council offi cial but the chief of the Jewish police in the Vilna Ghetto. 
Hilberg depicts Gens as the “prime mover” of the ghetto’s “militariza-
tion” and a corrupt underling who impressed his Nazi overseers. He 
describes at length Gens’s education, military involvement, and radical 
Zionist political inclinations, creating an overall impression of a quite 
unsavory individual. Interestingly, Hilberg does acknowledge the oppor-
tunities Gens had to escape the ghetto, writing that he “chose to remain 
and be judged by history.”78 He then immediately proceeds to elucidate 
what this judgment should be, drawing a parallel with the behavior of 
other Jewish leaders and then suggesting that Gens crossed the line 
of complicity even further by being “in competition” with the ghetto’s 
resistance movement:
In emphasizing a policy of accommodation and production, Gens did not 
differ from other ghetto potentates. … Sure of himself, [he] persisted in his 
course, even while the resisters were in a quandary over the question of risk-
ing severe German retaliation for a chance to fi ght. In this contest Gens pre-
vailed. He drove a wedge between the organizers of resistance and the ghetto 
community. The people followed him.79
Hilberg’s use of italics not only reveals his exasperation that the Jews 
followed their leaders rather than engaging in extremely risky armed 
resistance, but also his judgment of Gens as being far from suitable for 
the position he held. Also of signifi cance is that while Hilberg identifi es 
the ethical dilemma regarding the Nazis’ policy of collective responsibil-
ity that faced members of the Resistance,80 he does not acknowledge 
that Jewish leaders such as Gens faced this very same dilemma.
With his condemnation of Gens, Hilberg’s moral spectrum is com-
plete and is then clarifi ed even further through his criticisms of the 
Jewish leadership in France and Romania. At the end of his chapter, 
Hilberg returns to the subject of Jewish councils in general, reiterat-
ing many of the arguments he proposes in The Destruction of the Euro-
pean Jews: that Jewish leaders only desired stability; relied on petitions 
and compliance; and stressed the need to sustain the ghettos’ economic 
output to avoid becoming superfl uous to their Nazi persecutors.81 By 
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emphasizing small, last-minute concessions such as requests for milk 
to be supplied to children being deported, attempts to reduce deporta-
tion quotas, and pleas for deportations to be undertaken in a “humane 
spirit,” Hilberg implies that such strategies were not only ineffective, 
but hopelessly shortsighted. Yet, refl ecting that Jewish leaders were 
themselves victims caught up in the “cauldron,” Hilberg asks: “How, in 
these circumstances, did they judge their own positions?’82 He fi nds that 
Judenrat offi cials, at least those whose self-perception might be gauged, 
did not view themselves as complicit—although Hilberg makes it clear 
that they should have. Writing that Jewish leaders “did not think that 
they enjoyed undeserved privileges, even though they were aware that 
they ate better and were housed more spaciously than most other Jews,” 
his (seemingly confi dent) gesture toward the mindset of “privileged” 
Jews reveals negative judgment.83
In a move reminiscent of Levi’s conclusion to his essay on the grey 
zone, Hilberg begins the chapter’s last paragraph by shifting from the 
particular to the universal. He states that “Jewish leaders were, in short, 
remarkably similar in their self-perception to rulers all over the world, 
but their role was not normal and for most of them neither was their 
fate.”84 Taking this statement into consideration, Hilberg’s seemingly 
detached, dispassionate list of the grim ends that greeted many of the 
Jewish leaders he discussed reveals more a sense of irony than tragedy. 
Even so, the closeness of Hilberg’s representation at this point to what 
Hayden White would identify as a discourse of tragedy is signifi cant.85 
The ironic inducement of the archetype of the tragic (male) fi gure who 
“falls” (dies) due to “his” own fundamental fl aw(s) could be seen to be 
consistent with the nature of Hilberg’s judgment elsewhere. Hilberg 
does not question the legitimacy of the attempts to impose legal pro-
ceedings on some former council members after the war, and his implicit 
judgment of Rabbi Benjamin Murmelstein, elder of the Theresienstadt 
Ghetto, is equally evident. Hilberg simply reports that Murmelstein had 
“prudently chose[n] a life of anonymity” in Rome and seems to agree 
with the decision of the Jewish community, which “refused to bury him 
near his wife, but allowed him a plot at the edge of the cemetery.”86
While Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders contains no chapter on “re-
sisters” as such, Hilberg includes Jews who engaged in direct, armed 
opposition to the Nazis in a chapter titled “The Unadjusted,” a cate-
gory which also includes those who hid, escaped, or committed suicide. 
Signifi cantly, this constitutes the second-to-last chapter of the section 
on the victims, followed only by a chapter on “The Survivors,” another 
small minority. Hilberg summarizes his chapter on “The Unadjusted” in 
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his book’s preface by constructing a binary opposition that is more re-
fl ective of his earlier work: “Whereas most victims adjusted themselves 
step by step … there was a minority, however small, that did not share 
the adaptations of the multitude.”87 Importantly, Hilberg’s monograph 
makes only one brief mention of a case where “privileged” Jews en-
gaged in an act of resistance, generally portraying them as either the 
indefatigable obstacle to, or target of, others’ resistance efforts. Indeed, 
he gives the impression that “privileged” Jews in the ghettos strongly 
disapproved of any kind of opposition to the Nazis, thereby indicating 
what he thinks they should have done:
In the Jewish councils, no pamphlets were composed and no arguments were 
made to show that any German action was hurtful and morally wrong. No ill 
will was expressed to the Germans. No threats were made to the life of any 
German. No rumors were started that the Allied powers would retaliate for 
the destruction of the Jews.88
Of course, Hilberg does not elucidate what effects such activities might 
have had on the destruction process. Indeed, in mentioning the possibility 
of Allied retaliation, Hilberg temporarily ignores the issue of Nazi retri-
bution, which he acknowledges at length elsewhere. In terms of the as-
sumed need for the Judenräte to demonstrate that Nazi persecution was 
“morally wrong,” few would argue that Jews needed much convincing.
Lastly, in what marks a strong contrast to Levi’s portrayal of the 
majority of survivors as having been “privileged” or “compromised” 
in some way, Hilberg contends that those who survived comprised “a 
remnant of persisters and resisters,” whose psychological makeup con-
sisted of “realism, rapid decision making, and [a] tenacious holding on 
to life.”89 This reinforces his implicit argument that the tide of the Ho-
locaust could have been turned had a greater number of Jews opposed 
their persecutors more directly. In depicting the “unadjusted” as refus-
ing to cooperate “with the perpetrator or their own leadership,”90 Hil-
berg implies that the actions of the Judenräte always had a detrimental 
effect on the ghetto populations. While a number of familiar conceptual 
threads, as well as marked differences in methodology and style, serve 
to both connect and separate Hilberg’s earlier pioneering study and 
Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, his blatant judgment of “privileged” 
Jews in the former is no less evident in the latter. Indeed, Hilberg’s 
work has profoundly infl uenced the historiographical debate surround-
ing the contentious issues of Jewish “resistance” and “collaboration” 
during the Holocaust, and his controversial persona itself has played a 
signifi cant role in this.
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A Holocaust Historian and His “Thirty-year War”: 
Hilberg’s Controversial Persona
Although they are expected to maintain a degree of critical distance, his-
torians are always infl uenced by their personal context and the histori-
cal context in which they live. In his autobiographical work, The Politics 
of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian (1996), Hilberg makes 
little effort to hide his propensity to cast judgment, and he expresses 
dismay at others’ reactions to his ideas. In the fi nal lines of the memoir, 
Hilberg cites H. G. Adler’s characterization of him as representative of a 
generation that is “bewildered, bitter and embittered, accusing and crit-
ical not only vis-à-vis the Germans … but also the Jews.”91 Refl ecting 
on the fi rst time he read this, Hilberg states, “I felt as though Adler had 
peered directly into the core of my being.”92 The tension between the 
universal signifi cance and “unique” character of the Holocaust, which 
contributes to the paradox of judgment in Levi’s “grey zone” (see chap-
ter 1), also appears to have some bearing on Hilberg’s thought. In 1999, 
he commented: “For me the Holocaust was a vast, single event, but I am 
never going to use the word unique, because I recognize that when one 
starts breaking it into pieces, which is my trade, one fi nds completely 
recognizable, ordinary ingredients.”93 Signifi cantly, when Hilberg elabo-
rates on other genocides and draws a specifi c comparison between Rwan-
dan Tutsis and Dutch Jews, it is to make a point about the passivity of 
the victims. So while Hilberg may well agree that the Holocaust was an 
unprecedented phenomenon, there is no evidence—indeed, much to the 
contrary—that he views the event and the human behavior involved in 
it as undermining preexisting moral categories.
At no point in his memoir does Hilberg deny passing judgment on 
Jews, although he does seem to position himself as possessing a greater 
measure of moral neutrality than a close reading of his writings might 
suggest. Contemplating the opposition to his views on Jewish behavior 
during the war, Hilberg writes somewhat patronizingly of the criticism 
of The Destruction of the European Jews:
The fragile nature of the objections hurled against me did not impair their 
durability. … The opposition did not die. Added to the repetition of these 
charges was the accusation that in my subsequent writings I had reiter-
ated and elaborated what I had fi rst said in 1961 about compliant Jewish 
reactions to destruction. I had waged a thirty-year war against the Jewish 
resistance.94
Setting aside the issue of whether such criticisms are “fragile” and the 
telling use of the militaristic reference to a “thirty-year war,” it is Hil-
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berg’s claim to a certain “objectivity” in his work that has been shown 
not to stand up to closer scrutiny. Throughout his esteemed career, Hil-
berg has been a key fi gure of controversy, encountering strong and con-
sistent opposition to his views on Jewish behavior during the Holocaust, 
from the very beginning of his research. Indeed, a brief survey of Hil-
berg’s personal and public experiences demonstrates that the problem-
atic issue of judging Jews proved a crucial facet of his life and career.
Previously considered to be only potential historical sources at best, 
autobiographies have increasingly been thought of as representations of 
the past in themselves. In his volume on autobiographies by historians, 
Jeremy Popkin views this subgenre as “an ambiguous supplement to the 
fi elds of history on the one hand and autobiography on the other.”95 It is 
to be expected that life writing by historians will engage with not only 
their own personal histories, but also the histories they have focused 
on in their research. Furthermore, autobiographies always claim some 
form of historical verifi ability. While inevitably introducing an explicit 
subjectivity into their memoirs, historians still invariably reinforce 
their conviction that historiography is concerned with reconstructing 
“historical truth.”96 Nonetheless, although fi rst-person narratives by 
historians generally refl ect the form and tone of historical writing and 
attempt to gain the reader’s confi dence through their historical perspec-
tive, life writing arguably allows more opportunities for judgments to be 
made without the author’s usual scholarly scrupulousness. Hilberg is no 
exception to this. Popkin even suggests that Hilberg implicitly claims in 
his memoir that his “methods produce a representation of past events 
that is in some sense truer and more accurate than that of those who 
were actually there.”97 This is particularly important when considering 
Hilberg’s earlier dismissal of survivor testimony. Throughout his recol-
lections Hilberg engages at length with the theme of Jewish behavior 
during the Holocaust, primarily by responding to the many criticisms 
of his views by survivors, historians, publishers, and critics alike. In 
its merging of historical and life writing, Hilberg’s memoir stresses the 
legitimacy of the arguments presented in his earlier publications.
Hilberg notes in his memoir that when he submitted his trial master’s 
essay for review, his sponsor “objected only to one passage in the con-
clusion … that the Jews had cooperated in their own destruction.”98 In 
reworking this essay into his doctoral dissertation, which eventually be-
came The Destruction of the European Jews, Hilberg deleted the passage 
as requested, although he notes that he was “silently determined to re-
turn it to my larger work.”99 Even the very fi rst person to read Hilberg’s 
manuscript—his father—expressed concern over the issue.100 In 1958, in 
what proved to be the fi rst of many setbacks on Hilberg’s road to publi-
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cation, Yad Vashem, the prominent Holocaust research and educational 
institution in Jerusalem, anticipated “hostile criticism” of Hilberg’s 
work and refused to participate in the publication of his manuscript. 
Hilberg was given two reasons for this decision: fi rst, the editorial board 
was concerned that his history relied primarily on German sources; and 
second, it had reservations regarding his “appraisal of the Jewish re-
sistance.”101 Interestingly, after quoting the offending letter from Dr. J. 
Melkman, then the general manager of Yad Vashem, Hilberg asserts in 
his memoir that Melkman survived in the Nazi-occupied Netherlands 
through “a precarious privileged position, fi rst in Amsterdam, then in 
the transit camp of Westerbork, and fi nally in Bergen-Belsen.”102 While 
Hilberg states that Melkman’s decision was motivated by Yad Vashem’s 
ideological stance, which prioritized Yiddish and Hebrew sources and 
the theme of resistance, his accusation of “parochial self-preservation” 
may be seen to imply a double-meaning when taking into account Melk-
man’s “privileged” status during the war. Hilberg’s argument regard-
ing Jewish behavior became a further obstacle in 1965 to publication in 
Germany, where it was feared by a potential publishing company that 
the volume could have “very dangerous consequences.”103
Amidst the controversy over Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (see 
the introduction), with which his approach was frequently aligned, Hil-
berg reiterated his views on the Judenräte at a 1963 symposium, only 
to be loudly booed by the forum’s audience and denounced in the open 
discussion that followed.104 He had used an example of a woman and her 
young child standing “passively” while waiting to be shot at the edge of a 
mass grave to illustrate a controversial point about what he saw as “the 
outcome of Jewry’s age-old policy” of compliance.105 Hilberg, who was 
accused of “sadism” during question time, later described his disposition 
during the symposium pithily, in short sentences: “I was not friendly. 
I did not yield, and I was oblivious to the fact that I was tearing open 
unhealed wounds. I was not allowed to fi nish.”106 At times, his self-repre-
sentation in his memoir almost takes on the aspect of a lone crusader:
It has taken me some time to absorb what I should always have known, that 
in my whole approach to the study of the destruction of the Jews I was pitting 
myself against the main current of Jewish thought, that I did not give in, that 
in my research and writing I was pursuing not merely another direction but 
one which was the exact opposite of a signal that pulsated endlessly through 
the Jewish community. … The philistines in my fi eld are everywhere. I am 
surrounded by the commonplace, platitudes, and clichés.107
This somewhat glorifi ed self-representation is equally evident in Hil-
berg’s short article “The Judenrat: Conscious or Unconscious ‘Tool.’” 
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Responding here to Gideon Hausner’s queries about his views on Jew-
ish behavior, Hilberg aggressively invokes what he sees as “a genera-
tional problem” defi ned by “the willingness or the unwillingness to ask 
questions.”108 He describes his evaluation of Jewish complicity not only 
as “critically important” but also “very obvious,” and he ends his article 
with an uncharacteristic exclamation: “If you have diffi culty with me, 
watch the next generation!”109 In a sense, Hilberg constructs a binary op-
position between different interpretations of Jewish behavior, with him-
self at one extreme and the entire academic establishment at the other. 
There appears to be no room for compromise, no room for nuance or doubt 
regarding “the active role of the Jews in their own destruction.”110
Elsewhere in The Politics of Memory, Hilberg uses personal attacks 
on academics to reiterate his judgment of “privileged” Jews. He delib-
erately distances himself from Arendt and opposes the parallels that 
have often been drawn between his position and her remarks regarding 
Jewish leaders in Eichmann in Jerusalem. Hilberg dismisses Arendt’s 
highly infl uential (and controversial) concept of the “banality of evil” 
out of hand and makes a sharp distinction between her evaluation of 
Jewish behavior and his own. Whereas for Arendt the Jewish leaders 
effectively betrayed the communities for which they were responsible, 
Hilberg argues that for him, “the problem was deeper”:
The councils were not only a German tool but also an instrument of the Jew-
ish community. Their strategy was a continuation of the adjustments and 
adaptations practiced by Jews for centuries. I could not separate the Jewish 
leaders from the Jewish population because I believed that these men repre-
sented the essence of a time-honored Jewish reaction to danger.111
This reveals a new dimension of Hilberg’s judgment of Jews, with his 
criticism of those in “privileged” positions during the Holocaust being 
in no way diminished simply because at times he paints his judgments 
with a broader brush. Indeed, the distinctions he draws in his various 
publications between “privileged” and “non-privileged” Jews (despite 
not using these specifi c terms) have been clear. While Hilberg’s work 
avoids the polemical tone and hypothetical statements of Arendt’s book, 
there are some similarities in their views on Jewish complicity, as much 
as Hilberg denies this. Hilberg also denigrates the work of the Holocaust 
historian Lucy Dawidowicz, who criticizes his “rashness in generalizing 
about” Jewish history and claims he “has fl awed his otherwise valuable 
work with uninformed comments and distorted conclusions about Jew-
ish behavior.”112 Hilberg offers only an offhand rebuttal of Dawidowicz’s 
view that nothing could effectively have been done by Jews to prevent 
or halt the Holocaust.113
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Unlike Levi, Hilberg never questions the appropriateness of judging 
“privileged” Jews. Although the historian laments his premature dis-
missal or misinterpretation of historical documents over the years,114 he 
never expresses any doubt about his position in relation to the Jewish 
councils. Indeed, his memoir’s account of the opposition he came up 
against is very self-assured. As Mitchell Hart points out in his analysis 
of The Politics of Memory, Hilberg provides “a sense of his self-perceived 
heroic isolation, of a battle … waged between the solitary soldier for 
truth and all the rest who are satisfi ed with myth. … He sets himself 
up as a scholar under siege, surrounded on all sides by ineptitude, bad 
taste, and dishonesty.”115 After interviewing Hilberg in 1999, Erna Paris 
describes her impression of the historian who, then in his early sev-
enties, was still furious with the criticism of his evaluation of Jewish 
behavior: “His mouth is etched with deep creases, and his speech car-
ries a bitter, ironic edge after a lifetime of unending controversy over 
his work. … At the forefront of his concerns is his reputation and his 
legacy.”116 The complexity and controversial nature of Hilberg’s persona 
is no more evident than in his prolonged engagement with the diary of 
Adam Czerniakow.
Remnants of the Past: The “Ghost 
Inside Czerniakow’s Offi ce”
Around the same time Hilberg was writing Perpetrators, Victims, By-
standers, he published a very critical—in some passages, scathing—
analysis of the Jewish councils entitled “The Ghetto as a Form of Gov-
ernment,” which reviewed Isaiah Trunk’s major study, Judenrat: The 
Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation (1972). Here, 
in writing that “Jewish executives, like the Germans in charge, could 
make use of coercion and take advantage of helplessness,” Hilberg seems 
to imply a similarity in behavior that borders on blurring the distinc-
tion between victim and perpetrator, a distinction that the taxonomy of 
Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders upholds.117 Reiterating his theory that 
the councils were “an essential link in the chain of destructive steps,” he 
passes judgment using his customary irony and short sentences: “First 
the Jewish councils handed over money; then they delivered human be-
ings.”118 He also blames Jewish leaders for being “completely nonpro-
vocative”; emphasizes their “corruption” and other “vices”; and claims, 
using phrasing reminiscent of Arendt, that the actions of the Jewish po-
lice (and presumably the councils) constitute “one of the greatest moral 
disappointments of the Holocaust.”119
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In the fi nal lines of “The Ghetto as a Form of Government,” however, 
Hilberg distinctly changes the tone of his discussion, noting that “the 
moral questions raised over so many years have not been closed; they 
have only become more complicated.”120 He briefl y refl ects on the fate 
of three Jewish leaders—Rumkowski, Gens, and Czerniakow—writing: 
“They were different men by background as well as in their ideas, but 
in the end all three declined to save themselves after they had not suc-
ceeded in saving their people.”121 The way Hilberg connects these three 
“privileged” Jews in this essay differs from the way he positions them 
along a spectrum in Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, although further 
details of their behavior provided earlier in the essay perhaps indicate 
a negative evaluation of them overall. Nonetheless, Hilberg’s increased 
efforts to engage with the situations of those “privileged” Jews he holds 
to account reveal differences in the way he passes judgment, a develop-
ment most evident in his role as coeditor of the English translation of 
Czerniakow’s diary.
Hilberg’s six-year involvement, if not obsession, with Czerniakow’s 
diary further complicates the analysis of judgment in the historian’s 
work. He writes in his autobiography that the “diary became a place, 
a strange locality that I was entering for the fi rst time. I was a voy-
eur, a ghost inside Czerniakow’s offi ce, unobserved, and the longer I 
inhabited that enclosure, the more I saw.”122 Hilberg’s explanatory foot-
notes, which briefl y refer to abbreviations used and individuals or places 
named, accompany the majority of pages comprising Czerniakow’s pains-
takingly recorded entries. Describing Czerniakow as having a “unique” 
vantage point due to his “privileged” position, Hilberg writes: “The 
ghetto marked a sharp separation between perpetrator and victim, but 
Czerniakow was like a bridge.”123 While Czerniakow served as the sole 
link between the Nazi authorities and his fellow Jews of the Warsaw 
Ghetto in a literal way, Hilberg’s choice of word comparing Czerniakow 
to a bridge might also be construed as briefl y gesturing to a “grey” area 
beyond the “sharp separation” of persecutor and persecuted. Indeed, 
Hilberg’s wording is somewhat reminiscent of Levi’s characterization 
of the grey zone as comprising “ill-defi ned outlines which both separate 
and join the two camps of masters and servants.”124
There have been many positive accounts of Czerniakow.125 While 
stopping short of approaching what might be considered empathy, Hil-
berg’s negative judgment of Jewish leaders in general became dulled to 
some extent due to his engagement with Czerniakow’s diary. This may 
be partly due to the fact that after refusing to publish The Destruction 
of the European Jews, Yad Vashem agreed to participate in a joint pub-
lication venture of the diary, albeit with the highly signifi cant proviso 
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that “Hilberg’s footnotes must be factual, identifi ed as his, and under no 
circumstances … evaluative.”126 Noting Hilberg’s disillusionment with 
the less-than-enthusiastic reception of the diary due to its challenging 
of the binary opposition of “good” and “evil,” Annette Wieviorka writes: 
“Reading Czerniakow entails adopting a state of mind that does not 
judge. It entails trying to understand a man and the historical role he 
chose to assume, a role that forced him to face an absolute aporia, until 
he could bear it no longer and committed suicide.”127
Importantly, Hilberg’s introduction to the diary, which is cowritten 
with another of the book’s editors, Stanislaw Staron,128 is preceded by 
another introduction. This piece, written by the diary’s third editor, Jo-
sef Kermisz, gives an overwhelmingly glowing account of Czerniakow’s 
“moral strength” and “devotion to his people.”129 Kermisz stresses the 
Jewish leader’s extensive contribution to the ghetto’s educational, reli-
gious, and cultural activities; the personal suffering he experienced at 
the hands of the Nazis, including multiple arrests; and his opposition 
to the corruption displayed by those surrounding him. Exercising un-
wavering positive judgment, Kermisz seldom broaches the controversy 
surrounding the Jewish leader’s behavior, instead writing that Czernia-
kow “would surrender nothing of his dignity and honor. … In his feeling 
of responsibility, his devotion and persistence, which knew no bounds, 
Czerniakow was outstanding.”130 In one section, Kermisz suggests that 
“perhaps [Czerniakow] did not pay suffi cient attention to the rumors 
in the ghetto and to the serious portents concerning the ghetto’s fate”; 
however, he also implies that this was because Czerniakow was so thor-
oughly “immersed” in his activities elsewhere.131
One can only hypothesize what the reason might be for the English 
translation of the diary to be given two introductions, but it is in any 
case clear that the essay to which Hilberg contributes represents Czer-
niakow in a radically different manner than Kermisz does. Writing in 
a seemingly more formal, “objective” tone than Kermisz, Hilberg com-
piles a detailed record of the Warsaw Ghetto’s history by drawing on 
both archival documents and Czerniakow’s diary entries. Toward the 
beginning of his introduction, he writes:
What sort of man was he? One is tempted to speak of him as overwhelmingly 
ordinary. Often enough, he has been recalled as a kind of non-villain and non-
hero, non-exploiter and non-saint. Several of his contemporaries have even 
attributed to him all of the qualities of nonleadership.132
Here, Hilberg evokes the impressions of others who seem to neither offer 
outright praise of nor ascribe blame to Czerniakow. Allocating the Jew-
ish leader the status of “non-villain and non-hero” might be interpreted 
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as positioning Czerniakow as a fi gure of moral ambiguity; however, a 
close reading of the introduction reveals that judgment is constructed 
in implicit and familiar ways. First, Hilberg situates Czerniakow and 
other members of the Jewish Council within several of the organiza-
tional charts typical of The Destruction of the European Jews. Shortly 
after utilizing a tree diagram that displays the Nazi authorities above 
Czerniakow and the various divisions, including the Jewish police, be-
low him, the written text interprets the signifi cance of the power rela-
tions displayed: “To be sure, the police were entitled to some important 
nonmonetary benefi ts, mainly, as we shall see, meals and larger bread 
rations. Czerniakow, incidentally, remained loyal to his controversial 
police.”133 In the use of phrases such as “to be sure” and “incidentally,” 
Hilberg’s customary irony implicitly judges the “privileges” the Ord-
nungsdienst received and Czerniakow’s complicity in this, despite the 
statement in the previous paragraph that the ghetto’s German Kom-
missar had absolute power over the Council.
Hilberg describes the progression of events by employing subheadings 
based on what he classifi es as major phases of Nazi activities, leading up 
to “Phase V: The Deportations.” The description present in the fi rst 
sentence of this section is signifi cant: “In February 1942, Czerniakow 
watched a Jewish workman install stained-glass windows in the Council 
chambers.”134 This immediately positions the reader to adopt a negative 
attitude toward the Jewish leader’s state of knowledge. Several pages 
of examples from the diary are then used to further illustrate Czerni-
akow’s fl uctuation from apparently being certain of the Nazis’ inten-
tions to doubting them—going from despair to hope. After commenting 
on a notice regarding changes to the Krakow Ghetto and its Judenrat, 
which Czerniakow had found in the offi cial newspaper distributed by 
the Nazis, Hilberg succinctly writes in one of his characteristically short 
sentences: “Czerniakow cut the report out of the paper and placed it 
into the diary.”135 The details that follow reinforce the implicit judgment 
behind Hilberg’s position, including references to a chess tournament 
and concerts that took place in the ghetto while rumors of atrocities 
continued to circulate.
Characterizing Czerniakow as “clinging to residual hopes,” Hilberg 
writes that the Jewish leader “tried not to accept the truth until the very 
last moment.”136 He links what he evidently interprets as Czerniakow’s 
naivety directly to what he wrote daily into his notebooks:
In his diary, Czerniakow does not ask where the deported Jews of Lwów, 
Lublin, or Kraków had been taken. It was not a question commonly verbal-
ized by ghetto leaders. There was in fact no Jewish intelligence network, no 
systematic acquisition of information, no organized verifi cation of rumors 
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and reports. At that very moment, Nazi Germany was “solving” the “Jewish 
problem” in death camps created on Polish territory.137
Hilberg is evidently suggesting that Czerniakow should have asked such 
questions and thus should have taken measures, such as the unlikely 
ones Hilberg lists, to acquire the answers. He makes a similar argument 
regarding all Jewish councils in The Destruction of the European Jews. 
Indeed, by relying on retrospective evaluations, Hilberg’s reference in 
his introduction to the diary to the systematic killing of Jews in Nazi-oc-
cupied Poland overlooks his later comment that Czerniakow inhabited a 
“world of recurring nightmarish problems.”138 Hilberg later wrote about 
the issue of Czerniakow’s state of knowledge in his autobiography, re-
vealing an apparent transformation in his judgment on the matter, per-
haps partly due to his involvement in Claude Lanzmann’s fi lm, Shoah.
Hilberg’s fascination with Czerniakow, along with his participation in 
Lanzmann’s fi lm, complicates the role of his controversial persona even 
further. Hilberg notes that after fi lming was fi nished, Lanzmann said to 
him: “You were Czerniakow.”139 While Roth interprets Lanzmann’s com-
ment as relating to the “understated” linguistic expression that Hilberg 
and Czerniakow seemed to share,140 it may also refl ect their obsessive 
need to record. In fact, Hilberg’s memoir refl ects explicitly on the plau-
sible reasons he became so attached to Czerniakow, pointing to aspects 
of the council elder’s character with which he seems to identify. Hilberg 
notes with apparent admiration the Jewish leader’s “sense of honor, of 
not being allowed to desert his post.”141 In relation to the issue of Czer-
niakow’s state of knowledge, Hilberg goes on to stress the Jewish lead-
er’s eventual realization of the ultimate fate of Jews under the Nazis by 
interpreting the fragmentary information and rumors to which he was 
exposed. Hilberg even appears to view this in a positive light: “Without 
an intelligence organization of any kind, relying only on chance remarks 
by Germans, veiled newspaper accounts, and ever-present rumors, he 
anticipated the bitter end.”142 The positive connotations of this state-
ment contrast strongly with Hilberg’s negative appraisal of Czerniakow 
in his earlier publications, where he criticizes the Jewish leader’s alleg-
edly willed ignorance. Indeed, Hilberg’s last refl ection on Czerniakow in 
his autobiography is a frank and unembellished sentence, perhaps signi-
fying a softened judgment, if not approaching a more “neutral” position: 
“When the deportations began, he wanted to save the Jewish orphans, 
and when he could not secure even their safety, he killed himself.”143
Any gesture to Levi’s grey zone or Lawrence L. Langer’s choiceless 
choices is notably absent from Hilberg’s representation(s) of Jewish 
leaders. Writing at one point of the “options” council offi cials faced, he 
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states his position clearly: “We deal with a sequence of steps in such a 
way that if step one is taken, one becomes a prisoner of that step; if step 
two is taken, one becomes a prisoner of step two; if step three is taken, 
one becomes a prisoner of step three.”144 The idea that Jewish leaders 
may have been prisoners of the “steps” before they were taken—that 
these steps were, as Zygmunt Bauman points out, the only rational 
steps to take—does not appear to be a possibility for Hilberg.145 His pub-
lications reveal that negative judgment is passed in diverse ways, both 
explicit and implicit, depending on the form his representation takes. 
Whether explicating through “force of logic” the place of the Jews in 
the “destruction process,” positioning individual Jewish leaders along 
a spectrum of culpability, or seeking answers from Czerniakow’s diary, 
Hilberg’s personal and professional engagement with the extreme situ-
ations of “privileged” Jews during the Holocaust is engulfed by judg-
ment. This would seem to underline Friedländer’s point that “the link 
between the writing of the history of the Holocaust and the unavoidable 
use of implicit and explicit moral categories in the interpretation and 
narration of the Nazi era remains a major challenge.”146 The same might 
be said of the representation of “privileged” Jews in Holocaust fi lms, the 
focus of the remainder of this book.
Signifi cantly, Hilberg was approached in the early 1980s by the re-
nowned American director Stanley Kubrick, who had admired The De-
struction of the European Jews, for advice on a potential Holocaust fi lm 
project. Hilberg had recommended basing a fi lm on Czerniakow’s diary. 
Perhaps refl ecting the widespread negative judgments of “privileged” 
Jews to which Hilberg himself contributed, Kubrick rejected the idea 
because he believed such a fi lm would be anti-Semitic.147 This potential 
interaction between Hilberg and the medium of fi lm did not therefore 
eventuate; however, the historian would play a crucial part in Lanz-
mann’s Shoah. In this landmark fi lm, the “ghost inside Czerniakow’s 
offi ce” becomes the fi lmmaker’s doppelgänger.
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CHAPTER 3
BRIDGING HISTORY AND CINEMA
“PRIVILEGED” JEWS IN CLAUDE LANZMANN’S 
SHOAH AND OTHER HOLOCAUST DOCUMENTARIES
R
Just as various prefi gurative choices in the use of language signal the moral 
point of view of a historian, “the camera’s gaze” may signal the ethical, politi-
cal, and ideological perspective of the fi lmmaker.
—Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary
Claude Lanzmann’s infl uential fi lm Shoah (1985) may be viewed as 
a bridge between history and documentary fi lm. Widely believed to be 
“the most important fi lm about the Holocaust ever made,”1 Shoah has 
been praised by John K. Roth as “a cinematic counterpart to Hilberg’s 
monumental writing.”2 Indeed, Lanzmann’s fi lm exhibits a complex re-
lationship with history, not least of all through the crucial impact Raul 
Hilberg had on the fi lm’s conceptualization and his on-screen presence 
in pivotal scenes. The intersection of fi rsthand testimony, historical 
content, and fi lmic techniques in Shoah—along with Lanzmann’s po-
sitioning of Hilberg in the fi lm—results in judgments of “privileged” 
Jews being developed in intricate ways. Complicating generic boundar-
ies, Lanzmann’s groundbreaking fi lm is a complex, confl icted, and often 
incoherent work that is the result of various infl uences. Embracing the 
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early writings of Primo Levi and Hilberg, Lanzmann shuns traditional 
modes of representation to create a singular fi lm that still commands 
widespread attention today. The fact that Shoah has been so infl uential 
attests to the importance of discussing it here, but also necessitates the 
qualifi cation that its mode of representation cannot be considered char-
acteristic of the documentary genre as a whole.
The introduction indicated that nuanced distinctions can be made 
between documentary and fi ction fi lms. While the two forms share 
many narrative conventions and styles (and even, in the case of drama 
documentaries, enacted characters), documentaries are distinguishable 
from fi ction fi lms by their assertion of a “truth claim” and their quali-
tatively different appeals to audience expectations of the “real” through 
the use of “actual people, settings, and situations.”3 Thus, making a 
distinction between documentary and fi ction fi lm is useful, particularly 
in the context of how judgment is passed within the two genres. Annette 
Insdorf has expressed a strong preference for documentary over fi ction 
fi lms, claiming that documentaries “tower above … the cheap packag-
ing of ‘Hollywood’ motion pictures—manipulative music, melodramatic 
clichés, [and] literal violence.”4 While a value judgment of this kind is 
not pertinent to the present discussion, it suffi ces to point out that the 
“historical fi gure” portrayed on the screen in innumerable Holocaust 
documentaries is generally not the product of dramatization as in fi c-
tion fi lms, but is (re)presented as a “real” person who “was there.” Lan-
zmann’s ambiguous characterization of Shoah as, among other things, a 
“fi ction of the real”5 seems to refl ect a certain claim to “truth,” although 
an equally important attribute of a documentary fi lm’s engagement with 
its audience is the presence of an argumentative thrust. Documentary 
fi lms not only make an implicit claim to represent the “truth” of a situ-
ation, but construct an argument in the process of attempting to do so. 
The treatment of “real” fi gures throughout all stages of the production 
process consists of varying levels of manipulation, thus the conventions 
available to Holocaust documentary fi lmmakers in the construction of a 
fi lm’s internal argument result in judgments of “privileged” Jews being 
developed in a number of ways.
The limit of judgment plays an intrinsic part in representations of 
“privileged” Jews; however, these depictions in Holocaust documenta-
ries are both few and brief. Notable exceptions include Night and Fog 
(1955), Photographer (1998), Lodz Ghetto (1989), Partisans of Vilna 
(1986), and Kapo (1999), although the degree of attention given to the 
issue of “privileged” Jews varies with each fi lm. As in Shoah, Holocaust 
documentaries seldom focus specifi cally on their morally ambiguous be-
havior, although Tor Ben-Mayor and Dan Setton’s Kapo is one work 
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that has done so.6 “Conventional” documentaries such as this fi lm com-
prise a clear narrative trajectory constructed from an argumentative 
thrust, which is often communicated through authoritative voiceover 
narration and other familiar techniques. Lanzmann’s somewhat “un-
conventional” mode of documentary representation puts forward its 
argument(s) much more implicitly than in other Holocaust documenta-
ries, having important repercussions for the ways in which “privileged” 
Jews are represented in Shoah. Thus the clear assertive stance of Kapo 
serves as a valuable point of contrast to Lanzmann’s fi lm.
While many documentary fi lmmakers seek to construct a coherent 
narrative from the debris of the past, Lanzmann’s anti-redemptory 
mode of representation in Shoah attests to the impossibility of such 
an undertaking, engaging self-consciously with the notion of the “un-
representability” of the Holocaust. Even so, the impossibility of avoid-
ing judgment remains evident in the fi lmic medium. Yet in contrast to 
Hilberg’s work, the exposure of the image in the fi lmmaking process ar-
guably offers a heightened potential for the experiences of “privileged” 
Jews to be depicted in a nuanced manner. Produced at the same time 
Levi was writing The Drowned and the Saved, Lanzmann’s fi lm can 
at times be seen to make the kind of clear-cut judgments Levi warns 
against, while at other times it seems to work toward the suspension of 
judgment that Levi requires.
Beyond the Conventional: The Complexity 
of Judgment in Shoah
An assimilated French Jew who organized an anti-Nazi student re-
sistance group at the age of seventeen, Lanzmann worked as a writer, 
journalist, editor, and fi lmmaker after the war and spent over a decade 
making Shoah before its release in 1985. The editing process itself took 
over fi ve years, during which 350 hours of footage was cut down to 566 
minutes.7 Lanzmann, who studied historical literature on the Holocaust 
intensely before and during the making of his fi lm,8 focuses solely on 
the annihilation of Jews in Poland. His fi lm primarily consists of inter-
views he conducted with victims, persecutors, and onlookers, often at 
the geographical sites of destruction and sometimes (when questioning 
former perpetrators) using a hidden camera. Lanzmann received death 
threats, and on one occasion, after he was discovered secretly fi lming 
a former Einsatzgruppe offi cer who had been involved in mass shoot-
ings, he was beaten so badly that he spent eight days in the hospital.9 
Despite its unusual format and running time, Shoah has been seen by 
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millions of viewers worldwide, although its current dissemination might 
be considered limited when compared with more “popular” fi lms, such 
as Schindler’s List.
In addition to his fi lm’s infl uence, Lanzmann’s often polemical com-
ments have contributed much to broader debates on the Holocaust. 
Lanzmann argues that it is an event beyond comparison: “No one can 
mistake it, deny the Holocaust its specifi c character, its uniqueness.”10 
The fi lmmaker’s emphasis on the incommunicability of the Holocaust 
is epitomized early in Shoah, with his inclusion of the words of the sur-
vivor Simon Srebnik on returning to Chelmno: “No one can describe 
it. No one can recreate what happened here. … And no one can under-
stand it.”11 The impossibility of understanding forms the foundational 
rule of Lanzmann’s philosophy. His comments in relation to what he 
sees as Shoah’s utter superiority to other Holocaust fi lms in every re-
spect also reveals how he positions himself and his representation of 
the Holocaust. Lanzmann has described Shoah as “more thoroughly 
provocative and powerful than anything else” and uses words such as 
“reality” and “truth” frequently when describing the fi lm.12 Lanzmann 
was strongly infl uenced by Levi’s memoir If This Is a Man, particularly 
its vignette of a Nazi offi cer who informs Levi that “there is no why” in 
Auschwitz.13 Nonetheless, in being so dismissive of representations of 
the Holocaust (other than Shoah), Lanzmann takes the limits of repre-
sentation much further than Levi intended.
Lanzmann’s strategies, which may be seen as further developments 
of those found in other infl uential French fi lms dealing with aspects of 
the Holocaust,14 subvert many generic conventions of documentary fi lm. 
He shuns all use of archival photographs and fi lm footage, and rejects 
voiceover narration, the use of a musical score, the construction of a 
linear narrative, and closure. Indeed, Lanzmann has even claimed that 
Shoah is not a “documentary” or in any way “representational.”15 None-
theless, Lanzmann represents former “privileged” Jews using a variety 
of means, from his selection and editing of footage to his depiction of 
facial expression and voice. While he repudiates any mimetic recreation 
of events, his interviews often encourage “reenactments” in a different 
sense, and the director has frequently referred to his interviewees as 
“actors” since his fi lm’s release.16 The ways in which the fi lmmaker po-
sitions his characters through on-screen prompting or interruption and 
postproduction editing reveal an intricate process of judgment in Shoah. 
Furthermore, as many of Lanzmann’s “actors” are former Sonderkom-
mando members, an analysis of Shoah provides a necessary and revealing 
counterpoint to the signifi cantly different representation of “privileged” 
Jews in more conventional documentary fi lms, such as Kapo.
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Much has been written about Lanzmann’s complex accumulation, 
contrasting, and blending of settings, witnesses, and languages; and 
his controversial representation (and judgment) of German perpetra-
tors and Polish onlookers has occupied a number of scholars and other 
commentators. Referring to Shoah’s representation of Germans, the 
fi lmmaker Marcel Orphüls notes that “Lanzmann felt that his camera 
should act as a substitute for a gun or a court of law; he put himself in 
the role of judge and jury.”17 Likewise, Shoshana Felman argues that 
“Shoah embodies the capacity of art not simply to witness, but to take 
the witness stand.”18 Nevertheless, very little attention has been paid to 
the judgment of “privileged” Jews in the fi lm. Signifi cantly, Lanzmann 
has described himself as having been obsessed throughout fi lming with 
the question of when it was too late for Jews to resist effectively. Al-
though he denied that this historiographical problem is also a moral 
issue, he did note that all “questions of content were immediately ques-
tions of technique and questions of form”19—and the technique and 
form of Shoah reveal the passing of moral judgment(s).
Lanzmann’s own multifaceted role in Shoah is crucial to the man-
ner in which former perpetrators and “privileged” victims are portrayed 
against one another, as well as how the historian Hilberg is depicted in 
several key scenes. Most discussions of the fi lm comment in some way 
on the fi lmmaker’s dominant presence, which is variously characterized 
as sympathetic, encouraging, cajoling, controlling, intrusive, aggressive, 
and unrelenting. Lanzmann himself has described his interviewing 
method as having an “obsessional character.”20 Whether Lanzmann is 
within or just outside the frame, his controversial interviewing tech-
niques involve either eliciting specifi c emotional reactions from the sur-
vivors upon remembering their experiences or demanding they provide 
this testimony even against their own wishes. There has been consider-
able criticism of Lanzmann’s manipulation of survivors;21 however, this 
has not previously been linked to the issue of “privileged” Jews.
Lanzmann portrays himself throughout Shoah not only as a moral 
authority, but as a quest fi gure in search of “the truth,” an image he 
partly establishes through long scenes showing his van journeying to 
the residences of Raul Hilberg and Franz Schalling.22 Indeed, the in-
teraction between Lanzmann and Hilberg on-screen renders the his-
torian a kind of doppelgänger of the fi lmmaker. While Lanzmann has 
been viewed as having a tripartite role of narrator, interviewer, and 
inquirer,23 the following analysis posits a fourth role: Lanzmann as a 
fi gure of judgment. While Shoah has sometimes been characterized as 
presenting a “compassionate and admiring look” at the victims,24 this is 
not always the case. As a fi gure of judgment, Lanzmann intertwines the 
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often dichotomized realms of history and fi lm through Shoah’s modus 
operandi. This is no more evident than in the fi lmmaker’s multifaceted 
representation of Judenrat leader Adam Czerniakow, which passes judg-
ment in a highly sophisticated manner.
Positioning the Historian: Lanzmann 
and His Doppelgänger
Both Hilberg and Lanzmann have praised each other for having a pro-
found impact on their respective works. While Hilberg acknowledged 
Lanzmann in The Destruction of the European Jews for reinforcing him 
in his “own quest on many occasions,” Lanzmann described Hilberg’s 
volume as his “bible,” which he reread constantly.25 The convergence of 
their philosophies and their roles in passing judgment are developed in 
several scenes throughout the course of Shoah. That Hilberg is the only 
historian to appear on-screen in the fi lm is highly signifi cant, particularly 
given that Yehuda Bauer, whose views on Jewish resistance and coop-
eration lie in stark opposition to Hilberg’s, served as a historical advisor 
to Lanzmann.26 While Felman rightly notes that Hilberg is “neither the 
last word of knowledge nor the ultimate authority on history” in Shoah, 
the absence of a direct counterpoint to his views gives them considerable 
weight.27 Hilberg’s responses to Lanzmann’s questions bear a strong re-
semblance to comments made in his publications; nonetheless, it must 
be kept in mind that—to use Lanzmann’s own term—Hilberg is an “ac-
tor” in Shoah, who, like other interviewees, is subject to the fi lmmaker’s 
selection and juxtaposition of both visual footage and soundtrack. This 
complex positioning of the historian using a fi lmic mode of representa-
tion engenders an effect completely unlike that engendered in written 
historical discourse. Indeed, Lanzmann’s editing of his interviews may 
be read as challenging Hilberg’s judgments at times. In these instances, 
the fi lm invokes, intentionally or not, a degree of ambivalence toward 
Czerniakow’s behavior.
Lanzmann not only includes Hilberg’s physical person in the fi lm but 
also highlights and endorses his historical approach to the Holocaust. 
In the historian’s fi rst appearance, almost three hours into the fi lm, 
Lanzmann’s focus on the annihilation process is temporarily sidelined 
to demonstrate the historical methods, standards, and authority that 
Hilberg embodies. Sitting at his desk in his study in Vermont—a much 
more formal setting than the sites of memory hitherto appropriated in 
the fi lm—Hilberg is framed in a close-up as he declares in a sober and 
assured tone:
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In all of my work I have never begun by asking the big questions. … I have 
preferred therefore to address these things which are minutiae or detail in 
order that I might then be able to put together in a gestalt a picture which, if 
not an explanation, is at least a description, a more full description, of what 
transpired.28
This passage of dialogue succinctly captures the conceptual framework 
informing Shoah. Lanzmann can be seen throughout the fi lm constantly 
pressing his witnesses for small details, placing emphasis on the “how” 
rather than the “why.”29 Furthermore, during Hilberg’s subsequent 
evaluation of the Nazis’ reliance on incremental anti-Semitic measures, 
Lanzmann’s comments portray an utmost respect—if not reverence—
for the historian. Unlike numerous other moments in Shoah when Lanz-
 mann interrupts, disagrees with, or unsettles his interviewees, the ques-
tions he poses to Hilberg seek only to clarify aspects of his interpretation, 
acquire more detail, or at times express surprise at what has been said, 
giving the impression that the historian is almost a mentor fi gure to the 
inquiring fi lmmaker.
Hilberg’s thus far unquestioned authority and infl uence on Lanz-
mann is equally visible in his second appearance, during which Hilberg, 
again seated at his desk, interprets a German railroad timetable, Fahr-
plananordnung 587, to explain the role played by “special trains” to 
deport Jews to the Treblinka death camp. While Lanzmann peers over 
Hilberg’s shoulder to examine the document, his shadow covers half 
of the historian’s face. Hilberg estimates that “we may be talking here 
about ten thousand dead Jews on this one Fahrplananordnung right 
here.”30 When Lanzmann suggests “more than ten thousand,” Hilberg 
implicitly agrees through his body language but makes a qualifi cation: 
“Well, we will be conservative here.” Lanzmann simply replies, “Yes.”31 
Hilberg’s authority is also reinforced by Lanzmann’s positioning of this 
scene immediately after the evasive testimony of Walter Stier, a former 
chief of a Reich railways department who organized deportation trains 
for Jews. The viewer’s awareness that Lanzmann assumes an alias, “Dr. 
Sorel,” and uses a hidden camera to fi lm Stier, grants the entrusted 
and trusting Hilberg authority even before one considers what the in-
terviewees say.32 Stier’s repeated claim that he had no knowledge at all 
that “deportation” meant death is refuted by Hilberg’s calm and precise 
analysis of what the document clearly revealed to the bureaucrat about 
the return of the empty train.33
In the scenes involving Hilberg, he often talks with downcast eyes, 
only glancing at Lanzmann occasionally and a few times at the camera. 
Hilberg’s grim contemplation rests in stark contrast to Stier’s shifting 
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gaze and signs of physical discomfort under Lanzmann’s prodding. At 
the same time, the dominant physical presence of Hilberg within the 
frame bears a striking resemblance to Lanzmann in terms of age and 
body size, with both men having similar postures, hair color, and thick-
rimmed glasses. These connections, along with the two men’s seemingly 
unshakeable confi dence in what they say and the fact that they concur 
with each other at all times on-screen, in a way render Hilberg the fi lm-
maker’s doppelgänger. Indeed, when Lanzmann somberly comments 
that the trains depicted in the document signify “death traffi c,” Hilberg 
repeats these words in agreement.34 However, the construction of this 
on-camera relationship and how it bears on the judgment of “privileged” 
Jews is most evident in their joint discussion of Adam Czerniakow, the 
only Jewish leader explored in the fi lm.
After the release of Shoah, Lanzmann emphasized that he saw Hil-
berg as something of a fl esh-and-blood substitute for Czerniakow in the 
fi lm, that the historian “take[s] the place of a dead man. He is, entirely, 
Adam Czerniakow.”35 There are several indications that Hilberg bears 
similarities to Czerniakow, which will be discussed below. This, along 
with Hilberg’s previously established historical and moral authority, 
create the impression that he is the most appropriate person to judge 
the Jewish leader. Lanzmann’s confi dence in the historian’s ability to 
represent Czerniakow (in a double sense) is exemplifi ed by the fi lm-
maker’s exclusion from Shoah of the fi rst—and longest—interview he 
recorded, which was with Benjamin Murmelstein, the last Jewish “el-
der” of the Theresienstadt Ghetto. Although Murmelstein’s testimony 
produced around fourteen hours of fi lm, Lanzmann decided it did not 
fi t with the tone and style he wanted for Shoah, and he omitted the 
interview from the fi nal cut.36 Lanzmann’s decision to exclude Murm-
elstein’s recollections grants Hilberg considerable authority; however, 
despite Lanzmann’s conviction that the “actor” Hilberg stood in for—or 
as—Czerniakow, there is a sense of critical distance that the historian 
assumes through his discussion and judgment of the Jewish leader’s 
character and behavior. In addition to Hilberg’s role in transmitting 
judgment through his perception of Czerniakow’s shortsightedness, 
Lanzmann’s own contributions to these nine scenes are pivotal to how 
the fi lm evaluates the “privileged” Jew.
Just as Hilberg’s earlier appearance in the fi lm was contrasted with 
Stier’s interview in order to demonstrate Hilberg’s moral superiority 
and relay the fi lmmaker’s judgment of Stier, Lanzmann juxtaposes four 
sections of Hilberg’s refl ections on Czerniakow’s diary with parts of his 
interview with another perpetrator—the “forgetful” and self-deluding 
Franz Grassler, who served as assistant to the Nazi commissioner of the 
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Warsaw Ghetto.37 The way in which Lanzmann incorporates Czernia-
kow’s testimony into Shoah contrasts strongly with the use of the diary 
in the documentary fi lm A Day in the Warsaw Ghetto (1991). In that 
fi lm the Jewish leader (whose diary is read by narrative voiceover) is not 
distinguished from the “non-privileged” authors of other ghetto docu-
ments the fi lm draws on.38 The mode of representation in Shoah reveals 
that Czerniakow’s position as Jewish leader—even if it is not character-
ized explicitly in the fi lm as “privileged”—is under scrutiny.
Early in his discussion of Czerniakow, Hilberg testifi es to how one is 
able to judge the Judenrat leader by using his diary: “Perhaps because 
he wrote in such a prosaic style we now know what went on in his mind, 
how things were perceived, recognized, reacted to.”39 This is reminis-
cent of Hilberg’s comment in his introduction to the English translation 
of the diary that it not only contains valuable facts, but “reveals also the 
man—his beliefs, attitudes, and above all his style.”40 However, Hilberg 
works toward his judgment of Czerniakow in Shoah by fi rst addressing 
the issue of “privilege” more broadly, with the historian’s moral author-
ity evident in the following exchange:
Hilberg: He [Czerniakow] is sarcastic enough, if that is the word, in December 
1941 to remark that now … members of the intelligentsia were starving 
to death. And he even has—
Lanzmann: Why does he mention specifi cally the intelligentsia at this time?
Hilberg: He mentions it because there is a difference, owing to the class struc-
ture within the ghetto, in vulnerability to starvation. The lower classes 
died fi rst. The middle class died a little bit later. The intelligentsia were 
of course at the top of the middle class, and once they started dying, the 
situation was very, very, very bad. And that’s the meaning of that.41
Several key observations can be made here. First, the fact that the scene 
moves from several panning shots of Warsaw’s desolate streets to Hilberg 
shifts more attention to his authoritative interpretation. It is also tell-
ing that Lanzmann, on one of the rare occasions he interrupts Hilberg, 
prompts the historian to digress on the issue of socioeconomic status 
in the ghetto. Furthermore, Hilberg’s foregrounding of Czerniakow’s 
sarcasm suggests a quality he shares with his subject, perhaps refl ecting 
the connection Lanzmann perceives between the two men. Hilberg, who 
later refers to Czerniakow’s “rather sardonic comments about death,” 
had himself demonstrated a predisposition to moments of dark humor 
several times in previous scenes.42 Indeed, the historian adopts a sarcas-
tic tone when he describes the “class structure” of the Warsaw Ghetto. 
While Hilberg does not explicitly pass judgment on this situation, he be-
comes very animated in his explanation of the “intelligentsia” and ends 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
118 Judging “Privileged” Jews
the discussion with a fi nal, authoritative pronouncement: “And that’s 
the meaning of that.” The effect of the fi lm’s audio-visual depiction of 
Hilberg’s emotive commentary on the “intelligentsia,” infl uenced di-
rectly by the fi lmmaker’s interruption, is considerably different from 
that achieved by Hilberg’s writings. For instance, the complex way in 
which Hilberg’s judgment is portrayed in this scene differs markedly 
from the section of his review essay “The Ghetto as a Form of Govern-
ment,” in which he delivers the same information as he does in Shoah: 
“Czerniakow himself made the point obliquely at the end of 1941 when 
he observed that the intelligentsia were dying now.”43
The infl uence on Shoah of Hilberg’s historical research is also evi-
dent in the next scene. When Lanzmann seeks further information on 
Czerniakow’s state of mind, Hilberg becomes more direct in his judg-
ment. Asked if Czerniakow ever seemed “revolted” by the situation 
Jews faced, Hilberg replies that “he doesn’t express the disgust except 
with other Jews, Jews who either deserted the community by emigrating 
early, or Jews who like Ganzweich collaborat[ed] with the Germans.”44 
Hilberg seldom uses the term “collaboration” when discussing Jews, 
but in adopting Czerniakow’s framework of judgment here, he makes 
a clear distinction between different “privileged” Jews, thereby making 
distinctions that might be likened to the spectrum along which he situ-
ates Jewish leaders in Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders (see chapter 2). 
The indirect representation of the issue of “privilege” in this scene argu-
ably discourages any clear-cut judgment of Czerniakow by the viewer. In 
drawing on the Jewish leader’s testimony and judgment, Lanzmann’s 
positioning of the somber Hilberg implies neither a positive nor a nega-
tive evaluation of his behavior. Nonetheless, this changes in the next 
scene that focuses on Hilberg, in which he begins to address what he 
sees as the problem with the ghetto, particularly in terms of the activi-
ties of its leaders.
While Lanzmann invokes Czerniakow’s own identifi cation in his di-
ary as the captain of a sinking ship, the camera’s focus on Hilberg’s 
contemplative state suggests he is engaged in deep thought prior to 
making his judgment. The camera closes in on the historian’s highly 
emotional facial expression and body language, his fl at hands joined be-
fore pursed lips, as if praying. When Lanzmann refers to the Warsaw 
Ghetto’s cultural activities, Hilberg suddenly adopts a particularly em-
phatic, if not aggressive, tone. He proclaims that such activities were 
“not simply morale-building devices, which is what Czerniakow iden-
tifi es them to be.”45 Instead, Hilberg characterizes these instances of 
passive resistance as self-deluding and “symbolic of the entire posture 
of the ghetto.”46 Lanzmann’s depiction of Hilberg’s sharp alteration of 
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tone exemplifi es the way in which Shoah points out that judgment is 
being passed on the “privileged” Jew in question. Although changes in 
tone can be noticeable to readers of the written word, the aural and 
visual communication of a judgment made by the historian on-screen 
arguably opens up more space for the audience’s critical engagement 
with the issue of “privileged” Jews. This adds an important element to 
Hilberg’s critique of the Judenräte in “The Ghetto as a Form of Govern-
ment,” in which he briefl y writes: “Many ghetto activities, especially in 
education and culture, bordered on illusionary behavior.”47 Here, the 
historian’s attitude toward the Jewish councils is communicated in a 
considerably more straightforward manner than in the fi lm. The self-
refl exive nature of Shoah is particularly important when Hilberg’s judg-
ments of Czerniakow become increasingly clearer.
Hilberg’s distaste for what he perceives as the fl awed policy of allevia-
tion and compliance, spelled out so clearly in The Destruction of the Eu-
ropean Jews, can be seen in Shoah when he links his generalized view 
of the behavior of the ghetto population as a whole with Czerniakow’s 
state of knowledge regarding German intentions:
Hilberg: [The ghetto] is in the process of healing or trying to heal sick people 
who are soon going to be gassed … is trying to educate youngsters who 
will never be growing up … is in the process of trying to fi nd work for 
people and increase employment in a situation which is doomed to fail-
ure. They are going on as though life were continuing. They have an of-
fi cial faith in the survivability of the ghetto, even after all indications are 
to the contrary. The strategy continues to be: “We must continue, for this 
is the only strategy that is left. We must minimize the injury, minimize 
the damage, minimize the losses, but we must continue.” And continuity 
is the only thing in all of this.
Lanzmann: But obviously when he compares himself to this captain of a sink-
ing ship, he knows that everything … 
Hilberg: He knows, he knows. I think he knew or he sensed or he believed the 
end was coming, perhaps as early as October 1941, when he has a note 
about alarming rumors as to the fate of Warsaw Jewry in the spring.48
Lanzmann’s role in prompting Hilberg’s judgment is again crucial here, 
for his suggestion directs Hilberg to focus more specifi cally on Czer-
niakow’s state of knowledge. Although Hilberg’s tone is never overtly 
critical, negative judgment is evident in the emphasis he places on the 
words indicated in italics above. His pronouncement, “And continuity is 
the only thing in this,” which he stresses by raising his hands, is remi-
niscent of his earlier authoritative statement: “And that is the meaning 
of that.” Likewise, Hilberg’s use of the present tense might serve to cre-
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ate the impression that his evaluation is not reliant on the problematic 
phenomenon of “backshadowing” discussed earlier. Also telling are the 
several examples of repetition Hilberg uses in his characterization of 
the ghetto and that he begins to speak in the fi rst person inclusive, as 
if from Czerniakow’s point of view: “We must continue, for this is the 
only strategy that is left. We must minimize the injury, minimize the 
damage, minimize the losses, but we must continue.” This refl ection is 
then linked back, through his response to Lanzmann’s suggestion, to 
Czerniakow’s state of knowledge. Such a connection further reveals Hil-
berg to be engaging in a process of judgment, albeit through a radically 
different discourse from that which he uses in his publications. Hilberg 
seldom evokes hypothetical thoughts of his subjects in his writings as he 
does in this scene from Shoah.
In an earlier scene, Hilberg details the rumors, reports, and anxieties 
recorded in the diary that lead him to believe that Czerniakow knew a 
great deal about Nazi intentions. He criticizes Czerniakow implicitly 
for focusing on peripheral concerns that were essentially useless in the 
long term when his knowledge meant more could have been done to re-
sist Nazi oppression.49 However, his wording of the fi nal sentence in the 
later scene quoted above suggests some uncertainty: “I think he knew or 
he sensed or he believed the end was coming, perhaps as early as October 
1941.” Hilberg’s ambivalent phrasing is signifi cant when contrasted to 
his confi dent assertion earlier in this scene that Czerniakow “takes for 
granted, he assumes, he anticipates everything that is happening to the 
Jews, including the worst.”50 Furthermore, Hilberg’s uncertainty is not 
present in any of the publications discussed in the previous chapter, 
again highlighting the extra dimension that documentary fi lm can add 
to written texts. 
Lanzmann’s infl uence on Hilberg’s judgment is again evident imme-
diately after the historian’s seemingly uncertain comment about Czer-
niakow’s state of knowledge. The camera fi xes on the site of the Belzec 
extermination camp, the destination of many Polish Jews deported in 
1942, while Lanzmann again asks Hilberg to comment on Czerniakow’s 
understanding of the rumors about the deportations.51 Although Hilberg 
concedes that Czerniakow never wrote about any destination, as the im-
age shifts to a close-up of a rolling train, he stresses: “But we cannot 
really decide that he had no knowledge whatsoever about these camps. 
All we know is that he didn’t mention them in the diary.”52 Signifi cantly, 
Hilberg now distances himself from the primary document—until this 
moment a completely reliable source and “window” for him53—at a time 
when his reliance on its content threatens to reinforce the impossibil-
ity of judgment. Also noteworthy is that, on-screen at least, Lanzmann 
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
Bridging History and Cinema 121
expresses agreement with Hilberg’s judgment, responding to the histo-
rian’s argument regarding the inconclusiveness of the diary with a brief, 
confi dent statement: “That’s right.” Hilberg then implies that it is al-
most certain that Czerniakow was aware of more than he revealed in his 
diary: “We also know, of course, from other sources, that the existence of 
death camps was already known in Warsaw, certainly by June.”54 This 
exposes the tension between the problems involved in relying on retro-
spect and the need to decipher the ultimately unknowable realities of 
the past. Hilberg’s use of verbal repetition further reveals his judgment 
when he laments that even on the day before Czerniakow committed 
suicide, he “keeps appealing. He wants certain exemptions. He wants 
the Council staff to be exempt. He wants the staff of the welfare or-
ganizations to be exempt.”55 However, having addressed Czerniakow’s 
controversial role as Judenrat leader throughout his interview with Hil-
berg, Lanzmann’s portrayal of Czerniakow’s fi nal hours arguably ques-
tions the possibility of judging the “privileged” Jew.
In Hilberg’s last appearance in Shoah, the fi lm’s focus shifts to Cz-
erniakow’s relationship with the ghetto’s orphans. Asked by Lanzmann 
to elaborate on the subject, Hilberg meditates at length on the Jewish 
leader’s strong attachment to children. When the visual image shifts to 
a cemetery, panning slowly over gravestones, Hilberg’s somber intona-
tion might be seen to imply that Czerniakow had been forced into an 
impossible situation: “If he cannot take care of the children, what else 
can he do? Some people report that he wrote a note after he closed the 
book on the diary in which he said, ‘They want me to kill the children 
with my own hands.’”56 Here the historian speaks as if from Czernia-
kow’s perspective, producing a markedly different effect from his previ-
ously cold, analytical stance. Additionally, just as Hilberg speaks these 
last words, the camera comes to rest on a tombstone engraved with the 
barely readable name “Adam Czerniakow.” Hilberg’s commentary on 
Czerniakow’s death parallels Rudolf Vrba’s earlier discussion in Shoah 
of the suicide of Freddy Hirsch, the informal leader of the “Czech Camp” 
in Auschwitz. Vrba describes Hirsch as a man of “upright behavior and 
obvious human dignity” whose concern with the children’s welfare dis-
couraged him from supporting a revolt.57 The convergence of sympathy 
and judgment here is signaled by the fact that there is more than one 
way to interpret Czerniakow’s suicide, which has elsewhere been con-
demned as an act of weakness or cowardice.58
While not necessarily contradicting his belief that more could have 
been done earlier by Czerniakow, Hilberg’s fi nal words can be interpreted 
as portraying the Judenrat leader in a positive light. Indeed, the effect of 
this prolonged scene is very different from the noticeably brief sentence 
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Hilberg uses to note Czerniakow’s death in Perpetrators, Victims, By-
standers: “Adam Czerniakow in Warsaw committed suicide when the de-
portations began and when he realized that he could not save the Jewish 
orphans.”59 On the other hand, another perspective on this scene might 
suggest that the gravestones—or the Jewish deaths they represent—are 
to be seen as a consequence of Czerniakow’s actions, thus reinforcing 
Hilberg’s judgment of his naivety.60 This underlines the multiplicity of 
meanings that can arise from the ambiguity of the visual image in fi lm. 
Felman aptly describes both Lanzmann and Hilberg as “catalysts—or 
agents—of the process of reception,”61 and in this way they also mediate 
the fi lm’s judgment. In the scene analyzed above, however, the complex, 
unconventional mode of representation seems to eschew a clear asser-
tive stance regarding Czerniakow’s behavior. This part of Shoah reveals 
the potential of documentary fi lm to position an audience to—in Levi’s 
words—“meditate” on Czerniakow’s ethical dilemma with “pity and 
rigor,” while seeming to suspend (a fi nal) judgment on him.62
Most important, like the testimony of other people in Shoah, Hilberg’s 
contributions do not fl oat freely within the fi lm but are mediated by 
Lanzmann’s construction of a sequence of interview fragments. André 
Colombat interprets Hilberg’s role in Shoah as “gather[ing] the dissemi-
nated testimonies heard in one general and clear historical interpreta-
tion.”63 However, there are aspects of Lanzmann’s editing technique that 
serve to challenge Hilberg’s judgments. Refl ecting the fi lmmaker’s com-
mitment to a nonlinear structure, the representation of Czerniakow’s 
situation in mid-1943 is situated a few scenes from the fi lm’s end, after 
the death camps and the annihilation process have been explored in 
detail. As a consequence of this, the viewer has already been exposed to 
hours of accounts of what happened to Jewish victims, including those 
from Warsaw, after deportation. The numerous testimonies of the hor-
rifi c shock Jews experienced when discovering the purpose of the camps 
on arrival provide a broader context for the viewer that points to the 
sheer unprecedentedness of the Holocaust and the problem of clarifying 
how Jewish leaders perceived events as they transpired. The inclusion 
of Franz Grassler’s interview before and after Hilberg’s fi nal appear-
ances in Shoah offers a strong contrast between the historian’s reading 
of Czerniakow’s last diary entry and the perpetrator’s dishonesty and 
denial of any personal culpability.
While the majority of Hilberg’s discussion of Czerniakow portrays 
the Jewish leader as a somewhat shortsighted fi gure, Lanzmann’s juxta-
position of his interviews with Hilberg and Grassler reveals a different 
preoccupation, focusing on the gulf between heartless perpetrator and 
helpless victim. Indeed, the diary itself is used as a tool of judgment 
against Grassler at the beginning of the fi lmmaker’s interrogation of 
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him. A determined Lanzmann, reinforcing his own moral authority, re-
sponds to the bureaucrat’s claims of memory loss with the statement, 
“I’ll help you remember,” and dutifully informs Grassler that “this is 
Czerniakow’s diary. You’re mentioned in it.”64 Furthermore, when Lan-
zmann argues with Grassler about the purpose of the ghetto, again with 
assistance from Czerniakow’s diary, the fi lmmaker presses him to ad-
mit that the Jews “couldn’t do anything” against Nazi persecution.65 
The positioning of this admission highlights the utter helplessness of 
the Holocaust’s victims just moments before showing Hilberg’s nega-
tive evaluation of Czerniakow’s state of knowledge. While Lanzmann 
seems to agree with Hilberg’s judgment on-screen, the contrast between 
interviews is signifi cant. The juxtaposition of Hilberg’s analysis of Cz-
erniakow’s diary with Grassler’s suspect testimony elicits an effect that 
differs considerably from Hilberg’s reliance on Nazi documents in The 
Destruction of the European Jews, which occasionally led him to adopt 
the perpetrators’ judgments (see chapter 2). Lanzmann’s depiction of the 
continued evasion—if not self-deception—of the former perpetrator with 
whom Czerniakow was forced to deal may be seen to challenge Hilberg’s 
evaluation of the Jewish leader’s actions. In this way, Hilberg’s criticism 
of Czerniakow’s lack of awareness or understanding, as expressed in 
Shoah and in publications such as “The Ghetto as a Form of Govern-
ment,” is brought into question by Lanzmann’s editing decision.66
Hilberg’s judgment regarding Czerniakow’s alleged awareness of the 
intentions of the Nazis is followed by Grassler’s absurd suggestion that 
due to their “excellent secret services,” Jews in Warsaw knew more than 
their Nazi captors.67 Again, this could be seen to counter the argument 
Hilberg makes in both his writings and in the fi lm that Jewish leaders 
should have been more responsive to wartime developments. Further to 
this, during Grassler’s fi nal appearance in Shoah, the camera holds his 
face in a steady close-up as Lanzmann interrogates him:
Lanzmann: Czerniakow wrote, “We’re puppets, we have no power.”
Grassler: Yes.
Lanzmann: “No power.”
Grassler: Sure … that was … 
Lanzmann: You Germans were the overlords.
Grassler: Yes.
Lanzmann: The overlords. The masters.
Grassler: Obviously.
Lanzmann: Czerniakow was merely a tool.
Grassler: Yes, but a good tool. Jewish self-management worked well, I can 
tell you.68
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This is the only scene in the entire fi lm in which Lanzmann loses his 
patience. Exuding a loud sigh and raising his voice, he continues arguing 
with the obtuse former perpetrator for several minutes. Grassler even ap-
propriates Czerniakow’s claim, “I had no power,” after which Lanzmann 
gives up trying to convince him (or make him admit) otherwise. While 
Lanzmann does not get Grassler to concede any responsibility for his ac-
tions, by showing Grassler’s description of the Judenräte as effi cient, the 
viewer is positioned to be repelled only by the perpetrator. This juxtapo-
sition—what Lanzmann calls “corroboration”—of interviews reveals the 
complex mode of representation at the heart of the fi lm.
In a sense, the displacement of the perpetrator’s deceptions and anti-
Semitism has the effect of calling into question Hilberg’s judgment of 
Czerniakow by contextualizing the historian’s evaluation of his behav-
ior. Nonetheless, while the moral ambiguity of Czerniakow’s perilous 
situation is highlighted through Lanzmann’s multilayered depiction of 
Hilberg’s persona and perspective, the portrayal of former members of 
the Sonderkommandos engenders a very different outcome. Lanzmann’s 
aggressive interviewing techniques and editing practices ensure that his 
fi lm constructs a binary opposition between former “privileged” Jews 
and other fi gures in the fi lm.
Constructing Oppositions: Continuing 
Anti-Semitism and Perpetual Victimhood
Closely refl ecting the central contention of Levi’s essay on the grey 
zone, Ilan Avisar argues in his early volume on Holocaust fi lm that it 
is “impossible to judge, and at times even to understand” the members 
of the Sonderkommandos, and that “it would be absurd and heartless 
to view them as collaborators.”69 Refl ecting on Lanzmann’s fi lm, Avisar 
writes that Shoah “imposes a state of mind which confronts agoniz-
ing, occasionally unbearable recognitions on the spectrum of possible 
human behaviour and moral decisions under extreme circumstances.”70 
In some ways, Lanzmann seems to take little interest in the formerly 
“privileged” status of many of the Jewish survivors he interviews, but 
rather seeks their testimony due to their close proximity to the exter-
mination process. On the other hand, the victims’ ethical dilemmas are 
exposed (if only briefl y) in some of his interviews with former cremato-
rium workers. Notwithstanding these instances, Lanzmann’s represen-
tation of their trauma reveals the impossibility of suspending judgment. 
His displacement of the perpetrators’ continued anti-Semitism and eva-
siveness, and his simultaneous emphasis on the perpetual suffering and 
victimhood of survivors, constructs a binary opposition that disallows a 
detailed examination of the issue of “privilege.” Instead, Lanzmann’s 
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treatment of the survivors he interviews reveals a process of making 
clear-cut moral judgments, pointing to an argumentative thrust that 
was less evident in his examination of Czerniakow.
Through the fi lmmaker’s self-representation and vigorous approach 
to gaining the information—and emotional response—he desires, Lanz-
mann, in the words of Tzvetan Todorov, “revives a kind of Maniche-
anism.”71 In his Levi-inspired discussion of Holocaust representation, 
Todorov writes that Shoah “succeeds in telling us the events of the past, 
and it does so with great power, but it also leads us to judge these events 
in so oversimplifi ed a fashion that it does not always help us understand 
them.”72 Focusing his analysis on the fi lm’s depiction of Germans and 
Poles, Todorov argues that Lanzmann confi rms “the familiar opposi-
tions: us and them, friends and enemies, good and wicked. For him, in 
the domain of moral values at least, everything is simple and straight-
forward.”73 Sami Nair adopts even stronger language, arguing that Lanz-
mann “rehabilitates the survivors from the Jewish work commandos 
who assisted the Nazis in murdering their [Jewish] brothers and sisters 
… and transfi gures them here into saints by revealing their inner in-
nocence.”74 While this comment itself reveals a stark moral evaluation, 
earlier chapters have revealed that Levi opposes these kinds of black-
and-white judgments, particularly in relation to the Sonderkommandos. 
Several scholars have criticized Lanzmann’s failure to engage with the 
fact that the majority of his Jewish witnesses were “privileged” in some 
way; indeed, some commentators explicitly refer to Lanzmann’s un-
willingness to differentiate between victims and thereby acknowledge 
Levi’s grey zone.75 Nonetheless, no analysis of how Lanzmann conveys 
his judgment of these liminal fi gures has previously been undertaken.
Lanzmann’s personal attitude toward “privileged” Jews—and per-
haps one reason he rarely engages with their controversial positions in 
Shoah—can be seen in his aggressive criticism of Andrzej Wajda’s 1991 
fi lm Korczak for portraying Jewish police, black marketeers, and thieves. 
Lanzmann declared that this issue “has no importance whatsoever, this 
exists in every society and it happened there less than in other places. 
The truth, the only thing that matters, is to represent the tragedy in 
its immensity, in its purity.”76 The term “purity,” a problematic term in 
any discussion of the Holocaust, would seem to preclude any explora-
tion of the ambiguous circumstances of “privileged” Jews. Through his 
use of the camera, construction of interviews, and editing of footage, 
Lanzmann’s positive and negative judgments of survivors and perpetra-
tors respectively are revealed in his often intense manipulation of his 
subjects to achieve his ends.
Just as Lanzmann juxtaposes Hilberg with Stier and Grassler, his 
editing of interviews with former members of the Sonderkommandos 
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to appear alongside the interviews of German perpetrators or Polish 
onlookers helps construct the Manichean framework of judgment that 
Todorov identifi es. In a sense, Lanzmann revictimizes his Jewish inter-
viewees in two ways: by implying that their persecution persists through 
continued anti-Semitism and by pushing them to the point of emotional 
breakdown. The fi lmmaker’s accumulation, selection, and juxtaposi-
tions of footage, as well as the intrusiveness of the camera, represent 
the former Sonderkommando members as permanent victims. Indeed, 
Brian Winston argues that the positioning of the subject as victim in 
certain documentary fi lms involves the fi lmmaker arrogating to her or 
himself the authority to control the representational outcome, thereby 
denying the subject the “voice” that the fi lmmaker claims to (freely) 
allow.77 This characterization of the “victimization” of subjects can be 
applied to Lanzmann’s Shoah. While the scenes between Lanzmann 
and Hilberg are often constructed as inquisitive conversations or even 
lessons, Lanzmann’s discussions with other witnesses, particularly for-
mer “privileged” Jews, are substantially different in their coerciveness. 
The fi lmmaker interviews several men who were former members of 
the Sonderkommandos, including Michaël Podchlebnik, Simon Sreb-
nik, Richard Glazar, Filip Müller, and Abraham Bomba, most of whom 
have also testifi ed elsewhere.78 Lanzmann went to great lengths to ob-
tain these witnesses, as they were for him “spokesmen of the dead.”79 
When refl ecting on his choice of survivors for the fi lm, he noted that he 
“wanted very specifi c types,” not because they held the kind of “privi-
leged” positions at issue in this book, but because they “had been in 
the very charnel houses of the extermination, direct witnesses of the 
death of their people.”80 Locating these witnesses and obtaining their 
agreement to participate in the fi lm proved diffi cult. Lanzmann stated 
in 1985: “The real question was to convince them to talk. This was not 
easy.”81 An analysis of select examples serves to elucidate how Lanzmann 
judges former “privileged” Jews.
While claiming not to have been interested in the psychology of his 
witnesses,82 Lanzmann’s treatment of survivors suggests otherwise. 
Early instances of this include his short exchanges with Podchlebnik, 
one of two survivors of the Chelmno extermination camp. The following 
crucial encounter takes place between Lanzmann, Podchlebnik, and a 
translator in one of Shoah’s opening scenes:
Lanzmann: What died in him in Chelmno?
Translator: Everything died. But he’s only human, and he wants to live. So 
he must forget. He thanks God for what remains, and that he can forget. 
And let’s not talk about that.
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Lanzmann: Does he think it’s good to talk about it?
Translator: For me it’s not good.
Lanzmann: Then why is he talking about it?
Translator: Because you’re insisting on it. He was sent books on Eichmann’s 
trial. He was a witness, and he didn’t even read them.
Lanzmann: He survived, but is he really alive, or … ?
Translator: At the time, he felt as if he were dead, because he never thought 
he’d survive, but … he’s alive.
Lanzmann: Why does he smile all the time?
Translator: What do you want him to do, cry? Sometimes you smile, some-
times you cry. And if you’re alive, it’s better to smile.83
This exchange serves to establish the fi lmmaker’s convictions regarding 
testimony and (non)recovery. Lanzmann seems to assume that survivors 
of the Sonderkommandos are obligated to record—even relive—their 
experiences for posterity. The confrontational method of questioning is 
prolonged and exacerbated by the impersonal adoption of the third per-
son by both fi lmmaker and (with one brief exception) his translator.
While Lanzmann rarely engages directly with the issue of “privi-
lege” in relation to former Sonderkommando members, he persistently 
seeks an emotional reaction from them in his interviews. The under-
lying assumption being communicated here is that bearing witness is 
a positive—if not healing—act for the survivor, despite Podchlebnik’s 
disagreement. While Avisar praises the “magic” of Shoah for visibly 
transforming the survivors through “emotional and mental crises,”84 
Bill Nichols’s discussion of the ethics of documentary fi lmmaking and 
the limits of provocation contemplates whether viewers can assume that 
Lanzmann’s promptings are as “therapeutic” as the fi lmmaker seems to 
suggest.85 Indeed, scholars have noted that some survivors’ re-engage-
ment with their pasts has brought about more harm than healing.86 
That Podchlebnik’s face is held in a constant close-up throughout the 
scene signifi es the process of judgment conducted through the screened 
image. Under close, unrelenting examination, Podchlebnik’s smile and 
good-humored replies become increasingly forced as he is confronted 
with the imperative to “relive” his victimhood.
Lanzmann’s initial encounter with Podchlebnik is immediately fol-
lowed by his interview with another cigarette-smoking inquirer, Hanna 
Zaïdel, the daughter of a Holocaust survivor and the only member of 
the second generation portrayed in the fi lm. Asked about her curios-
ity regarding her father’s experiences, Zaïdel states: “I never stopped 
questioning him, until I got at the scraps of truth he couldn’t tell me 
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… I had to tear the details out of him.”87 The effect of this segment 
is to elucidate the approach that Lanzmann himself takes throughout 
Shoah, not unlike his adoption of Hilberg’s philosophy of avoiding “big 
questions.” When Podchlebnik is briefl y shown again several minutes 
later, his smile has disappeared and the viewer can only guess at how 
much prodding Lanzmann has instigated before asking the question 
that ensures Podchlebnik breaks down. This is, apparently, the only 
moment worth screening. Lanzmann asks the translator: “How did he 
react, the fi rst time he unloaded the corpses, when the gas van doors 
were opened?” While this question can be seen to indirectly point to the 
ethical dilemma Podchlebnik faced, the focus of Lanzmann’s agenda is 
again on the victim’s suffering, not the tasks he was forced to perform. 
Podchlebnik quickly loses his composure and weeps openly. Lanzmann’s 
assistant translates as Podchlebnik testifi es to his utter helplessness in 
broken dialogue: “What could he do? He cried. The third day he saw his 
wife and children. He placed his wife in the grave and asked to be killed. 
The Germans said he was strong enough to work, that he wouldn’t be 
killed yet.”88 Having convinced Podchlebnik to speak about what he pre-
ferred to “not talk about,” Lanzmann subsequently provokes his tears 
despite the survivor’s conviction that “it’s better to smile.” The grue-
some work of the Sonderkommando is subordinated by Lanzmann’s de-
sire to reveal (or construct) the survivor’s perpetual victimhood.
Moral oppositions are implied again by Lanzmann in the second 
half of Shoah through the contrast he draws between the testimonies 
of Franz Suchomel, an SS Unterscharführer at Treblinka, and Müller 
and Glazar, Czech-Jewish survivors of Auschwitz and Treblinka respec-
tively. Signifi cantly, this section engages to some extent with the ethical 
dilemmas that faced “privileged” Jews, with the subject matter of the 
precarious existence of the Sonderkommandos connecting consecutive 
scenes.89 The “corroboration” of the testimonies begins with Müller de-
scribing what he calls the Auschwitz Sonderkommando’s “crisis situa-
tion.” While images of moving trains fi ll the screen, Müller’s voice can 
be heard lamenting that the continued existence of the “special squads” 
relied on transports of victims and that “when there were fewer train-
loads, it meant immediate extermination for us.”90 Then, as the cam-
era’s gaze turns to his face, Müller emphasizes with a clenched fi st that 
the members of the Sonderkommando still found meaning in their dire 
circumstances:
With our own eyes, we could truly fathom what it means to be a human being 
… the situation taught us fully what the possibility of survival meant. For 
we could gauge the infi nite value of human life. And we were convinced that 
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hope lingers in man as long as he lives. Where there’s life, hope must never 
be relinquished. That’s why we struggled through our lives of hardship.91
Müller’s account of the attempts by crematorium workers to come to 
terms with their traumatic situation points to the choiceless choices they 
confronted; nonetheless, the editing of Suchomel into the next scene re-
directs the focus back to the bifurcation of victims and perpetrators.
Suchomel admits that Treblinka’s Jewish workforce was reduced 
once the transports decreased, with the Nazis employing starvation 
rather than shooting or gassing in order to discourage resistance; how-
ever, the former SS offi cer goes on to give a very different impression 
of the Sonderkommando’s will to live. Tapping his fi nger on the table 
as if blaming the victims, who he has just noted were dying of hunger 
and disease, Suchomel states: “The Jews stopped believing they’d make 
it. … It was all over. … It was all very well to say … I … we kept on 
insisting: ‘You’re going to live!’ We almost believed it ourselves. If you 
lie enough, you believe your own lies. Yes. But they replied to me, ‘No, 
chief, we’re just reprieved corpses.’”92 This last line is even delivered 
with a chuckle. Lanzmann’s inclusion of the perpetrator’s appropria-
tion of the “voice” of his victims positions the viewer to be repelled by 
the anti-Semite’s efforts to absolve himself. Suchomel not only fails to 
reveal a conscience about (nor apparently any awareness of) how his 
own actions destroyed the hope he seems to value, but he also goes so far 
as to posit an atmosphere of camaraderie on the threshold of death. As 
in his interview with Stier, Lanzmann signals Suchomel’s fundamental 
unreliability through his employment of a hidden camera. Suchomel’s 
revealing testimony and unsympathetic body language, covertly trapped 
within the frame, shows that he then lacked—and continues to lack—
humanity. Müller’s words, on the other hand, suggest he and his fellow 
Jews in extremis discovered “what it means to be a human being,” con-
structing a binary opposition between cold malignity and humane vir-
tue, and thereby marginalizing the issue of “privilege.”93 This judgment 
is further reinforced in the next scene, in which Glazar briefl y dwells on 
the ethical dilemma of his Sonderkommando.
Glazar describes the starving special squad’s guilt-ridden relief when 
“transports” of Jews started arriving again at Treblinka: “Then an aw-
ful feeling gripped us, all of us, my companions as well as myself, a feel-
ing of helplessness, of shame. For we threw ourselves on their food.”94 
Lanz mann asks Glazar whether this realization of being compromised 
came instantly at this time, revealing the fi lmmaker’s desire to clarify 
how the Sonderkommando’s behavior should be judged. Most signifi -
cantly, Lanzmann wonders whether the relatively strong and healthy 
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deportees looked like “fi ghters.” With this inducement, Glazar almost 
loses his composure when he replies, “Yes, they could have been fi ght-
ers.”95 Reiterating the shame induced by the admirable qualities of the 
deportees completely ignorant of their fate, Glazar describes the deter-
mination of the special squad that “this couldn’t go on, that something 
had to happen.”96 He then makes reference to the Sonderkommando’s 
forthcoming armed revolt, which marks the end of the scene. Lanz mann’s 
editing of this testimony—the last words Glazar speaks in the fi lm—sug-
gests that Treblinka’s “privileged” Jews had not been corrupted as they 
feared, but it does imply a judgment of their desire (in Glazar’s words) 
“to survive until the rebellion” as the height of dignity.
Refl ecting Felman’s point that “to testify is always, metaphorically, 
to take the witness stand,”97 Lanzmann sets the perpetrators’ ongoing 
anti-Semitic prejudice and deception against the stories of the victims, 
who painfully and truthfully—if not always willingly—“relive” their suf-
fering. The fi lmmaker’s strong desire to depict what he perceives as the 
“courage” and “heroism” displayed by the members of the Sonderkom-
mandos is highlighted with vigor in Lanzmann’s recently published 
memoir, The Patagonian Hare (2012). Listing the names of several cre-
matorium workers he deeply admires and providing a detailed and sym-
pathetic account of their suffering before and during their forced labor 
in the gas chambers, Lanzmann writes:
The other members of the special unit who shared this Calvary with Filip 
Müller, noble fi gures, gravediggers of their own people, at once heroes and 
martyrs, were, like him, simple, intelligent, good men. For the most part, 
despite the hell of the funeral pyres and the crematoria … they never gave 
up their humanity.98
While the phrase “for the most part” seems to imply exceptions to his 
general rule, Lanzmann does not explore further (either in his fi lm or 
his memoir) what he might mean by this. Fitting his interviews of sur-
vivors of the Sonderkommandos into a very specifi c agenda, Lanzmann 
engages to some degree with the extreme ethical dilemmas they faced, 
but only within a broader Manichean framework of judgment.
Framing “Privileged” Jews: The Construction of 
Authorities and Defendants in Holocaust Documentaries
The ethical dilemmas faced by “privileged” prisoners in the camps and 
ghettos are rarely explored in Holocaust documentaries in a substantial 
manner. The six-part miniseries Hitler’s Holocaust (2000), a fi lm that 
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purports to represent the Holocaust in its totality, offers no engagement 
with “privileged” Jews, not even in the episode entitled “Ghetto.”99 Like-
wise, despite a lengthy segment on the Lodz Ghetto in another fi ve-hour 
miniseries, The Nazis: A Warning from History (1997), the ghetto’s in-
famous leader Chaim Rumkowski is not mentioned.100 This is not to say 
that Holocaust documentaries are obligated to explore the situations of 
“privileged” Jews, but it is signifi cant that coverage of them has been 
limited. The notion of “moral compromise” on the part of the victims of 
the Nazis is touched on in several works, although rarely as a central 
theme. While not specifi cally dealing with the “privileged” Jews who 
are the focus of this book, the fi lm Prisoner of Paradise (2002) focuses 
on the story of how the famous German-Jewish fi lmmaker Kurt Gerron 
was forced to create the Nazi propaganda fi lm, The Führer Gives a City 
to the Jews, while incarcerated in Theresienstadt. In Bach in Auschwitz 
(1999), on the other hand, former members of the women’s orchestra in 
Auschwitz only briefl y recount the “privileges” they received for deceiv-
ing prisoners with their music during “selections.”
Clear-cut negative judgment of “privileged” prisoners can be found in 
Alain Resnais’s landmark production, Night and Fog (1955), which per-
sistently condemns the behavior of Kapos. While seldom distinguishing 
Jewish from non-Jewish victims in its eclectic selection of archival foot-
age, Resnais’s mode of representation stresses the “privileges” Kapos 
were awarded for their participation in beatings and torture. While the 
voiceover often questions the fi lm’s potential to capture the “reality” of 
the camps, the narrator emphasizes that Kapos were “almost always” 
common criminals and makes little distinction between prisoner-func-
tionaries and perpetrators, at one point comparing the SS directly with 
the “privileged Kapos. These are the bosses of the camp, the elite.”101 
The use of archival footage—a practice Lanzmann rejected outright—
has proven a particularly powerful vehicle of expressing judgment in a 
number of cases, and this is no more evident than in recent productions 
that portray the Lodz Ghetto.
Photographer (1998) and Lodz Ghetto (1989) both situate the behav-
ior of Chaim Rumkowski within broader narratives that seek to encap-
sulate the experiences of the doomed population of the longest-surviving 
ghetto. Visually speaking, the fi lms rely on a combination of purpose-
shot and archival images, including hundreds of color photographs taken 
during the ghetto’s existence by Walter Genewein, the ghetto’s chief ac-
countant. The use of material originating with the Nazi perpetrators 
is widely considered to be problematic due to the fact it was invariably 
intended for propaganda purposes.102 Indeed, Dariusz Jablonski’s Pho-
tographer is considerably different from Lodz Ghetto in this respect, as 
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it self-consciously reveals an awareness of the artifi ciality of its source 
material and exposes the “persistent Nazi gaze” therein.103 With little 
use of a guiding narrator, Photographer juxtaposes lingering shots of the 
photographs, fragments of wartime speeches and writings read out by 
actors, and the testimony of the fi lm’s only on-screen presence, Arnold 
Mostowitz, who worked as a doctor in the Lodz Ghetto and survived fi ve 
concentration camps. Signifi cantly, the fi lm begins by questioning the 
reliability of the photographs. Mostowitz expresses his deep-seated “un-
ease” that “though this was the ghetto, it was not the ghetto; though 
[the photographs] were real, they did not show the truth.”104 Nonethe-
less, the manipulation of this same source material soon afterward has 
the effect of evoking judgment of Rumkowski. 
At one point in Photographer the camera zooms in on a photograph of 
the Jewish leader meeting Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS.105 The 
image is overlaid with the reenactment of an apparently cordial conver-
sation between the two men regarding work in the ghetto. While one 
might argue that the power relations of such a meeting are impossible 
to recreate, the exchanged words between Rumkowski and Himmler, re-
cited by actors, seem to suggest that the fi lm captures the situation “as 
it really happened.” The seeming civility with which this conversation 
is represented on the soundtrack, which in no way acknowledges the 
ethical dilemma Rumkowski faced, reveals a negative judgment of the 
“privileged” Jew. This scenario is depicted in an almost identical man-
ner in Lodz Ghetto, although the conversation is reenacted in this fi lm 
with somewhat more sinister overtones and accompanied by an intense 
drumbeat on the soundtrack.106 Both fi lms take photographic material 
out of its (already questionable) context on various other occasions in 
order to depict a sharp rift between public statements made by Rum-
kowski and the conditions suffered by the inhabitants of the ghetto.
The use of archival footage and authoritative voiceover are only two 
ways in which Holocaust documentaries may judge “privileged” Jews, 
as the construction of various subject positions within a fi lm’s narrative 
often orient the viewer in similar ways. The positioning of “witnesses,” 
“defendants,” “authorities,” and “evidence” within the frame is crucial 
to how some fi lmmakers have represented (and judged) “privileged” 
Jews. In Josh Waletzky’s Partisans of Vilna, conventional techniques are 
employed in a much more subtle manner than in many other documen-
taries; nonetheless, the fi lm’s attention to the issue of “privileged” Jews 
is relatively short and somewhat overshadowed by its main focus on 
resistance fi ghters.107 Through the fi lmmaker’s editing technique, sev-
eral often-confl icting fragments of testimony from various individuals 
describe Jacob Gens, the chief of the Jewish police in the Vilna Ghetto. 
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These fragments range from acknowledging the ways in which Gens 
aided the partisans, to admitting the diffi cult situation he faced, to high-
lighting the ambivalent attitudes of members of the Resistance toward 
Gens’s controversial activities. By juxtaposing contradictory viewpoints 
(and judgments), the fi lm gives the impression that a fi nal judgment, 
if any can be made, is either unattainable or, at the very least, should 
be left for the viewer to make. As the fi lm also reveals the impossible 
ethical dilemmas that confronted members of the partisans, it might be 
argued that it presents no fi nal authority on the subject of Gens’s be-
havior. Ben Smith has praised Partisans of Vilna for “not taking up an 
obvious position” on whether “collaboration” or resistance was prefer-
able.108 Indeed, Waletzky’s use of multiple viewpoints bears similarities 
to Lanzmann’s method of juxtaposing different perspectives on the role 
of Czerniakow, further revealing that documentary fi lm has the poten-
tial to provide a nuanced representation of “privileged” Jews.109
Ewout van der Knaap seems to touch on this point when he notes 
that the “black and white” representation of prisoner-functionaries in 
Night and Fog contrasts strongly with Kapo, which he argues depicts 
“privileged” prisoners “with shades of gray”: “Here, in a situation of op-
pression, the ethics of survival are arbitrary.”110 However, while the por-
trayal of “privileged” Jews in Kapo often entails less explicit judgments 
than those put forward in Night and Fog, the mode of representation 
in the former fi lm still reveals a distinct process of moral evaluation. 
Very little has been written about Ben-Mayor and Setton’s Kapo, which 
is generally relegated to a footnote;111 nonetheless, the similarities and 
differences between Kapo and Lanzmann’s Shoah serve to further high-
light the possibilities for, and limits of, representing the ethical com-
plexities facing Holocaust victims in extremis.
From the Legal to the Moral: 
Jewish “Collaborators” in Kapo
Although Israeli cinema initially ignored the Holocaust to a large ex-
tent, a spate of documentaries on the subject emerged from the late-
1980s dealing with issues of the second generation, postmemory, and 
identity.112 Amidst this development, Kapo drew on Israel’s so-called 
“Kapo Trials” (discussed in the introduction) to focus specifi cally on the 
behavior and judgments of “privileged” Jews. Despite such an explicit 
undertaking, Kapo does not subscribe to Levi’s pronouncement on the 
need to suspend judgment. In its portrayal of “privileged” Jews and the 
postwar attempts to prosecute them, the fi lm’s preoccupation with legal 
judgment hastily transforms into a moral evaluation of its subjects.113 
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Standing in stark contrast to Lanzmann’s dialogic approach to repre-
senting the Holocaust, Kapo’s expository strategies involve the use of 
traditional documentary devices to engage directly with the problem of 
what is frequently termed Jewish “collaboration.”
Various stylistic features serve to bolster the fi lm’s assertive stance 
in relation to liminal fi gures. The narrative in Kapo begins by contex-
tualizing its investigation within the volatile postwar environment in 
Israel and then branches off to several “case studies” of former “privi-
leged” Jews, fi rst in the ghettos and then in the camps. Fragments of 
contemporary interviews fi lmed in Germany, Poland, Israel, and Aus-
tralia are interspersed with archival documents, photographs, and 
fi lm footage to develop a narrative that encompasses acts of seeming 
“complicity” and “resistance” on the part of several women who had 
held various positions in Auschwitz and a former member of the Jew-
ish police who refused to be interviewed.114 In addition to the testimony 
of former “privileged” Jews, further on-screen interviews are given by 
carefully chosen authorities, including Holocaust survivors who did not 
hold a “privileged” position but who have fi rsthand knowledge relat-
ing to those under scrutiny; the retired Israeli Supreme Court judge 
Haim Cohen; and Michael Gilad, a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau and 
former war crimes investigator. Whereas the plurality of perspectives 
portrayed through Lanzmann’s positioning of Hilberg and Grassler pro-
vides a multilayered representation of the fi gure of the “privileged” Jew, 
the views espoused by authority fi gures in Kapo are never challenged 
through the fi lm’s other devices.
Unlike Lanzmann’s unconventional mode of representation, Kapo is 
permeated by an authoritative voiceover narration. This constitutes the 
central technique of a “conventional” or “expository” documentary fi lm 
that ties all of its other attributes together and guides the viewer to 
adopt the text’s ideological stance. Nichols states that “the adoption of 
direct address has run the perennial risk of dogmatism, using the voice 
of a commentator to authoritatively, if not authoritarianly, assert what 
is, and what is not, the case.”115 The advantage of direct representation 
that Nichols notes, namely “analytical precision,” would seem to be of 
limited value if attempting to negotiate the ethical dilemmas of “privi-
leged” Jews. The use of narrative voiceover in Kapo is complemented 
by the notable absence of any of the fi lmmakers’ questions during the 
interview fragments it includes. This contrasts strongly with the con-
stantly visible and audible impact that Lanzmann’s dominant persona 
has on Shoah. Ben-Mayor and Setton’s less interactive mode of rep-
resentation has signifi cant implications for the ways in which former 
“privileged” Jews are judged in the fi lm.116
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Despite the problematic nature of the Kapo Trials, the fi lm’s “omni-
scient” narrator seldom refl ects on their validity, nor is the use of the 
term “collaboration” questioned. The constantly deep, assertive tone 
of the voiceover is always intense, never sympathetic, and adds to the 
impression that judgment can—and must—be passed. Even when de-
fi ning the term Kapo, the narrator appears to be making a moral pro-
nouncement, loudly declaring that they inhabited “the lowest rung on 
the Nazi ladder of command. Either voluntarily or by force, the Kapos 
were made the instruments of the Nazis, those who delivered the ter-
ror, deprivation, slave labor and, ultimately, death to the prisoners.”117 
The archival photographs selected to follow this, including an image 
of two Nazis torturing a prisoner and several shots of starved victims 
after liberation, bear little connection to “privileged” Jews but reveal 
a clear process of judgment taking place. After a brief summary of the 
Kapo Trials, the camera scans over numerous court transcripts. These 
scenes occur at frequent intervals throughout Kapo and are displayed 
with overlapping excerpts being read out by actors via voiceover, usu-
ally regarding alleged acts of brutality by Kapos during the war. This 
repeated motif not only serves to make negative judgments, but also 
creates the impression that the problem of Jewish “collaboration” has 
a particularly wide scope.
Within the fi lm’s fi rst fi ve minutes, attention turns to one of its major 
case studies, Zvi Hanek Barenblat, the former chief of the Jewish police 
in the Bedzin Ghetto. Through the use of a musical score evoking sus-
pense and horror, the fi lm represents Barenblat’s denunciation, arrest, 
and trial as a dramatic series of events. Reuban Vaxelmann, a survivor 
of the Bedzin Ghetto and Barenblat’s sole accuser in Kapo, had testi-
fi ed at Barenblat’s trial and is consequently used as a “witness” in the 
fi lm. The inclusion and framing of Vaxelmann using an almost legalistic 
discourse implies judgment in itself. Additionally, rather than focus on 
an account of Barenblat’s behavior, Kapo prioritizes Vaxelmann’s de-
scription of his emotional reaction at just hearing Barenblat’s name: “I 
started trembling, the hair on my hands stood up, and I lost control.” 
The misleading use of archival footage is also evident when a fi lm frag-
ment is included of a member of the Jewish police strolling past two 
naked corpses in a street. The images used originate from a Nazi propa-
ganda fi lm of the Warsaw Ghetto, thus Kapo imposes the perpetrators’ 
perspective on—and judgment of—Jews onto the viewer. Further to this, 
immediately after a passage is recited from Calel Perechodnik’s diary 
regarding the impossible situation facing “privileged” Jews in the ghet-
tos, Vaxelmann is portrayed soberly condemning them for their access 
to material “privileges”: “The policemen and the different collaborators 
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had fantastic conditions. They had unlimited food and no restrictions on 
their movements.”
Only after these elements of Kapo are woven together in a blanket of 
judgment does the fi lm return to Barenblat’s story (and its intimidating 
musical score). The narrator points out that the Nazis randomly ap-
pointed all members of the local orchestra, of which Barenblat was the 
conductor, to be Jewish police, although the effect of this revelation is 
arguably lost due to the scenes preceding it. Signifi cantly, Kapo gives no 
indication that during Barenblat’s 1961 trial, his prosecutor conceded 
that he had saved between ten and twenty Jews.118 After Vaxelmann is 
shown emphasizing the fear other Jews had of Barenblat, Gilad authori-
tatively underlines his judgment: “Under such circumstances some have 
moral integrity and stand by their principles. And others simply … turn 
into creatures who would do anything to survive.” As Gilad raises his 
fi nger and repeats “Anything,” the camera returns to images of starving 
children and corpses in the Warsaw Ghetto. Just as Vaxelmann’s role 
as “witness” is prioritized, the positioning of Gilad in relation to “privi-
leged” Jews points to another key facet of the fi lm’s mode of judgment, 
namely its construction of a binary opposition between “authorities” 
and “defendants.”
Whereas Lanzmann concentrates his attention in much of the editing 
process on setting victims against persecutors, the fi lmmakers of Kapo 
stress the distinction between “privileged” and “non-privileged” prison-
ers in the camps and ghettos, placing signifi cantly limited emphasis on 
the role of the Nazi perpetrators. Gilad is established as a moral author-
ity throughout his several appearances in Kapo. One of only three sur-
vivors in the fi lm who did not hold a “privileged” position, his testimony 
is of crucial importance, serving to guide the viewer’s judgment(s). In 
his fi rst scene, after the narrator clarifi es the role of “privileged” Jews 
in the ghettos, Gilad delivers a general statement that may be seen to 
apply more broadly to the camps as well:
Nobody knew what could happen in fi ve minutes time. So it’s hard to say. … 
Most of the people with positions were chosen at random. It’s true that those 
selected could have refused. Refused and maybe paid for it with their lives. 
Still, it was possible. Those willing to sacrifi ce their lives for their principles 
did not have to accept the position.
Seated in front of a wall stacked with rows of books, Gilad appears in 
a considerably more studious setting than other interviewees. The na-
ture of his judgment is clear in his emphatic tone and the authoritative 
way in which he raises his hand when declaring it was possible (and 
preferable) to “sacrifi ce” one’s life and refuse “privilege.” While he also 
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concedes that “it’s hard to say,” or, in other words, “diffi cult to judge,” 
this and subsequent appearances by Gilad confi rm that he is capable of 
judgment, a point sustained throughout the fi lm by his continued input 
during the examination of specifi c “privileged” Jews.
During the brief appearance of another authority, Judge Cohen, who 
had presided over some of the Israeli trials of former “privileged” Jews, 
Kapo seems on the verge of suggesting that judgment of these liminal 
fi gures should be suspended. Toward the end of the fi lm, a contempla-
tive Cohen delivers this pivotal statement:
I could not escape the feeling that we are not at all able to judge these people, 
or even to put ourselves in their shoes, as one must do to judge someone. If a 
person acts under the threat of death to himself or his children [sic], solidar-
ity with others doesn’t come into the equation. His solidarity is fi rst of all to 
himself and his children. It’s not only natural but also moral and permissible. 
I had sleepless nights for over a year. I sometimes felt … great pity for the 
person I had to judge and accuse. But sometimes I was also disgusted.
Here Cohen seems to acknowledge the impossibility of judgment but is 
simultaneously compelled to pass it; his fi nal admission that he could 
not help but be “disgusted” suggests that he may be, like Levi, caught 
in a paradox of judgment. While Cohen implies that “privileged” Jews 
should be pitied for being forced into extreme situations, he also sug-
gests that one cannot resist being repulsed at times by their behavior. 
Cohen’s verdict on judgment is, in any case, surrounded by a plethora 
of evidence that the “privileged” Jews depicted in Kapo are subject to 
a process of moral evaluation, developed in part through the editing of 
interviews with several survivors who are essentially placed “on trial.”
The fi lmmakers’ positioning of former “privileged” Jews as “defen-
dants” is revealed most clearly in the representation of Magda Hellinger, 
a Czech Jew who at one point became responsible for 30,000 women as 
Lagerälteste [Camp Eldest] of the Women’s Camp in Birkenau. Hellinger 
held the (notably low) prisoner number of 2318 and survived three and 
a half years in Auschwitz. Kapo’s overwhelming focus on Hellinger’s 
experiences as a “privileged” Jew is signifi cant, as this marginalizes 
her experiences as a prisoner before and after her “privileged” period, 
which are detailed in her memoir.119 Barely surviving both malaria and 
paratyphus, Hellinger narrowly escaped several “selections” and was 
even pulled from a line heading for the gas chamber. In her memoir 
and the video testimony she recorded for the Jewish Holocaust Centre 
in Melbourne, Australia, Hellinger represents herself as consistently 
generous, self-sacrifi cing, and protective of others.120 Reportedly held in 
high esteem by the camp’s Resistance, she describes her situation as 
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“fi ght[ing] a daily battle to save the lives of fellow prisoners of war.”121 
During her nearly six-hour-long video testimony, Hellinger speaks with 
an invariably relaxed, even tone, often gentle expression, and occasion-
ally humorous engagement with her interviewers.
In Kapo, Hellinger is presented to the viewer with what seems to be 
a very different persona. At one point she sternly explains her willing-
ness to punish those beneath her if they did not meet her expectations: 
“I was very strict, to myself and to others.” Delivering her statements 
in an increasingly aggressive voice and pointing her fi nger at the inter-
viewer at times, Hellinger exhibits a somewhat unfriendly disposition. 
It is also noteworthy that during this scene, the footage of Hellinger 
speaking is bisected with archival footage of female prisoners calmly 
conversing in a barrack, images obviously fi lmed after the war. In this 
way, the fi lm not only ignores the extreme environment in which “privi-
leged” Jews operated, but implicitly dilutes it. On the other hand, Hell-
inger is shown recounting how she “suffered” from being utterly help-
less during Mengele’s “selections.” Notably, this is preceded by the sole 
instance when Gilad expresses doubt in his ability to judge. Refl ecting 
on whether a member of the Sonderkommando could have shouted a 
warning to Jews on the unloading ramp, he sincerely concludes: “How 
could he have helped us by doing it? I don’t know. I simply don’t know.” 
Echoing this, Hellinger asks: “How could I stop it, I thought. How could 
I stop it? I can’t!” Yet there is a strong dissonance between such mo-
ments and the means by which the fi lmmakers proceed to depict victim 
behavior in extremis.
Later in Kapo, Hellinger recounts with apparent satisfaction how she 
quelled the “brewing” of a group of prisoners by using the threat of 
physical violence. She follows this with a description of the personal 
consequences of her “privileged” position: “It sounded [as if] I am so 
strong, and you know, I was showing so strong [sic]. But when I came 
home, in my room, then I cried, and I cried … and I cried.” An emotional 
Hellinger seems on the point of losing her composure in this shot’s fi nal 
moment; however, the fi lm immediately cuts to footage of Auschwitz, 
including what appears to be the corpse of a child. Interestingly, while 
Lanzmann prioritizes—and actively seeks—the emotional breakdown 
of former “privileged” Jews, Ben-Mayor and Setton move away from 
this. Instead, the narrator of Kapo refl ects on Hellinger’s situation:
But was it truly essential at the threshold of death to maintain order and 
obedience? We will never know. In hindsight, it appears that manipulating 
Jews to collaborate in return for their lives was yet another component in the 
Nazi plan to rid Europe of its Jews. In reality, apart from a few insignifi cant 
attempts to rebel, the camp’s routine continued uninterrupted.
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Despite the narrator’s signifi cant—though somewhat ironically spoken—
statement that “we will never know,” subsequent observations seem to 
imply that there were options other than “collaboration.” Indeed, the 
narrator’s reference to the need “to maintain order and obedience” dis-
tracts from the reason why “privileged” Jews behaved as they did: to 
attempt to survive. The narrator’s comment might almost be seen as 
transferring the desire to maintain camp discipline from the Nazi perpe-
trators to the prisoner-functionaries they coerced into obeying them.
Judgment is also brought to bear on Hellinger after she fi nishes her 
story, via the fi lm’s reintroduction of Vaxelmann. Until now only used 
as a witness to Barenblat’s behavior, which he witnessed fi rsthand, 
Vaxel mann is now positioned as an authority qualifi ed to make an un-
challenged judgment on “privileged” Jews in general. His aggressive pro-
nouncement, echoing Arendt’s criticism of the role of Jewish leaders (see 
the introduction), can be seen to constitute the fi lm’s climax: “Today, 
more than ever, I’m convinced that without the collaboration of Jews 
they wouldn’t have succeeded in murdering six million Jews.” The fi lm 
now fades to black and cuts to footage of the liberation, signaling the 
end of the section on wartime experiences. While Kapo engages to some 
degree with the problem of judgment, the fi lm’s clear argumentative 
thrust frequently conveys negative judgments of former “privileged” 
Jews. Having established the defendants and authorities, the fi lm’s de-
nouement clarifi es the fi lmmakers’ judgments by constructing a moral 
spectrum not unlike that seen in the writings of Levi and Hilberg.
The fi nal section of Kapo highlights the lynchings and mock trials of 
“collaborators” in the war’s aftermath, before it returns to the trials 
in Israel with which the fi lm began. The narrator recounts the various 
convictions of Jewish “collaborators” without criticism, including Baren-
blat’s sentence of fi ve years imprisonment, which was later overturned. 
Vaxelmann delivers his fi nal, emotional verdict: “There is no forgiveness. 
There is no resurrection.” The demonization of Barenblat is further re-
inforced when the fi lmmakers go in search of the former “privileged” 
Jew, who has remarried and moved to Germany. Footage is shown from 
a moving car that seems to be seeking him out. At the same time, the au-
thoritative voiceover declares: “To this day, Barenblat refuses to make 
any reference to his past. He leads a quiet life and asked not to be inter-
viewed for this fi lm.” Just as this sentence begins, the camera zooms in 
on a building window, showing the back of an old man reading a news-
paper. The invasive shot of this fi gure, presumably Barenblat, implies 
that this “privileged” Jew has an obligation to testify and has failed to 
do so. Arguably, as he is not willing to subject himself to the scrutiny of 
the camera, Barenblat is subjected to moral condemnation.
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The “defendants” who have testifi ed throughout Kapo fare better on 
the fi lm’s moral spectrum. Unlike Barenblat, these individuals are re-
ferred to by their fi rst names and are shown relaxed in their homes. As 
the fi lm’s musical score comes to a halt, Vera Alexander, a former Aus-
chwitz prisoner-functionary who was responsible for a prisoner barrack, 
is shown peacefully tending her garden at her home in Israel. None-
theless, in the narrator’s ironic observation that Alexander “does not 
see a moral problem in the fact that she held a position in the camps,” 
there seems to be a suggestion that there is a moral problem—and one 
that should be recognized. In the next frame, Alexander is shown sitting 
in her house. Clearly annoyed, Alexander tells the interviewer: “No, it 
wasn’t the power. I don’t know. Today I don’t know what it is. This 
passion to live. To live.” After Alexander stresses the last phrase, the 
camera lingers on her while she calmly smokes a cigarette. This scene 
illustrates the crucial importance of the fi lmmakers’ questions being 
left out of the fi nal cut. From Alexander’s attitude toward the unseen 
interviewer(s) and because of the initial words she uses to attempt to 
explain her motivation—“No, it wasn’t the power”—it is evident that 
she has been asked a particularly loaded question. While Lanzmann’s 
provocation of emotional responses from former “privileged” Jews is 
shown on-screen, this process is disguised in Kapo behind a curtain of 
silence and anonymity.
The viewer is positioned to be similarly discomforted by the fi nal ap-
pearance of Hellinger, who, according to the voiceover, to this day “jus-
tifi es her life story on that far planet called Auschwitz.” An intrusive 
humming sound is heard on the soundtrack as the former Lagerälteste 
polishes ornaments in a cabinet, which might be viewed as an implicit 
reference to the material benefi ts that Hellinger had access to in Aus-
chwitz due to her “privileged” position. The camera then captures her 
fi nal, intensely spoken words in a close-up: “I feel that I was chosen 
by fate, chosen by fate, to save, to help … by every step [that] I did 
[sic].” The omission of any context for this claim—we do not hear the 
interviewer’s comments or questions—again has implications for how 
judgment is passed. However one interprets the statement made by 
Hellinger, the inclusion of it in Kapo without any acknowledgment of 
her numerous recollections of saving prisoners, as recorded in her mem-
oir and video testimony, reveals that the fi lm positions her claim to come 
across as ludicrous.
The next scene represents Francis Kousal, who also held a “privi-
leged” position in Auschwitz, in a completely different manner from the 
previous portrayals of Barenblat, Alexander, and Hellinger. Judgment 
of Kousal is passed primarily through the depiction of her present-day 
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friendship with Thea Kimla, a “non-privileged” prisoner who had been 
in the barrack that Kousal had supervised. The camera tracks Kimla 
and Kousal as they walk down a busy commercial street, chatting 
happily with each other. The narrator states in a calmer tone than is 
generally used in the fi lm’s voiceover that while “Francis was neither 
questioned nor tried for her conduct during the war … Thea chose to 
forgive, and despite the vast difference in status, Thea, a common pris-
oner, and Francis, a block commander, became close friends.” Seated in 
another domestic setting, an emotional Kimla is shown describing what 
she terms the “spark of life” that drove prisoners in the camp to survive 
and her perception of Kousal during her incarceration: “Everybody, in-
cluding myself, did anything to survive. I knew she was a prisoner like I 
was, so I didn’t blame her that she took a position, because she wanted 
to survive—which I could very well understand.” Kousal, who is shown 
sitting on a nearby sofa and humbly listening to Kimla’s words, is re-
deemed through her friend’s testimony.122 The authoritative narrator’s 
unambiguous pronouncement that “Thea chose to forgive” explicitly re-
inforces this judgment.
The last word on “privileged” Jews in Kapo is given to the authority 
Gilad, who represents himself almost as a historian in his own right: 
“And I keep on researching this period and the more I research … the 
less I understand. I’m glad about one thing, that I myself didn’t lose 
my human dignity. And that I did not lose faith in humanity, although 
I came very close.” Gilad’s fi nal words progress from showing visible 
sorrow that a full understanding of the time cannot be obtained to ex-
pressing relief that conventional notions of dignity and humanity re-
main intact. This may be seen to refl ect the fi ndings of the fi lm as a 
whole. Although Kapo seems to question the possibility of judgment 
through the inclusion of Cohen’s refl ections (as noted earlier), this is 
overwhelmed by the adoption of a redemptory discourse that positions 
the fi lm’s case studies along a moral spectrum. While Lanzmann’s mul-
tifaceted involvement in Shoah produces a more refl exive process that 
seems to entail the possibility of suspending judgment at times, Kapo’s 
linear structure, manipulative musical score and direct, unquestioning 
mode of expository address result in clear-cut judgments, casting aside 
the ethical uncertainty to which the fi lm briefl y refers.
In their efforts to bridge history and witness testimony with the me-
dium of fi lm, documentary fi lmmakers have utilized numerous means 
of representing the Holocaust. In some ways, the exposure of the image 
through the camera can be seen to offer a heightened potential for pro-
viding a nuanced representation of “privileged” Jews; nonetheless, the 
preceding analysis of the discursive differences between Shoah and 
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other documentaries highlights the distinct ways in which the problem 
of judgment informs—and is informed by—the genre. Situated between 
the conventional narrative tropes common to fi ction fi lms and the direct, 
expository address most often adopted in documentaries, Lanzmann’s 
editing technique serves not to create a coherent whole but to construct 
paradigmatic relations between two groups, namely victims and perpe-
trators. On the other hand, the editing of interviews and archival mate-
rial in Kapo often sets “privileged” and “non-privileged” victims against 
one another. Indeed, judgment may be seen as intrinsic to the interview 
process itself, which Nichols describes as “a form of hierarchical dis-
course deriving from the unequal distribution of power, as in the confes-
sional and the interrogation.”123 While the interview process in Kapo is 
markedly rigid, the internal structuring and comparative openness of 
Shoah allows for Hilberg’s judgment of Czerniakow to be exposed and 
challenged.
Overall, the documentary fi lms analyzed here offer only limited 
awareness of—and insight into—the indecipherable realm of Levi’s grey 
zone. Yet this has not always been the case in the genre of fi ction fi lm. 
Through substituting “real” people with fi ctionalized characters, some 
fi ction fi lmmakers self-consciously engage with the problem of judgment 
in relation to “privileged” Jews. Indeed, when taking into account the 
signifi cant differences between the traditional documentary format and 
Lanzmann’s conceptualization of his interviewees as “actors,” it would 
seem logical that fi ction fi lms would employ very different modalities 
when representing liminal fi gures. The fi nal substantive chapter will 
examine what implications the limit of judgment has for Holocaust fi c-
tion fi lms and what potential the fi lms of this genre have to suspend 
judgment of “privileged” Jews.
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CHAPTER 4
PORTRAYING “PRIVILEGED” JEWS 
IN FICTION FILMS
THE POTENTIAL TO SUSPEND JUDGMENT?
R
In one of his last essays, which was fi rst presented at an academic 
conference on the grey zone, Raul Hilberg emphasizes the inevitable 
incompleteness of empirical historiography, noting that in contrast to 
written history’s “scattered images,” more complete “descriptions” are 
attempted by novelists and fi lmmakers.1 In relation to literary and fi lmic 
works that represent the Holocaust, Hilberg writes: “To fi ll the gap they 
promise an imaginative reconstruction, but given the manifest diffi cul-
ties it is often imaginary.”2 Considerable scholarly attention has been 
directed at fi ction fi lms dealing with the Holocaust, particularly Steven 
Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993) and Roberto Benigni’s Life Is Beau-
tiful (1998), with many commentators condemning their apparently 
reassuring messages of spiritual triumph and selfl ess heroism.3 Such ar-
guments are refl ected in the title of Lawrence L. Langer’s essay “Life Is 
Not Beautiful,”4 and chapter 1 of this book highlights how Primo Levi’s 
skepticism toward Holocaust fi lms partly motivated him to develop his 
concept of the grey zone in the fi rst place. Nonetheless, Holocaust cin-
ema has had a signifi cant impact on collective memories of the war and 
for this reason alone is an important topic of discussion. This chapter 
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explores representations of “privileged” Jews in fi ction fi lms—of which 
there have been many—through a comparative analysis of Spielberg’s 
Schindler’s List and Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone (2001).
In contrast to what is often perceived to be the close relationship to 
historical “reality” displayed in documentary fi lms, fi ctional represen-
tations on fi lm generally devote less attention to ideas of “truth” and 
“accuracy.” The dramatization of “privileged” Jews using actors differs 
considerably from the representational strategy used in documentaries 
of placing historical fi gures themselves before the camera. Additionally, 
just as varied modes of judgment were shown to be at work in Claude 
Lanzmann’s Shoah and other documentary formats, two categories can 
be identifi ed within the fi ction fi lms being looked at here—what may 
be considered “conventional” and “unconventional” representations of 
“privileged” Jews. There is insuffi cient space here to do justice to the 
immense variety of these depictions, and it is important to keep the 
diverse strategies of fi lmmakers in mind when grouping fi lms in such a 
broad manner. However, a distinction such as this is useful for the pur-
poses of this analysis, which focuses on two key fi lms that can be seen 
in many ways to exemplify both categories. As in the previous chapter, 
in contrasting Holocaust fi lms in this way, the overt purpose is not to 
express a preference for one fi lm over another, but to point to the differ-
ent modes of representation and judgment that are adopted and resisted 
in the fi ctional space.
First, “conventional” or “mainstream” fi lmic representations of “priv-
ileged” Jews portray the Holocaust using traditional narrative conven-
tions, often concentrating on incidents of resistance and rescue, and 
relying on moral distinctions between what is constructed as the “good” 
and the “bad.”5 These common thematic concerns of mainstream fi lms, 
which frequently attract a widespread theatrical release and prominent 
cast, invariably go hand in hand with the importance placed on fi nanc-
ing and profi ts. Refl ecting what is thought to garner commercial success, 
a fi lm’s audience is positioned to identify with the “good” characters 
and think negatively of the “bad” characters through sympathetic or 
unsympathetic characterization, with the aid of many other devices. As 
suggested previously, this kind of binary opposition extinguishes the 
moral complexities involved in the experiences of “privileged” Jews. 
Like documentary fi lmmakers, fi ction fi lmmakers are under no obliga-
tion to represent “privileged” Jews; nonetheless, it is interesting to note 
that those who do portray these liminal fi gures generally marginalize 
the importance of their experiences and behavior.6 Commonly portrayed 
as minor, insignifi cant characters, “privileged” Jews are repeatedly rep-
resented in a negative light, often before being absolved by their own 
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or others’ courageous acts. A close analysis of Schindler’s List reveals 
that the fi lm’s classical Hollywood narrative formula has considerable 
implications for its portrayal of “privileged” Jews, as the majority of the 
fi lm pivots on clear positive and negative moral judgments.
On the other hand, several recent fi lms deviate from themes of brav-
ery and martyrdom, and focus on issues of survivor trauma, guilt, and 
compromise. While in mainstream productions the ethical dilemmas 
confronting Jews in the camps and ghettos are frequently overshad-
owed by glorifi ed feats of courage, some other fi lms do represent the 
complexities of survival by adopting an anti-redemptory approach. Such 
productions utilize unconventional characterization and reject tradi-
tional “Hollywood” tropes, such as heroism, romance, sentimentality, 
and closure. The self-refl exive aspects of such fi lms seem to question 
whether defi nitive moral categories can be applied when exploring the 
extreme situations of “privileged” Jews. In so doing, these fi lms move 
toward the suspension of judgment required by Levi. Such an undertak-
ing is exemplifi ed in Nelson’s response to Levi’s writings in his fi lm The 
Grey Zone, which is also in many ways a response to Schindler’s List.
From Heroic Deeds to Happy Endings: 
Hollywood’s Compromise
The cinematic representation of the Holocaust arguably faces a vast 
number of obstacles. Many critics have denounced mainstream fi lmmak-
ers for trivializing the event through their use of conventions perceived 
as necessary to draw large audiences—and thus box offi ce returns. A 
major part of what has frequently—and negatively—been characterized 
as the “Americanization” of the Holocaust has been the “Hollywoodiza-
tion” of it, a development Tim Cole sees as exemplifi ed by Schindler’s 
List. Cole writes that “Spielberg hasn’t given us a documentary fi lm 
in Schindler’s List, but the contemporary example of the Hollywood 
‘Holocaust.’”7 Other scholars contend that even melodramatic misrep-
resentations can foster awareness.8 Exemplifying the tension between 
mass dissemination and historical “simplifi cation” is Marvin Chomsky’s 
seven-hour miniseries Holocaust: The Story of the Family Weiss (1978), 
which reached hundreds of millions of viewers worldwide and helped 
to establish the Jewish particularity of the Holocaust, while simultane-
ously igniting a fi ery debate over “trivialization.”9 Claude Lanzmann 
has himself condemned Holocaust and Schindler’s List, claiming the 
former “perpetrates a lie, a moral crime; it assassinates memory.”10 In-
deed, a binary opposition has arisen in the critical discourse on Holo-
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caust fi lm that sets Lanzmann’s Shoah against Spielberg’s fi lm, evoking 
contrasts between “high” and “low” culture, “art” and “kitsch,” invari-
ably to the detriment of Schindler’s List and mainstream representa-
tions in general.11
Some scholars maintain that Holocaust fi lms must be “judged by his-
torical standards,” as “given their role in public memory work, their 
status as works of art cannot absolve them of a responsibility to history, 
particularly when they set themselves up as ‘authentic historical docu-
ments.’”12 However, certain “reworkings” of accepted historical details, 
an all-pervasive and inevitable part of the fi ctionalizing process, can be 
both legitimate and valuable. Judith Doneson, a renowned analyst in 
the area, prioritizes a Holocaust fi lm’s faithfulness to “the actual event” 
as a whole, rather than the literal “accuracy” of “precise detail.”13 Done-
son’s perspective is crucial to the way this chapter understands fi ction 
fi lm, as it underlines the potential of works in the genre to capture the 
“essence” of the Holocaust without losing track of its historical specifi c-
ity. I argue later in the chapter that it is through a fl exible relationship 
with historical chronology and literal “facts” that Nelson’s fi lm engages 
directly with the ethical dilemmas of “privileged” Jews. On the other 
hand, these liminal fi gures are invariably subjected to clear-cut moral 
judgments in Hollywood-style narratives, judgments that can be readily 
connected to the fi lmmaker’s preoccupation with certain themes.
Annette Insdorf has observed that while the fi rst two decades of 
Holocaust feature fi lms focused on “Jewish victims and Nazi villains,” 
the “second wave,” beginning in the mid-1980s, has concentrated on 
resistance and rescue.14 The release of Schindler’s List perhaps only 
hastened this trend, with stories of Gentile saviors and Jewish fi ghters 
rushing to the screen ever since.15 Whether or not “privileged” Jews are 
represented in such fi lms is only partly determined by the settings in 
which their narratives take place. While the far-reaching plot of the Ho-
locaust miniseries represents Kapos, Judenrat offi cials, Jewish police, 
and members of the Sonderkommandos, it relegates all “privileged” 
Jews to brief appearances or relatively minor roles, a strategy common 
to many productions. In fi lms concentrating on ghetto experiences, Jew-
ish police in particular are depicted negatively, as seen, for example, in 
the Polish fi lm Korczak (1990) and the more recent NBC production 
Uprising (2001). Both fi lms treat the Judenrat leader Adam Czerniakow 
more sympathetically than members of the Ordnungsdienst, yet they 
still pass judgments redolent of Hilberg’s (see chapter 2). In Korczak, 
Czerniakow is contrasted with the morally superior savior of orphans, 
while the highly exaggerated depiction of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt 
in Uprising sees the Jewish leader portrayed as naïve (and at times 
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seemingly on the brink of madness), unlike the many heroic resistance 
fi ghters who choose to respond to Nazi oppression differently.16 Such ex-
amples of the distinction made between “resistance” and “cooperation” 
typify the judgments passed by many fi lmmakers. A small number of 
mainstream Holocaust fi lms position “privileged” Jews as protagonists, 
although such fi lms generally portray “privileged” positions as being 
held by virtuous or heroic main characters with whom the audience is 
positioned to identify, and issues of moral ambiguity and “compromise” 
are generally overwhelmed by their emphasis on resistance. 
While Hollywood’s Triumph of the Spirit (1989) represents dehu-
manization, theft, and confl ict between “non-privileged” prisoners in 
Auschwitz, its narrative strategies work to avoid confronting the ethi-
cal dilemmas of the Jews holding “privileged” positions in the camp. 
The fi lm dramatizes the story of Salomo Arouch, a Greek-Jewish boxer 
from Salonika who was deported with his family to Auschwitz, where he 
gained “privileges” after being enlisted to fi ght for the entertainment of 
the SS. Signifi cantly, while every prisoner-functionary in the fi lm is rep-
resented as cold and violent, all visible camp insignia and dialogue indi-
cate that they are, without exception, criminals, political prisoners, or 
Gypsies. On the other hand, Gillo Pontecorvo’s Italian fi lm Kapò (1959), 
a somewhat “Americanized” production with a Hollywood star and mu-
sical score, portrays a fourteen-year-old Jewish girl named Edith inad-
vertently gaining a position of “power” in a forced labor camp.17 After 
taking on a false identity as the non-Jewish “Nicole,” Edith gains “privi-
leges” at fi rst by becoming a sexual companion to a Nazi guard and later 
by becoming an emotionally callous Kapo, a position that earns her the 
resentment of the other prisoners. By the fi lm’s end, however, Edith’s 
conscience and identity are reignited by a love interest in the Resistance. 
She is sacrifi ced during a prisoner uprising, absolving herself by shut-
ting off the camp’s electricity while the other inmates escape, thereby 
establishing the fi lm’s depiction of the “privileged” Jew as martyr.
The representation of “privileged” Jews within the common paradigm 
of resistance and rescue, and the simultaneous emphasis on redemption, 
has important implications for how they are judged. At fi rst demonized 
for their behavior, the “morally compromised” individuals must then be 
absolved in some way before they can be acknowledged as victims of the 
Nazi perpetrators. The typology of the corrupt “privileged” Jew who is 
eventually redeemed is exemplifi ed in Schindler’s List, an adaptation of 
Thomas Keneally’s historical novel, Schindler’s Ark (1982). Spielberg’s 
fi lm engages with the Holocaust through a sentimental, Hollywood lens. 
Anthony Savile condemns the use of sentimentality in general, char-
acterizing the mode as a (self-)deceptive attempt to disguise diffi cult 
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and uncomfortable realities of the world. He argues that “a sentimen-
tal mode of thought is typically one that idealizes its object under the 
guidance of a desire for gratifi cation and reassurance.”18 An analysis of 
Spielberg’s various appeals to audience emotion reveals that the many 
strategies used in the making of his blockbuster have a signifi cant im-
pact on the representation and judgment of “privileged” Jews.
Redeeming the “Privileged” Jew: 
Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List
Schindler’s List focuses on the deeds of the German industrialist Os-
kar Schindler, whose rescue of approximately 1,100 Jews from Nazi-
occupied Krakow has become one of the most widely known, if far from 
representative, stories of the Holocaust.19 With its release coinciding 
with the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
Washington and a general lack of public awareness of the Holocaust 
(particularly on the part of young people), Schindler’s List ignited fi ery 
debates over the representation of the Holocaust. Miriam Hansen pro-
vides a useful overview of the main academic criticisms of Spielberg’s 
fi lm, which center on its status as a “Hollywood” product; its “fi ctional-
ized,” “classical,” or “realist” narrative; its appropriation of the per-
spective of perpetrators; its alleged portrayal of Jewish stereotypes; and 
its supposed violation of the “taboo on representation.”20
Assuming that the fi lm is likely to be the sole source of informa-
tion about the Holocaust for countless viewers worldwide, many critics 
feared the public would perceive its story to be the norm rather than the 
exception, constituting a paradigm shift of signifi cant proportions.21 As 
Omer Bartov contends, Spielberg’s “tale is so unique as to be untrue.”22 
Although hardly an inspiring fi gure initially, Schindler is the hero of 
the fi lm in the sense of both protagonist and virtuous savior. The fi lm’s 
much-discussed exaggeration and simplifi cation of Schindler’s actions 
and its simultaneous depiction of “his” Jews as overwhelmingly depen-
dent on him has the dual effect of overemphasizing altruistic rescue by 
Gentiles and neglecting the issues of Jewish resistance and cooperation. 
Many aspects of the fi lm’s representation of Schindler’s behavior are 
not only inconsistent with Keneally’s novel, but have been contradicted 
by Schindler’s wife’s memoir and David M. Crowe’s recent biography of 
Schindler.23 In his romanticization of his fi lm’s protagonist, Spielberg 
omits many of Schindler’s more dubious qualities, including his time as 
a loyal branch offi ce director of German counterintelligence who perse-
cuted foreign spies and collaborated with German occupiers. Schindler’s 
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assault of a Jewish retailer, originally included in the shooting script, 
was also left out of the fi nal cut.24 Signifi cantly, the fi lm’s earlier screen-
writer, Kurt Luedtke, abandoned the task after almost four years of 
struggling with personal doubts about Schindler’s heroism.25 Despite 
the often aggressive criticism of Schindler’s List, Spielberg’s fi lm is un-
questionably an accomplished production, which broke new ground in 
the cinematic representation of the Holocaust, at least in part due to 
its stylistic appeals to historical “authenticity” through black-and-white 
cinematography, chiaroscuro lighting, complex editing, and handheld 
camerawork. However, in its indebtedness to fi lm noir and the broader 
classical Hollywood tradition, Schindler’s List may still be considered a 
conventional Holocaust fi lm.
Many scholars have criticized Spielberg’s strict adherence to ste-
reotypes of good and evil.26 Signifi cantly, Sara Horowitz argues that 
Schindler’s List “softens the unrelenting nature of atrocity during the 
Holocaust and the moral complexities of survival that Primo Levi refers 
to as the ‘grey zone.’”27 However, only cursory attention has been given 
to Spielberg’s representation of “privileged” Jews. Bryan Cheyette ar-
gues in his Levi-inspired critique of Schindler’s List that the ethical un-
certainty evoked in the early parts of the fi lm’s narrative breaks down 
into a Manichean aesthetic. He asserts that “the dehumanization and 
enforced complicity of the victims of genocide is left unrepresented,” 
but offers little analysis of Spielberg’s depiction of members of the Ord-
nungsdienst, who make frequent appearances in the fi lm.28 Likewise, 
Gillian Rose only briefl y mentions that the novel’s preoccupation with 
the “growing viciousness of the Jewish police” is “barely evident” in the 
fi lm.29 Spielberg’s overwhelming focus is on the redemption and hero-
ism of the German rescuer, although this also allows for the redemption 
of the corrupt “privileged” Jew.
Negative judgment of “privileged” Jews is communicated throughout 
Schindler’s List, primarily in the characterization of Marcel Goldberg 
and Wilek Chilowicz. These fi gures become Jewish police early in the 
fi lm and contrast strongly with other Jewish characters and Schindler 
himself. A binary opposition is also constructed between Goldberg and 
another somewhat “privileged” fi gure, Itzhak Stern, who is judged in a 
positive manner (to be discussed later). Curiously, the representation 
and judgment of these “privileged” Jews frequently rely on the fi lm’s 
employment of humor. Still widely considered to be taboo, Holocaust 
humor nonetheless plays an important part in the representation of this 
traumatic event. The use of humor in Holocaust or Nazi-related fi lms 
has a long history, often drawing (ironically or otherwise) on German 
and Jewish stereotypes for the purposes of audience entertainment, but 
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also exhibiting considerable potential to invoke the tragic. However, in 
the case of Schindler’s List, which can by no means be classifi ed as a 
comedy, much of the humor embedded in the fi lm serves as a vehicle of 
judgment. The Jewish police are initially portrayed somewhat ambiva-
lently through the use of humor, although this soon reverts to a clear-
cut negative judgment of their behavior.
Goldberg and Chilowicz are depicted in one of the fi lm’s opening 
scenes as smugglers meeting their acquaintance, Poldek Pfefferberg, to 
barter black-market goods in a Catholic church. It is Pfefferberg whom 
the camera follows to the church, encouraging the viewer, if not to iden-
tify with him, then at least to consider him the most worthy of atten-
tion. However, the viewer is not yet positioned against the apparently 
benign fi gures of Goldberg and Chilowicz. Located in the middle of the 
frame between the two men, it is nonetheless clear from the start that 
Pfefferberg is not overly friendly with them. He threatens to report 
Chilowicz to the Nazi authorities for delivering shoe polish in breakable 
glass rather than metal containers, and their statements back and forth 
are playfully echoed by a smiling, sarcastic, and seemingly harmless 
Goldberg. When Schindler suddenly turns around in the seat in front of 
them to inquire after Pfefferberg’s shirt, which causes the other smug-
glers behind them to hastily depart, Goldberg comically pretends to pray 
before also abandoning his seat with Chilowicz. Walking down the aisle, 
the two men stop and look back, apparently waiting for Pfefferberg. 
Again situated in the middle of the frame, the seated Pfefferberg is sym-
bolically positioned between the German businessman foregrounded 
on his left and the two Jewish smugglers in the distance on his right, 
visually highlighting the choice that Pfefferberg hesitates to make. Af-
ter a prolonged pause, he accedes to Schindler’s request for goods and 
smirks wryly as he looks back at his former companions. The parting 
of these characters soon takes on a broader signifi cance, with Goldberg 
and Chilowicz joining the Jewish police while Pfefferberg becomes a re-
liable helper and primary procurer of goods for Schindler. Although the 
important moral implications of Pfefferberg’s choice are not crystallized 
until subsequent scenes, his decision clearly becomes one between good 
and evil. Indeed, shortly afterward, the Goldberg character transforms 
from a source of the fi lm’s humor to its target, and his initially innocent 
chuckle takes on a more sinister edge.
In the next scene, which depicts the ghettoization of Krakow’s Jews, 
Goldberg cheerfully confronts Pfefferberg in his new Ordnungsdienst 
uniform. Their brief exchange reinforces the lack of friendliness on 
Pfefferberg’s part and introduces the fi lm’s judgment of Goldberg as a 
“privileged” Jew:
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Pfefferberg: What’s this?
Goldberg: Uh, the Judenrat has its own police now.
Pfefferberg: You don’t say.
Goldberg: Ordnungsdienst. I’m a policeman now, could you believe it? I know 
it’s hard to believe.
Pfefferberg: Oh, no, it’s not hard to believe.
Goldberg: It’s a good racket, Poldek. The only racket here.30
The ambivalence evoked in the representation of the previously good-
humored (though somewhat disliked) Goldberg is undone by the strong 
contrast between Pfefferberg’s assured sarcasm and Goldberg’s nasal 
tone and nervous disposition, which makes it clear with whom the view-
ers are positioned to align themselves. When Goldberg offers to help 
Pfefferberg join the Ordnungsdienst, he reveals that his motivation for 
having joined himself was solely monetary profi t and in no way based 
on survival: “Come on, they’re not as bad as everyone says … well, the 
worst that everyone says, but it’s a lot of money. A lot of money.”31 In-
deed, it might be argued that this scene’s emphasis on the fi nancial 
machinations of its Jewish characters (along with the previous scene in 
the church) feeds into the fi lm’s much-criticized representation of anti-
Semitic stereotypes.32
Goldberg’s sole preoccupation with material wealth throughout 
Schindler’s List cements the overwhelmingly negative depiction of the 
“privileged” Jew. Yet despite his obvious self-interest and apparent posi-
tion of power, Goldberg is invariably portrayed as more of a degraded 
comic fi gure than one who is to be taken seriously. As Pfefferberg re-
jects Goldberg’s offer without hesitation, his wife sarcastically tells the 
“privileged” Jew, “You look funny in that hat Goldberg. You look like a 
clown, you know!” Goldberg then adjusts his uniform in an absurd man-
ner while another woman passing by glares at him hatefully. The binary 
opposition established here between the “innocent” victims and “cor-
rupt” functionary is even more signifi cant in light of the fact that the 
historical Pfefferberg actually did join the Jewish police and was later a 
Blockälteste (block eldest) in the Plaszow labor camp. Signifi cantly, Ke-
neally writes that “Pfefferberg could stand as a token of the ambiguity 
of being a member” of the Ordnungsdienst.33 The omission of this from 
the fi lm allows its Manichean framework to remain unchallenged.
Members of the ghetto police in the fi lm are portrayed as absurd car-
icatures on several occasions. Immediately after Goldberg adjusts his 
uniform in the shot noted above, the scene changes and another member 
of the Ordnungsdienst is shown being teased by a group of children he 
is unsuccessfully trying to catch. Excited children’s voices can be heard 
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on the soundtrack as the small fi gures dance around his truncheon.34 
Indicative of the fi lm’s overall marginalization of “privileged” Jews, this 
scenario occurs only momentarily in the background. The focus of the 
scene is Schindler’s attempt to woo Jewish investors. 
Goldberg and Chilowicz, who are both wearing Jewish police uni-
forms, are next seen together during the Nazis’ separation of “essential 
workers” from other Jews. Otherwise unoccupied, the two men walk 
calmly among the long lines of vulnerable Jewish victims, loudly taunt-
ing Pfefferberg, who is also waiting to be assessed by German offi cers:
Goldberg: Enjoying the weather, Poldek?
Chilowicz: Enjoying the lines?
Goldberg: Need some shoe polish?
Chilowicz: In a metal container maybe?35
Unlike the earlier scene in the church, the viewer is positioned to reject 
the humor shared by Goldberg and Chilowicz. The former’s insidious 
laugh and Pfefferberg’s refusal to respond imply the depths to which the 
Jewish police have allowed themselves to sink.
Humor is again employed in a scene portraying the various attitudes 
of captive Jews toward their situation in the Podgorze Ghetto. Talking 
with a group of Jews standing in the street, Pfefferberg is able to turn 
the previous sarcasm of the Jewish police back on Chilowicz, who is 
openly derided by those around him. When Chilowicz ironically states 
that he likes the ghetto due to its sense of “ancestral squalor,” an old 
man reprimands him for his cooperation with the Nazis: “You are a slave 
to these people!” After Chilowicz responds “I’m smart,” humor is again 
deployed as Pfefferberg ridicules him and knocks his cap down over his 
eyes. Pfefferberg declares dismissively, “You’re a real genius.”36 With an 
impetuous expression on his face, Chilowicz adjusts his cap and contin-
ues to joke with the others, signifying the lack of seriousness afforded 
to his role by both fellow Jews and the fi lm alike.37 Thus while humor 
is often used to endear the viewer to the characters of Schindler and 
Stern, the device is also employed to cast negative judgment on the Jew-
ish police. These fi gures are also judged in later scenes portraying the 
involvement of the Ordnungsdienst in the liquidation of the Podgorze 
Ghetto, which is one example of what are generally perceived to be the 
most controversial activities of the Jewish police.
The liquidation of the ghetto is portrayed in a pivotal scene that jux-
taposes the Nazis’ “Aktion” with Schindler’s witnessing of the event 
while out riding his horse on a nearby hilltop. Signifi cantly, the fi lm 
includes only one of the several instances of rescue by members of the 
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Jewish police described in Keneally’s novel, although even this is senti-
mentalized by replacing the adult “collaborator” with an innocent child 
wearing an Ordnungsdienst uniform, who is not involved in the vio-
lence of the liquidation.38 In relation to the role of the Jewish police in 
expropriating and arresting Jews during the event, the fi lm again rel-
egates them to the background and offers no engagement with the ethi-
cal dilemmas they faced; attention is once again focused on Schindler 
and his perspective. While observing the chaos taking place below him, 
Schindler glimpses a little Jewish girl wearing a red coat as she slowly 
navigates her way through the streets. Adapted loosely from Keneally’s 
portrayal of Schindler’s sighting of “Red Genia,” many commentators 
have interpreted the sequence as sparking the protagonist’s redemp-
tive transformation.39 In a rare use of color, Spielberg juxtaposes intense 
close-ups of Schindler’s anguished expression with an image of the little 
girl vanishing into a doorway. These images are accompanied by the 
sentimental singing of a children’s choir. Schindler can be seen giving 
one last contemplative stare, and a fl ash of resolute determination fl ick-
ers across his face as he turns and rides away. As will be detailed in the 
next section, Spielberg’s transformation of Schindler from shady indus-
trialist to heroic savior has clear implications for his representation and 
judgment of “privileged” Jews. 
From Absurdity to Absolution: Forgiving the Jewish Police
I went to an OD who had been involved with drawing up the list, Marcel 
Goldberg, and asked to be reinstated, insisting I knew that my name had 
been on it. He began to hit me around the face and head until I fell to the 
ground, and still he continued to beat me. Many people claimed afterwards 
that because of his greed some members of their family lost their lives. Oth-
ers stated that he was their saviour and didn’t take a penny for it.40
The above passage from Anna Rosner Blay’s Sister, Sister is one of many 
accounts that testify to Goldberg’s ambiguous behavior, demonstrating 
that he can readily be situated within Levi’s grey zone.41 Throughout 
the section of Schindler’s List that portrays events in the Plaszow la-
bor camp, members of the Ordnungsdienst—often encapsulated in the 
fi gure of Goldberg—are shown participating in prisoner registrations, 
roll calls, supervision of work details, “selections,” and deportations at 
regular intervals. Goldberg even shadows SS commandant Amon Goeth, 
the fi lm’s main perpetrator fi gure and Schindler’s (im)moral opposite, 
as his personal assistant. However, Goldberg’s most criticized activity, 
namely his contentious involvement in the creation and revisions of the 
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list of Jews to be rescued by Schindler, was left out of the fi nal cut. 
Another signifi cant omission from Spielberg’s fi lm in relation to “privi-
leged” Jews is the controversial behavior of Chilowicz, who was head of 
the Ordnungsdienst in Plaszow before being murdered along with his 
family by Goeth.42 After Chilowicz is depicted in the fi lm taking a roll 
call with Goldberg, he is not seen again.
While Daniel Schwarz briefl y notes that Spielberg “is not as hard as 
Keneally is on Goldberg,” the fi lm passes clear-cut negative judgment 
on him, particularly by contrasting him with another “privileged” Jew 
in Plaszow, the omnipresent, morally infallible Stern. The latter char-
acter is a fi ctionalized amalgamation of the historical Stern, Abraham 
Bankier, Mietek Pemper, and Goldberg himself.43 The positive judgment 
of Stern, who serves as the protagonist’s conscience on several occasions 
in the fi lm, sets up a similar opposition between Stern and Goldberg to 
that between Schindler and Goeth.
In his fi rst appearance in Schindler’s List, Stern is linked to Krakow’s 
Jewish Council. Keneally’s novel describes the activities of the Juden-
rat and Ordnungsdienst in detail, sometimes with negative judgment 
but often displaying an awareness of the ethical dilemmas they faced.44 
Whereas an early script instructed the camera to pan over “empathic 
but ultimately powerless administrators” of the Council, Spielberg’s fi lm 
portrays the humble Stern as the institution’s primary representative, 
who soon leaves to work for Schindler.45 Nonetheless, the impossible 
situation of the Judenrat is briefl y acknowledged. As Schindler makes 
his way past a long line of Jews waiting to have their complaints heard, 
the activities of the Council are summarized in a legend, which informs 
the viewer that it comprised “24 elected Jews personally responsible 
for carrying out the orders of the regime in Krakow, such as drawing 
up lists for work details, food, and housing.”46 The panning shots of the 
massive number of people waiting to speak to a Council representative 
as Schindler carelessly walks past them to the front of the line highlight 
the vast scope of the obstacles facing Jews in “privileged” positions. The 
scene briefl y shifts to a chaotic room, where arguments are ensuing 
between Judenrat workers and anxious Jewish civilians regarding the 
Nazi decrees. Complainants angrily tell various clerks, “You don’t know 
anything!” and “Aren’t you supposed to help?” A frustrated clerk offers 
the defense: “Please, I only know what they tell me, and what they tell 
me changes from day to day!” The diffi cult context within which the 
Council is forced to operate is further indicated when a woman recently 
dispossessed of her home threateningly asks another clerk what will 
happen if she takes off the armband identifying her as a Jew. The fi rst 
clerk, who is sitting at a desk behind her, turns and bluntly tells her 
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that the Nazis “will shoot you. Now why don’t you stop with your silly 
talk.”47 Yet after the fi lm briefl y addresses the obstacles faced by Jewish 
councils in these ways, Schindler enters and all attention shifts to him 
as the room falls silent in his presence.
Hesitantly revealing his identity to the intimidating German fi gure, 
Stern takes Schindler to another room. The dialogue turns immediately 
to Schindler’s business venture and Stern’s future role in running it. A 
heavily ironic Stern informs Schindler, “By law, I have to tell you, sir, I’m 
a Jew.”48 This line, along with Spielberg’s positioning of the two men at 
opposite edges of the frame, signifi es the (political, social, and moral) di-
vide that separates them during the fi rst part of the fi lm. Indeed, Stern 
displays a marked reluctance on several occasions while playing a major 
role in Schindler’s activities. Nonetheless, Stern’s behavior is invariably 
represented positively, particularly when he is shown rescuing Jews. It 
is Stern, after all, who instigates the initial gathering of Jewish work-
ers into Schindler’s factory, saving them from seemingly certain death. 
Stern’s desperate efforts to save Jews from being loaded onto trucks by 
recruiting them as “essential workers” are juxtaposed with the diligent 
cooperation of Jewish functionaries (including Goldberg and Chilowicz) 
aiding in the separation process. At one point, a cunning Stern literally 
pulls a former schoolteacher from the grasp of the Jewish police in order 
to get him work in Schindler’s factory.
Stern’s relationship with Schindler gradually transforms, in several 
pivotal scenes, from one of suspicion and aloofness to a bond of warmth 
and trust. Keneally describes Stern as a “substantial spiritual infl uence 
on Oskar” and his “only father confessor.”49 While it might be too much 
to interpret Stern as the main orchestrator of Schindler’s redemptive 
character arc, he is undeniably a constant moral presence in Spielberg’s 
fi lm who serves as (and appeals to) the protagonist’s conscience on sev-
eral occasions. In mortal danger himself at Plaszow, Stern only wor-
ries about Schindler’s business and the Jews it protects: “Herr Direktor, 
don’t let things fall apart, I worked too hard.”50 In Keneally’s novel, 
Stern deposits the “crucial dictum” of Schindler’s future virtue during 
his fi rst conversation with Schindler by ironically invoking the Talmu-
dic verse, “He who saves the life of one man, saves the world entire.”51 
The fi lm relegates this to its climactic scene, transforming the verse into 
a gesture of gratitude offered by Stern on behalf of all the “Schindler 
Jews.” Stern’s twin role as Schindler’s moral compass and critical-
then-admiring observer recurs throughout the fi lm, often made possible 
through his newly acquired “privileged” status as Goeth’s accountant in 
Plaszow. Stern’s behavior in this role contrasts strongly with the selfi sh 
disposition of Goldberg.
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The differences between Golberg and Stern are rendered most clearly 
during the scene in which Goeth explains Stern’s new position to him. 
A high angle shot of what is to be Stern’s offi ce shows Goldberg scurry-
ing back and forth carrying books and moving furniture, while a fear-
ful Stern stands submissively in the center of the room. In yet another 
denigration of the Jewish police as somewhat absurd and “morally 
compromised” fi gures, Goeth pushes back the table Goldberg is comi-
cally struggling to lower to the ground as he tells Stern, “Goldberg and 
Chilowicz make sure I see my cut from the, umm, factory owners in 
this camp, leaving you to take care of my main account, the Schindler 
account.” Once Goeth has fi nished his instructions, he orders Stern to 
look at him, with the sole purpose of intimidation. Intense close-ups 
highlight Stern’s vulnerability. After Goeth punctuates the silence with 
an ominous threat—“Don’t forget who you are working for now”—he 
leaves the room. Goldberg obediently follows, turning back to glance at 
Stern unsympathetically.52 
In addition to renewed danger, Stern’s “privileged” position also 
grants him further access to Schindler’s heroics. On one occasion, Stern 
watches intently in the background as Schindler initiates the hosing 
down of a train full of suffocating Jews before it departs from Plaszow.53 
The fi lm’s depiction of an increasingly obsessed Schindler bribing Nazi 
soldiers and guiding the hose to each cattle wagon himself simplifi es the 
more complex scenario that actually took place. Many of the Jews on 
this train, which was bound for the Mauthausen concentration camp, 
had been taken from Schindler’s factory shortly beforehand. Schindler 
had personally undertaken the “selection” of 300 workers (starting, as 
Crowe notes, with the “most important Jews”) to stay behind and dis-
mantle his factory, which was then being closed down, while the remain-
ing 700 Jews were sent to Plaszow.54 Thus Spielberg glosses over the 
more controversial aspects of Schindler’s involvement with the Nazis 
and the fact that a large number of the deportees who had previously 
been working for him perished in Mauthausen.55 Little sense is given in 
the scene described above of the impending fate of the victims about to 
be deported; a concerned Stern simply stands and watches as Schindler 
does his best to comfort the train’s dehydrated occupants.
The contrast between Stern and Goldberg is also evident when Goeth 
pays a visit to a metalworks staffed by Jewish prisoners, during which 
he attempts to shoot Rabbi Lewartow for working slowly. Goldberg en-
ters the factory fi rst, announcing Goeth’s presence loudly in German 
and following him attentively with a clipboard. When Goeth explains 
to Lewartow that he needs to make room for incoming deportees and 
asks for the origin of the new arrivals, Goldberg leans forward from his 
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position in the background and dutifully informs Goeth: “Yugoslavia, 
Herr Kommandant.”56 After Goeth’s malfunctioning weapon provides 
a reprieve for Lewartow, Goldberg’s eagerness to please is matched by 
Stern’s eagerness to save innocent lives. In the scene that follows, Stern 
convinces Schindler to take Lewartow into his own factory. Schindler, 
now in the early stages of the fi lm’s “sentimental deifi cation” of his 
character,57 provides Stern with valuable items three times in order 
to bribe Goldberg to add vulnerable Jews to Schindler’s workforce. 
Through elaborate editing, the sequence reveals a cigarette lighter, a 
cigarette case, and a wristwatch moving from the hands of Schindler to 
Stern to Goldberg. This process facilitates the rescue of individual Jews 
whose plight Stern or other Jews bring to Schindler’s attention.58 The 
sequence incorporates only brief shots of Goldberg accepting the bribes, 
focusing more on Schindler’s generosity and the positive outcome for 
the workers being transferred to his factory; hence the editing tech-
nique used here works more toward establishing Schindler’s growing 
heroism than revealing Goldberg’s ambiguous activities.
During the last of the three instances of rescue mentioned above, 
the fi lm’s emotive musical score is linked to Schindler’s actions for the 
fi rst time. Frequently criticized for being overly “sentimental and melo-
dramatic,”59 the fi lm’s main theme dominates the soundtrack as the 
Perl man couple follows Goldberg from the roll call in Plaszow to march 
enthusiastically through Schindler’s gates. The same melancholic mu-
sic that initially accompanies Jewish suffering alone is now linked with 
Schindler’s deeds, shifting the fi lm’s focus away from what Keneally 
describes as the industrialist’s “ambiguity that he worked within or, at 
least, on the strength of, a corrupt and savage scheme.”60
As the intermediary between Schindler’s growing compassion and 
Goldberg’s increasing corruption, the virtuous Stern continues to pro-
vide a clear moral contrast to the “privileged” Jew motivated by greed. 
While Goldberg is portrayed as Goeth’s enthusiastic assistant, Stern 
is revealed to be Goldberg’s opposite in his role as Schindler’s loyal 
sidekick. In one of the fi lm’s most emotive scenes, when the closure of 
Plaszow looms, Stern implies his awareness that the camp’s Jews are to 
die in Auschwitz: “I know the destination, these are the evacuation or-
ders. I’m to help organize the shipments, put myself on the last train.”61 
While this admission briefl y evokes the moral ambiguity of Stern’s 
task, the scene is primarily geared toward developing Schindler’s vis-
ible sympathy for Stern’s situation and thus the German character’s 
incremental redemption. After having declined Schindler’s offer of a 
drink in several earlier scenes, a tearful Stern now agrees to drink with 
him, suggesting that the audience, too, should accept the compassionate 
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Gentile. Although Schindler’s most “heroic” deeds in the fi lm are yet to 
eventuate, it is evident that the “good” “privileged” Jew has forgiven 
the German profi teer for his previous misdeeds.
Sue Vice points out that criticism of Keneally’s novel has generally fo-
cused on issues of “accuracy” and “representativeness.”62 Nonetheless, 
it is signifi cant that the fi lm’s source text contains numerous details 
relating to “privileged” Jews that were omitted or altered in Spielberg’s 
production. Most crucially, Spielberg leaves out Goldberg’s ultimate con-
trol over the list and, by doing so, marginalizes Goldberg’s involvement 
in the process of saving the 1,100 Schindlerjuden. The manner in which 
the list was actually constructed resulted in many names being added 
and erased, although as demonstrated in the above epigraph, Goldberg’s 
role was certainly ambiguous. Keneally nicknames Goldberg the “Lord 
of the Lists,” describing in detail his inclusion and exclusion of names, 
sometimes according to payments he demanded from fellow prisoners.63 
Whatever the exact nature of Goldberg’s actual involvement, the im-
portance of his role is clear from a remark made by Schindler after the 
war, when confronted by angry survivors who had not been on the list. 
Schindler told them that he “couldn’t stand over Goldberg’s shoulder 
keeping track all the time.”64 Crowe’s detailed research for his biogra-
phy of Schindler leads him to argue that “in reality, Oskar Schindler had 
absolutely nothing to do with the creation of his famous transport list.”65 
In fairness to Spielberg, Keneally also seems at times to view Schindler 
as the primary infl uence on the list, describing Goldberg at one point in 
his novel as having only “the power to tinker with its edges.”66 Nonethe-
less, the fi lm’s focus on Schindler drastically marginalizes Goldberg’s 
role, even when compared with its source text.
Goldberg’s involvement in making the list is replaced entirely by the 
highly sentimentalized sequence in which Schindler and Stern compile 
the names of Jews to be transported to safety. Through emotionally 
manipulative editing, the desperate efforts of Schindler and Stern to 
accumulate names from memory are juxtaposed with Schindler’s pay-
ment of bribe money to Goeth and unsuccessful attempt to persuade 
another German industrialist, Julius Madritsch, to join his altruistic 
venture. At the end of the dramatic scene, the bright light within the 
room forms a halo around Schindler’s head as Stern delivers perhaps 
the fi lm’s most sentimental dialogue: “The list is an absolute good. The 
list is life. All around its margins lies the gulf.”67 With strong biblical 
connotations, Stern holds the list up as if admiring the newly received 
Ten Commandments, inspiring many scholars to denounce the fi lm’s 
depiction of Schindler as a “prodigal son” and “Christ-like savior.”68 
Furthermore, the other lists that Stern was to make of Jews destined 
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for Auschwitz are not mentioned again. As Cheyette writes, “The fact 
that Stern takes the part of Goldberg fatally idealizes his actions so that 
Stern can only provide Schindler with an absolutely scrupulous moral 
framework for him to recognize eventually.”69 By splitting the activities 
historically associated with Goldberg between the two on-screen char-
acters of Stern and Goldberg, the fi lm essentially divides the complex 
fi gure of the “privileged” Jew into two different people, one represent-
ing the “good” and one, the “bad.” 
Lists are a central motif throughout Schindler’s List; as Amy Hun-
gerford points out, “Those who are on the list are powerless, those mak-
ing the list powerful.”70 In dispossessing Goldberg of his controversial 
role in the making of the list of prisoners to be saved, the fi lm further 
marginalizes the issue of “privileged” Jews. Equally, in suggesting that 
the list was under Schindler’s control, Spielberg avoids any moral com-
plications surrounding the rescuer. Crowe notes that if Spielberg “had 
linked Schindler with Goldberg, he would simply have strengthened the 
sense that what really drove Oskar Schindler in all of this was money.”71 
Indicative of the complexity (and judgment) surrounding the creation of 
the actual list, the survivor Jack Mintz has asserted that “if you selected 
from the eleven hundred [on the list], maybe three hundred should go 
in a concentration camp after the war. There were a lot of crooks and 
Kapos [on the list].”72 Ultimately, Schindler’s List avoids such moral 
complexities. Signifi cantly, the fi lm’s screenplay, describing Goldberg as 
a “blackmailing collaborator,” originally contained several scenes that 
involved Goldberg typing his own name onto the list, demanding bribes 
from other Jews to be included, and being beaten by Pfefferberg when 
he threatens to take Pfefferberg’s name off.73 A later scene in which 
Schindler punishes Goldberg for his past behavior by making him shovel 
coal for the remainder of the war was also scripted, but left out.74 In-
stead, Spielberg’s fi nal cut reverses this negative judgment of Goldberg, 
going from a message of condemnation and punishment to forgiveness 
and redemption.
Exemplifying the strong criticism of Schindler’s List’s redemptory 
aesthetic, Rose writes that the fi lm “degenerates into myth … betray[ing] 
the crisis of ambiguity in characterization, mythologization and identi-
fi cation, because of its anxiety that our sentimentality be left intact.”75 
Rather than acknowledge Goldberg’s involvement in making and main-
taining the list and his subsequent disappearance with the money and 
diamonds of fellow Jews (as described in Keneally’s novel),76 the last ap-
pearance of Goldberg in the fi lm takes place as the “Schindler Jews” are 
being transported to (apparent) freedom. A shot of Goldberg’s brightly 
lit smile is foregrounded as he states his name to be checked off on the 
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list of the rescued. Spielberg’s employment of chiaroscuro lighting and a 
sentimental score to enhance Schindler’s transformation from rogue to 
Christ fi gure is now applied to Goldberg’s redemption. Schindler’s face, 
half hidden in shadow in the fi lm’s early scenes, is later bathed in light 
when he performs virtuous acts. Similarly, no longer wearing his Ord-
nungsdienst uniform, a well-lit Goldberg is pictured within the frame as 
he reverts from his selfi sh demeanor as a corrupt Plaszow functionary 
to his earlier, smiling self, as depicted in the church at the beginning of 
the fi lm. In this way, Schindler’s heroism renders Goldberg just another 
face in what have been described as the fi lm’s “supernumeraries and 
huddled masses,”77 reducing him to a kind of anonymity despite being 
named and effectively absolving him from his past transgressions.
The fi lm’s plot is then relocated to Zwittau-Brinnlitz, in the former 
Czechoslovakia, where Schindler oversaw his last wartime factory. Here 
there is no sight of Goldberg. Instead, Schindler’s sentimental transfor-
mation is completed, with the fi lm deviating from the historical record to 
portray him racing to personally rescue Jewish women from Auschwitz, 
pledging (and seeming to maintain) fi delity to his wife, bankrupting 
himself to save his slave laborers, and fi nally, in another invented scene, 
breaking down in Stern’s comforting arms as he laments rescuing such a 
small number.78 Spielberg further sentimentalizes the fi gure of Schindler 
when he emphasizes the Stockholm syndrome-like attachment of “his” 
Jews. In an emotionally cathartic scene, Stern ceremoniously presents 
the rescuer with a gold ring etched with the Talmudic saying, “Whoever 
saves one life, saves the world entire.”79 This line epitomizes the overall 
redemptive message borne by and through the Gentile savior.
The fi lm’s denouement depicts actual Schindlerjuden placing rocks 
on Schindler’s grave and the Schindler character looking down on the 
tombstone. The fi lm thus implies there are no loose ends to this his-
tory, in spite of Schindler’s less-than-glorious fate, the survivors’ lost 
relatives and continuing trauma, and the postwar controversy relating 
to Goldberg.80 Spielberg’s redemptory discourse leaves the “privileged” 
Jew absolved of his former “guilt” and therefore disallows a nuanced 
engagement with the ethical dilemmas that confronted many victims 
during the Holocaust.
A similar process of judgment is evident in more recent mainstream 
productions that portray “privileged” Jews within the paradigm of res-
cue and resistance, such as Jon Avnet’s television miniseries Uprising 
and Roman Polanski’s fi lm The Pianist (2002). Along with Schindler’s 
List, the dramatization of Jewish police in these fi lms clearly invokes 
the issue of “privilege” to some degree; however, any potential to sus-
pend judgment of these liminal fi gures is drowned out by the fi lmmak-
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ers’ condemnation and then absolution of their behavior. On the other 
hand, a number of other Holocaust fi lms have rejected the rhetoric of 
heroic deeds and happy endings, with several of these unconventional 
representations engaging directly with themes of moral ambiguity and 
“compromise” in relation to “privileged” Jews.
Moving Away from the Mainstream: 
Confronting Moral Ambiguity
In Frames of Evil: The Holocaust as Horror in American Film (2006), 
Caroline J. S. Picart and David A. Frank conclude that “historical ex-
planations of the Holocaust, particularly of perpetrators and victims, 
are vastly more complicated than the clean depictions of monsters and 
their prey seen in the cinematic representations of the Holocaust.”81 
Focusing in part on the black-and-white representation of perpetrators 
and victims in Schindler’s List and Bryan Singer’s Apt Pupil (1998), 
the volume briefl y mentions Levi’s grey zone but does not address the 
issue of “privileged” Jews nor the fi lms that have dealt with them in 
a substantial manner.82 Indeed, in his foreword to the book, Dominick 
LaCapra notes that the authors’ analysis “leaves [the] reader with a 
number of questions that merit further thought and inquiry”:
Even if attempts to transcend fully an implication in trauma and its afteref-
fects are illusory, are there nonetheless signifi cant differences in the manner 
in which fi lms (or other artifacts) address problems with greater or lesser 
degrees of critical acumen? Is one forever complicit in the victim-perpetrator 
dynamic, and are the affi rmation of complicity and the radical blurring of dis-
tinctions (such as that between perpetrator and victim) the only alternatives 
to deceptive binary oppositions between the innocent self and the monstrous 
“other”? Can one recognize the other in oneself and still acknowledge not only 
differences between perpetrators and victims but also a variable gray area of 
complicity between them, indeed an uncanny zone of perpetrator-victims?83
In effect, LaCapra seems to issue a call similar to Levi’s for a nuanced 
representation of moral ambiguity and a recognition of the grey zone of 
victim behavior. While Levi argues that there is a need to suspend judg-
ment when representing “privileged” Jews, LaCapra suggests there are 
“alternatives to deceptive binary oppositions.”
The notion of “moral compromise” on the part of victims of Nazi 
persecution is hardly new to fi lms that evoke the Holocaust. Examples 
abound of representations of victims—not always Jewish prisoners—be-
ing placed or placing themselves in situations that confront them with 
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ethical dilemmas. A well-known example is Alan Pakula’s Sophie’s 
Choice (1982), which has been linked to both Levi’s grey zone and 
Langer’s concept of choiceless choices.84 Through fl ashback, the fi lm de-
picts a Polish woman being forced to “choose” which of her two children 
will be killed. Additionally, Ilan Avisar notes that despite the lack of 
explicit focus on the Holocaust in Israeli cinema, Tel Aviv-Berlin (1987) 
and A New Land (1994) incorporate in their narratives a combination 
of “collaborators” and women who became victims of sexual exploita-
tion in order to survive or save others.85 Behavior that is portrayed as 
morally compromising, sexual or otherwise—of Jewish or non-Jewish 
victims—and undertaken for survival or revenge, appears in various 
forms in fi lms as diverse as Europa, Europa (1990), Bent (1997), Train 
of Life (1998), The Ninth Day (2004), The Good German (2006), Black 
Book (2006), and A Secret (2007).86 However, the various invocations of 
“compromise” in these fi lms are not related in any way to the positions 
of “privilege” focused on here.
Chapter 1 highlighted that Levi was motivated to write about the 
grey zone in part because of what he saw as the simplifying tendencies 
of fi ction fi lms. He was dismayed by Liliana Cavani’s The Night Porter 
(1974), which he accused of blurring the distinction between victims and 
perpetrators.87 In Seven Beauties (1975), another Italian fi lm controver-
sial for its portrayal of sexuality, a (non-Jewish) murderer and rapist is 
sent to Auschwitz, where he is made a Kapo after seducing a grotesque 
female SS offi cer. Subsequently, and with only brief hesitation, the “priv-
ileged” protagonist “selects” six prisoners to be killed, including one 
of his friends whom he is himself forced to shoot.88 The infamous fi lms 
Ilsa, She-Wolf of the SS (1975), Salon Kitty (1976), and many other Nazi 
(s)exploitation fi lms have been criticized as encouraging a perverse voy-
eurism and form part of what Saul Friedländer characterizes as “a vast 
pornographic output centered on Nazism.”89 Indeed, the common use of 
interconnecting themes of Nazism, sex, death, and moral compromise 
in a wide array of fi lms forms a problematic cultural context for any 
fi lmmaker who attempts to represent “privileged” Jews on the screen.90 
However, even Levi does not necessarily disqualify fi ction fi lm as a genre 
that might be able represent the complex situations that gave rise to the 
grey zone, and LaCapra’s questions quoted above appear to suggest fi c-
tion fi lms are capable of representing liminal fi gures.
Several fi lms released in recent years veer away from mainstream 
Holocaust productions and engage directly with the issue of “privileged” 
Jews. These fi lms can be seen to self-consciously refl ect on, or respond to, 
key ideas entailed in Levi’s grey zone or Langer’s choiceless choices. Im-
plicitly rejecting Spielberg’s sentimental depiction of survival as result-
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ing from heroic acts of defi ance, some fi lmmakers have helped establish 
a new trend in Holocaust fi lm that focuses on issues of survivor trauma, 
guilt, and compromise. One such example is Lajos Koltai’s Hungarian 
fi lm Fateless (2004), an adaptation of the novel by Nobel laureate Imre 
Kertész, who has condemned Schindler’s List as “a mistake for a person 
who knows exactly what happened. … It’s unacceptable because all the 
horror is pictured like it’s about the victory of humanity, but humanity 
will never get over the Holocaust. So it’s a totally fake interpretation, 
a lie.”91 Judgments of “privileged” prisoners are nonetheless evident in 
Fateless, which depicts the harrowing experiences of an adolescent Hun-
garian Jewish boy incarcerated in several Nazi concentration camps. 
The sadistic and sexually perverse Kapo in the fi lm is clearly labeled a 
criminal prisoner, while the Jewish assistant who shadows him is given 
little attention. On the other hand, “privileged” Jews have been the cen-
tral focus of several other recent fi lms.
In his essay on Holocaust representation and its perceived limits, 
Frank Stern mentions Nelson’s The Grey Zone, which was yet to be 
released, and predicts that more “fi lms that are preoccupied with prob-
lematic or marginal aspects of the Shoah will doubtlessly follow in the 
coming years. Beyond all questionable and purely market-oriented fi lm 
productions, this development indicates a shift in cinematic culture.”92 
This has indeed been the case. Joseph Sargent’s made-for-television pro-
duction Out of the Ashes (2003) was screened shortly after the release of 
Nelson’s fi lm. It focuses on Gisella Perl, a Hungarian-Jewish prisoner 
doctor in Auschwitz who assisted Josef Mengele’s medical experiments 
while covertly performing a large number of abortions on fellow inmates 
to save them from being gassed.93 Sargent structures his representa-
tion of Perl’s ambiguous behavior through the use of a “trial,” a tech-
nique also adopted in the considerably more melodramatic, politically 
motivated miniseries The Kastner Trial (1994), which “scandalised the 
Israeli public even prior to its actual broadcasting due to its revisionist 
post-Zionist reading of the affair.”94 While the structure of these fi lms 
reveals clear processes of moral evaluation, they nonetheless draw at-
tention to the problem of judgment.
Similar strategies to those at work in Nelson’s The Grey Zone (the 
focus of the remainder of this chapter) can also be seen in Audrius Ju-
zenas’s recent German fi lm Ghetto (2005) and Stefan Ruzowitzky’s The 
Counterfeiters (2007). The former takes Jacob Gens, the controversial 
chief of the Jewish police in the Vilna Ghetto, as one of its main char-
acters, while the latter portrays the ambiguous existence of a group of 
“privileged” Jews assigned to a Nazi counterfeiting operation in the 
Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Caught between “resisting” and 
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“cooperating,” the irresolvable ethical dilemmas confronting these 
“privileged” Jews are exposed to the viewer through various means. Such 
works are not unconventional or postmodern in the sense that they at-
tempt to undermine realist principles, as does Hans-Jürgen Syberberg’s 
highly fragmented fi lm Hitler: A Film from Germany (1977). They are 
unconventional rather in terms of their subversive uses of characteriza-
tion and anti-redemptory rhetoric, which, to varying degrees, exhibit a 
questioning, self-refl exive approach to the issue of “privileged” Jews. 
Avoiding “the affi rmation of complicity and the radical blurring of dis-
tinctions” that LaCapra is wary of, these fi lms explore the ethical di-
lemmas that occupied Levi in a sophisticated manner. The Grey Zone, 
in particular, strongly repudiates the narrative conventions deployed in 
Schindler’s List, working instead toward the suspension of judgment 
that Levi requires.
Into the Crematoria: Responding to Levi 
in Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone
Nelson’s The Grey Zone is not the fi rst fi ction fi lm to be made as a direct 
response to Levi’s writings, nor is it the fi rst to portray Jewish prisoners 
in the Sonderkommandos. Firmly situated within European art cinema, 
Francesco Rosi’s The Truce (1997) represents Levi’s journey through 
Eastern Europe before his return to Italy. While Levi’s second memoir 
is commonly thought to be the more optimistic (or less pessimistic) of 
his testimonies, strong signs of what would become his somber medi-
tation on the grey zone were already present in this earlier work (see 
chapter 1). However, Rosi’s fi lm omits the former “privileged” prison-
ers portrayed in Levi’s opening chapters and makes little reference to 
his more ambivalent refl ections on victim behavior in the camp. At one 
point in the fi lm, the Levi character defends a woman being derided for 
selling her body in Auschwitz, lecturing a group of liberated prisoners 
that starvation, torture, and murder were not the peak of Nazi crimes: 
“The worst thing they did was to crush our souls, our capacity for com-
passion, fi lling the void with hatred, even toward each other.”95 Soon 
afterward, however, the fi lm’s narrative shifts to an invented romantic 
encounter between the woman and Levi. In a blatant appeal to audience 
emotion, Rosi arguably draws on the Christological image of Jesus and 
the adulteress, and renders Levi himself a vehicle of redemption.
The portrayal of the situation(s) of the Sonderkommandos, despite be-
ing seemingly convenient plot devices in several fi lms, has been limited. 
Barry Langford argues that the Sonderkommandos “fi gure in Holocaust 
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fi lms out of all proportion to their actual numbers or (arguably) histori-
cal signifi cance.”96 However, the appearances of crematorium workers 
in fi ction fi lms often reveal disparate ideological agendas and seldom 
dwell on the ethical dilemmas they faced. In the heavily politicized fi lm 
Exodus (1960), experiences in an Auschwitz Sonderkommando form the 
traumatic background of an Irgun fi ghter in Palestine. The complicity 
of the Vatican with Nazi Germany in Amen (2002) is contrasted with 
the fi ctional priest Father Riccardo’s refusal to leave his persecution in 
the crematoria, thereby sacrifi cing his life in protest. Similarly, when 
Rudi and Karl Weiss are enlisted to work in the Sonderkommandos in 
Auschwitz and Sobibor respectively in the Holocaust miniseries, they 
are “liberated” shortly afterward through armed revolt and artistic cre-
ation. And when the brother of protagonist Salomo Arouch is drafted as 
a crematorium worker in Triumph of the Spirit, he refuses to undertake 
the work on fi rst glimpsing the ovens. Although Salomo himself is later 
sent to the Sonderkommando, the squad begins its armed revolt at the 
same instant he arrives, thus preventing him from being able to per-
form any duties. Another resistance fi lm, Escape from Sobibor (1987), 
focuses on the “privileged” death camp inmates charged with greeting 
deportees upon arrival and sorting their belongings. The ethical dilem-
mas inherent in their situation are briefl y raised in the fi lm’s early 
scenes; however, the majority of this television movie is preoccupied 
with the preparations for, and implementation of, the uprising, ending 
with the surviving prisoners streaming out of the camp and into the for-
est amidst a jubilant musical score. In these ways, the experiences of the 
Sonderkommandos have been appropriated to communicate messages 
of Zionist legitimacy, Christian martyrdom, and the triumph of Jewish 
resistance. The Grey Zone is the only Holocaust fi ction fi lm to engage 
in a substantial and serious manner with the extreme circumstances of 
those prisoners forced to work in the “special squads.”
In addition to using Levi’s essay, writer-director Nelson, whose 
mother was a Holocaust refugee, drew his material and inspiration for 
The Grey Zone from a range of sources, including the memoirs of Miklos 
Nyiszli and several other survivors, the unearthed manuscripts written 
and buried by Sonderkommando members, and a considerable amount 
of historical research.97 Nelson adapted his screenplay from his earlier 
stage production, a process that can present certain diffi culties, evident 
in the occasional criticism of his fi lm for being “stagy” and slow-mov-
ing.98 Yet perhaps partly owing to Nelson’s combination of unorthodox 
characterization, a claustrophobic setting, ambient noise, and staccato 
dialogue, his fi lm convincingly represents the inherently complex nature 
of “resistance” and “cooperation” in a world of industrialized death. 
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Nelson shuns many of the narrative-driven tropes of conventional fi lmic 
representations and portrays the ethical dilemmas of “privileged” Jews 
without romanticizing or condemning them. By resisting spiritual tri-
umph, emotional simplifi cation, and cathartic heroism, The Grey Zone 
has often been praised for its lack of sentimentality and contrasted fa-
vorably with Spielberg’s fi lm.99 Nelson himself explicitly positioned his 
fi lm against Schindler’s List and Life Is Beautiful, proposing for The 
Grey Zone a “jagged and hard realism” that is “fast, not mournful; cold, 
not sentimental.”100 In reviewer Kristin Hohenadel’s words, Nelson’s 
production is “a Holocaust horror story without a Schindler.”101
While Escape from Sobibor contains only a momentary image of Jew-
ish workers standing exhausted outside the gas chambers,102 Nelson’s 
fi lm is set almost entirely within the crematoria. It is important to note 
that Nelson chose to depict the twelfth special squad (out of thirteen) 
to work the extermination machinery in Birkenau, as this included the 
group of men who instigated the armed revolt of 7 October 1944, the 
only such event to occur in the camp. Numerous contradictory accounts 
exist regarding how this insurrection began, what weapons were avail-
able, the duration of the revolt, the leadership of the uprising, the num-
ber of crematoria destroyed, and the extent of German losses.103 There 
is widespread agreement, however, that around 450 Sonderkommando 
members (all 300 active participants along with many others) perished 
in the uneven confl ict or were shot shortly afterward in retaliation. Fur-
thermore, the uprising had no effect on the extermination policies of 
the Nazis.104 Nelson’s fi lm represents the event with unsentimental de-
tachment, making clear that the revolt was ultimately futile. For this 
reason, among others, it would be simplistic to classify The Grey Zone as 
a resistance fi lm alone.
The focus of Nelson’s fi lm remains fi xed on the choiceless choices 
faced by “privileged” Jews. He vowed prior to the commencement of 
fi lming that the rebellion would “feel haphazard, clumsy, and poorly or-
ganised, as it probably was” and would involve “no mass slaughter of 
Germans followed by a heroic escape.”105 A scene depicting the unsuc-
cessful escape of several men was omitted from the fi nal cut, reinforcing 
the sense of hopelessness that surrounds the insurrection and refl ecting 
Nyiszli’s lamentation in his memoir that “after so much effort and loss 
of life, still no one had succeeded in escaping to tell the world the full 
story of this hellish prison.”106 Unlike the mass escape depicted in Escape 
from Sobibor, The Grey Zone portrays the remaining Sonderkommando 
members sitting passively on the ground after the revolt, waiting to be 
shot. Nelson nonetheless admits that without the uprising, “the movie’s 
but a bleak portrait of the twelfth Sonderkommando, and I dare say it 
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would have no audience.”107 His comment reveals that even his fi lm, 
which was produced under the assumption that it would not return a 
profi t,108 is still to some extent geared by a need to satisfy perceived au-
dience expectations.
Nelson has written that The Grey Zone “does not pretend to be a 
historical document. Rather, it’s meant to strike at the essence of the 
predicament faced by the Sonderkommandos, those unluckiest of death 
camp inmates offered the most impossible bargain humanity could pro-
pose to itself.”109 In his fi ctional reconstruction of events, the fi lmmaker 
confl ates two actual but separate incidents: the Sonderkommando’s 
revolt and the attempt by several prisoners to save a young girl who 
survived the gas chamber, which actually occurred long before the up-
rising.110 A signifi cant intertextual connection here is the relationship 
of Nelson’s fi lm to the fi rst German production to focus specifi cally on 
the camps, Frank Beyer’s Naked Among Wolves (1963). The discovery 
of a young child by a group of Polish prisoners in Buchenwald, which 
both threatens their resistance preparations and leads to the rekin-
dling of their “humanity,” serves as the central plot device in Beyer’s 
fi lm and makes it a notable precursor of The Grey Zone. However, the 
focus on moral ambiguity in Nelson’s fi lm, along with its very different 
setting, renders its narrative much more contentious. On more than 
one occasion, members of the Sonderkommando debate whether or not 
they should kill the girl to protect their resistance plans. Shortly after 
the dying girl has been revived, one crematorium worker argues that 
killing the girl would be an act of mercy: “It’s better we do it than 
them.”111 Emphasizing the need for “brutal and relentless accuracy,” 
Nelson wrote in his notes to his cast and crew, “Even with a helpless 
adolescent and an inchoate uprising, we’re not going to sentimentalise 
this world.”112
The only characters based on real people in the fi lm are Josef Mengele, 
the chief medical offi cer at Auschwitz; Nyiszli, Mengele’s pathologist 
and, although Jewish, doctor to all crematoria personnel; Mühsfeldt, 
SS Oberscharführer of the crematoria; Rosa Robota, a smuggler of gun-
powder to the Sonderkommando; and the young girl. Apart from Ny-
iszli and Mühsfeldt, the fi lm’s main characters—Rosenthal, Schlermer, 
Abramowics, and Hoffman—are invented. Nelson’s characterization 
of Hoffman, however, often draws on the fi rsthand account of Salmen 
Lewenthal, with whose testimony this book began.113 Importantly, Nel-
son’s fi lm has no protagonist, much less a “heroic” one, and the central 
Jewish characters are not only involved in the resistance preparations, 
but are also portrayed as deeply entangled in the extermination process. 
This has the effect of blurring Levi’s own moral distinction between the 
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Sonderkommando members who planned and took part in the uprising 
and the “the miserable manual labourers of the slaughter … the others, 
those who from one shift to the next preferred a few more weeks of life 
(what a life!) to immediate death, but who in no instance induced them-
selves, or were induced, to kill with their own hands” (see chapter 1).114 
Nelson complicates this situation even further by portraying several 
of his central characters—in the midst of simultaneously resisting and 
cooperating—directly killing other Jews for often ambiguous reasons. 
This serves to disrupt formulaic appeals to audience identifi cation and 
empathy. Anton Kaes has noted in an early work on Holocaust-related 
cinema that a violation of the mainstream conventions of representa-
tion established by traditional feature fi lms serves to “enable, if not to 
force, the viewer to maintain [a] critical distance.”115 This strategy can 
be seen as central to Nelson’s portrayal of “privileged” Jews.
Obtaining Critical Distance: Portraying 
“Privileged” Jews in Auschwitz
By adopting an anti-redemptory aesthetic, Nelson avoids what Avisar 
characterizes as the problematic “inducement of emotional involvement 
with the fate of the characters” in sentimental Holocaust fi lms.116 By 
employing various fi lmic devices in an unconventional manner, Nelson 
works to position the audience of The Grey Zone at an emotional and 
intellectual remove from the “privileged” Jews he represents. In con-
trast to the sentimentalized scenes between Schindler and Stern, which 
encourage the viewer to admire their growing bond and empathize with 
the heroic deeds that eventuate, Nelson’s fi lm self-consciously desta-
bilizes viewer identifi cation. All of the fi lm’s main characters are con-
stantly at odds with one another, seldom exchanging friendly words or 
sharing intimate moments. Before fi lming The Grey Zone Nelson noted, 
“In its storytelling and acting styles, this fi lm will never try to be liked. 
If it seems to be doing so, given the clear aesthetic of the script, we’ve 
failed. The characters aren’t out to be liked either. … Their interactions 
are never sentimental or quaint.”117 The resulting unorthodox charac-
terization of the crematorium workers and prisoner doctor Nyiszli is a 
major aspect of the fi lm’s apparent attempt to suspend judgment.
Many sequences in The Grey Zone are deliberately made to be hard to 
watch, further discomforting the audience in their “witnessing” of the 
activities of the Sonderkommando. In scenes that often resemble short 
vignettes throughout the fi rst half of the fi lm, the different aspects of 
the prisoners’ daily routine—including their deception of Jews about to 
be gassed, the cleaning of the chambers, and the transporting, pillaging, 
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and burning of the corpses—are graphically portrayed for the viewer at 
frequent intervals. All of the fi lm’s characters treat their duties with an 
air of normality, refl ecting Lewenthal’s statement that the workers “of 
necessity [got] used to everything.”118 The rough, handheld camerawork 
depicts violent images of the Sonderkommando’s gruesome tasks. The 
lingering camera shots The Grey Zone does contain are far from emo-
tionally intimate. During a gassing that takes place near the beginning 
of the fi lm, for example, the camera slowly zooms in on Schlermer, who, 
almost completely enveloped by shadow, continuously drinks from a 
bottle while hundreds of Jews are being gassed in the adjacent chamber. 
When the ventilators are activated, he calmly puts on a gas mask and 
walks through the door to collect the bodies.119
In another early scene, Nelson visually depicts the many “privileges” 
afforded to the crematorium workers for their labor. While a group 
of Sonderkommando members rests between work shifts, the camera 
pans over their relatively spacious barracks. Well-clothed prisoners are 
shown eating and bartering jewelry at a table laden with various kinds 
of food, alcohol, and cigarettes, presenting a considerably different pic-
ture from the brief scenes that depict emaciated, silent, and expression-
less munitions-factory workers residing in the camp proper. After a new 
trainload of Jews is exterminated, Abramowics distastefully comments 
in an early scene: “Looks like we got some good food in: smoked oysters, 
some meats, a few cakes. We’ll do all right tonight.”120 Furthermore, 
unlike Schindler’s List, on no occasion does Nelson seek to infl uence 
audience emotions through the use of a sentimental musical score. The 
soundtrack of The Grey Zone is instead immersed in ambient noise, most 
notably the constant roar of the crematorium furnaces, which serves as 
an ever-present reminder of the industrial genocide taking place and of-
fers no calming respite, for either characters or viewers. 
The majority of the fi lm’s plot and thematic details are communi-
cated through staccato-like dialogue. Speaking in sharp tones, the char-
acters often interrupt one another; their curses, insults, and threats are 
full of expletives. At other times, their measured dialogue emphasizes 
the seemingly universal distrust permeating the crematoria. The con-
stant confl icts between the characters reveal tensions and internecine 
hatreds between Jews from different national backgrounds—tensions 
which are rarely acknowledged in Holocaust fi lms.121 One example high-
lighting this is when Rosenthal, a Hungarian Jew, angrily denounces 
the hesitancy of the Polish Jews to start the uprising: “If we were burn-
ing Polish Jews we wouldn’t be waiting. … What’s another week to these 
guys? Another ten thousand Hungarians? They don’t care about us. 
They never have.”122 Frequent arguments regarding the planned rebel-
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lion or what to do about the girl also arise between Jews of the same 
country of origin, with their personal biases and inner shame seldom 
resolved. At one point in the fi lm, a heated argument develops between 
Rosenthal and Abramowics about the Sonderkommando’s involvement 
in the extermination process, revealing both their hatred for each other 
and themselves:
Rosenthal: It’s not pulling the trigger!
Abramowics: It’s locking them in. You leave the room, bring them in, say it’s 
safe, you’ll see them when it’s over. Who put her inside? Now you think 
she made it through, God knows how—you’re going to be a hero?
Rosenthal: Not a hero.
Abramowics: Not a hero, not a killer. What are you, Max?123
Through this brief exchange, the staccato dialogue spoken by each of the 
characters points to the anti-redemptory project of The Grey Zone. The 
destabilizing of binary oppositions and questioning of moral absolutes 
are thematized explicitly in the fi lm, with the above argument pointing 
to the space—or grey zone—between “heroes” and “killers.” The two 
men almost come to blows. Rosenthal screams, “I’ll fucking kill you!” at 
Abramowics, as other characters attempt to separate them. Neither the 
dispute nor their enmity for each other is resolved, for Abramowics is 
suddenly executed by Mühsfeldt.124
In these ways, Nelson provides a detailed depiction of the involve-
ment of the Sonderkommando characters in the extermination—or, in 
Nyiszli’s case, experimentation—process; the “privileges” these Jewish 
prisoners gain as a result of their cooperation; and their invariably in-
different or spiteful attitudes toward each other. In doing so, Nelson’s 
representation of “privileged” Jews is far from sympathetic. Yet the 
seemingly universal confl ict between the characters also discourages 
the viewer from identifying against any of these fi gures. The prevalence 
of character confl ict can be seen to refl ect the point stressed in Levi’s 
essay on the grey zone, that the common desire or need of human beings 
to divide themselves neatly between “us” and “them” fails to capture 
the impact Auschwitz had on human relations: “The world into which 
one was precipitated was terrible, yes, but also indecipherable: it did not 
conform to any model, the enemy was all around but also inside, the ‘we’ 
lost its limits.”125 Even though the plot of Nelson’s fi lm revolves around 
the preparations for armed resistance, the fi lmmaker’s use of “anti-
Hollywood” conventions alludes to a dystopian environment similar to 
that which Levi describes. Further reinforcing the alienating effect(s) 
imposed on the viewer, both Abramowics and Schlermer propose kill-
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ing the girl when her presence threatens their resistance plans, while 
Rosenthal and Hoffman are shown killing fellow prisoners with their 
own hands.
Crucially, Nelson’s representation of “non-privileged” prisoners, 
namely the women who smuggle the gunpowder to the Sonderkom-
mando, also lacks any appeal to audience sentiment. Rosa Robota, ide-
alized as a martyr elsewhere,126 is depicted as callous and unfriendly. 
Robota’s refusal to surrender information under prolonged torture is 
not shown but is communicated only by implication.127 By portraying 
“non-privileged” prisoners, like the members of the Sonderkommando, 
as emotionally hardened by their situation, the fi lm works to discourage 
the viewer from judging “privileged” Jews by not making a moral dis-
tinction between the two groups. Nelson’s fi lm thus avoids the kind of 
clear-cut binary opposition that is developed in Schindler’s List between 
Goldberg and other Jewish characters. Instead, Nelson represents all 
Jews as subjected to a harsh and degrading environment, which, in 
Levi’s words, resulted in a “desperate” and “continuous struggle.”128
Although Nelson portrays his Jewish characters as unsympathetic to 
others, he takes care to maintain a clear distinction between victims and 
perpetrators, avoiding the kind of blurred boundaries that Levi criti-
cized The Night Porter for alluding to. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that Nelson chose to omit any reference to the controversial soccer game 
played between members of the Sonderkommando and the SS. This is a 
particularly problematic scenario for Levi, who characterizes the soccer 
match in “The Grey Zone” as revealing that the SS to some extent rec-
ognized the “veterans of the squad” as “colleagues, by now as inhuman 
as themselves, hitched to the same cart, bound together by the foul link 
of imposed complicity.”129 Rather than echo this negative judgment, Nel-
son constantly reminds the viewer of the vulnerability of “privileged” 
Jews to the whims of their Nazi overseers. Indeed, the theme of survival 
permeates the fi lm’s narrative, albeit in a considerably different man-
ner from how the same theme is developed in Schindler’s List. Nyiszli 
writes in his memoir that members of the Sonderkommando seldom 
lived longer than four months, noting that “no one had ever come out of 
[the crematoria] alive, either from the convoys or from the Sonderkom-
mando. … We would all perish here and we were well aware of it.”130 
This statement is refl ected in The Grey Zone when Schlermer tells the 
on-screen prisoner doctor in typically blunt dialogue, “We’re almost four 
months. We’re dead. Our time’s up.”131 Early in the fi lm, Mühsfeldt tries 
to deceive the group of Sonderkommando members: “We’re going to be 
moving you soon. … We’re thinking of a reprieve.”132 The crematorium 
workers, however, have no delusions. Nonetheless, even the temporary 
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stay of execution that the fi lm’s “privileged” Jews are given is depicted 
ambivalently, particularly in the case of Nyiszli.
Nyiszli admits in his memoir to obtaining a “favored position” by dis-
secting the bodies of hundreds of murdered twins and Jews with physi-
cal deformities as part of Mengele’s medical experiments.133 He sums 
up the ambiguity of his position on the fi rst page: “As chief physician of 
the Auschwitz crematoriums, I drafted numerous affi davits of dissec-
tion and forensic medicine fi ndings which I signed with my own tattoo 
number.”134 Throughout his testimony, Nyiszli displays little awareness 
of the implications of his actions and seems at times to support the ends, 
if not the means, of Nazi medical experimentation. He proudly refers to 
the dissecting room as “my responsibility” and to Mengele as “my supe-
rior,” and writes, “I planned to carry out [Mengele’s] orders to the best 
of my ability.”135 Described by Ilona Klein as a “fully-fl edged Jewish col-
laborator,” Nyiszli allegedly obtained “enormous prestige” as Mengele’s 
pathologist and was a highly disliked fi gure in the camp, although his 
memoir (perhaps predictably) offers no evidence of this.136 It is also clear 
that Nelson’s construction of Nyiszli on-screen is infl uenced by his own 
judgment of the prisoner doctor. The fi lmmaker states that “Nyiszli’s 
complicity, while arguably not as gruesome in scale as others’ we’ll see, 
amounts to the most universally assailable in the world of this fi lm.”137 
However, while Nelson fi nds Nyiszli to be “dizzyingly thick,” he endeav-
ors to make the “privileged” Jew “more aware of the compromises he’s 
making, and therefore more sympathetic than I believe he comes off 
in his own book.”138 By using Nyiszli’s memoir as a “resource” rather 
than directly transposing its narrative in an attempt at “fi delity,” Nel-
son works to develop a critical distance between his representation of 
Nyiszli and his fi lm’s viewers.139 In a way, the fi lmmaker’s resistance to 
his own judgments allows him to expose the moral ambiguity elucidated 
in Levi’s grey zone.
Nelson’s fi lm engages directly with Nyiszli’s controversial behavior. 
Played with very limited emotion by Allan Corduner, Nyiszli is depicted 
in The Grey Zone as benefi ting from many “privileges,” including a spa-
cious, well-stocked offi ce. In an early scene, he tells Mengele that the 
dissection fi ndings are waiting on his desk and asks the SS offi cer if the 
lenses he requires have arrived. Nonetheless, moments after exhibiting 
this diligent demeanor, Nyiszli is shown to be immensely vulnerable. 
When Mengele tells him, “We’re going to be increasing the volume of 
our research,” a lingering close-up shows Nyiszli’s distraught face, on 
the brink of tears, his bottom lip visibly quivering. Restraining himself, 
Nyiszli simply replies, “I shall need more staff.”140 By avoiding explicit 
appeals to audience emotion, Nelson maintains Nyiszli’s ambiguity. 
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This representation of Nyiszli contrasts strongly with the brief yet ro-
manticized portrayal of the Jewish doctor and nurse during the liquida-
tion of the Podgorze Ghetto in Schindler’s List. These minor characters 
in Spielberg’s narrative administer poison to their bedridden patients 
before the SS arrive at the ghetto “hospital,” standing defi antly as the 
soldiers burst through the door.141 The behavior of Nyiszli in Nelson’s 
fi lm, on the other hand, is clearly motivated by a turbid combination of 
self-interest, self-preservation, and mortal terror.
In The Grey Zone, the successful rescue of Nyiszli’s family is repre-
sented without recourse to sentimentality, omitting the detailed descrip-
tions in Nyiszli’s memoir of his efforts to save his wife and daughter.142 
Nelson utilizes creative license in having Mühsfeldt, the fi lm’s main 
perpetrator fi gure, instigate the rescue, constructing the character as 
a considerably different kind of German rescuer from Spielberg’s hero. 
Unlike Schindler, Oberscharführer Mühsfeldt’s gesture comes at a price, 
for the perpetrator demands that the doctor pass on any information 
he obtains regarding the rumored prisoner uprising. As revealed in 
many other instances throughout the fi lm, the extreme circumstances 
of “privileged” Jews such as Nyiszli expose the seemingly antithetical 
concepts of “resistance” and “cooperation” as being intrinsically con-
nected. The complexity of the situation represented in the fi lm is fur-
ther reinforced through Nyiszli’s later attempt to enlist Mühsfeldt in 
the efforts to save the girl who survived the gas. In reply to Nyiszli’s 
pleas, Mühsfeldt invokes the paradoxical nature of survival in the camp, 
asking the “privileged” Jew, “And who is to die in her place? No one lives 
here without someone else dying. … It’s a fact of the camp. … To save 
her is a meaningless lie.”143 This sentiment regarding one prisoner sur-
viving only in place of another, so often reiterated in survivor testimony, 
is absent from Schindler’s List.
The controversial nature of continuing to live by cooperating with the 
Nazis is exemplifi ed in Nelson’s portrayal of the antipathy of the cre-
matorium workers toward Nyiszli. In an early scene Nyiszli admits to 
Mühsfeldt, with whom he is on semi-cordial terms, that his fellow Jews 
distrust him: “I’m their doctor but they know what I do.”144 This confl ict 
is particularly clear in Schlermer’s seething accusations after Nyiszli 
revives the girl. The dialogue between the two prisoners, delivered with 
stone-cold expressions, evokes many complex questions without provid-
ing solutions:
Nyiszli: I never asked to be doing what I do.
Schlermer: You volunteered.
Nyiszli: They wanted doctors for a hospital.
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Schlermer: You knew the sort of work you’d be doing and you continue to 
do it.
Nyiszli: I don’t kill.
Schlermer: And we do?
Nyiszli: I didn’t say that.
Schlermer: You give killing purpose.
Nyiszli: We’re all just trying to make it to the next day. That’s all any of us 
is doing.145
While Schlermer is the character in The Grey Zone most focused on 
armed resistance, he is far from a traditionally heroic fi gure. His dis-
missive order to Nyiszli to “get rid of this fucking girl” discourages the 
viewer from adopting his aggressive judgment of the prisoner doctor. 
Schlermer’s clear dislike for, and judgment of, Nyiszli is balanced by 
the latter’s seemingly logical rebuttal of the former’s accusations, along 
with the viewer’s knowledge that Nyiszli was able to use his position to 
save his family (a fact that is much despised by Schlermer). Likewise, 
the viewer is encouraged to question the harsh judgments of Nyiszli 
when they are proffered by Mühsfeldt, who implies a parallel between 
the victim’s role and the oppressor’s: “We’re each of us a part of it, once 
any of you decide to live this way, and you especially.”146 Later the SS 
offi cer asserts that Nyiszli’s expertise has “quintupled the torture of 
children in this camp, and that is fact!” Nyiszli’s impassioned reply that 
“to live isn’t to kill, Herr Oberscharführer, because we’re not doing the 
killing,” maintains the separation of victim and persecutor, and under-
mines the perpetrator’s attempt to blur this distinction.147
Nelson’s apparent commitment to suspend judgment is also revealed 
in his portrayal of the ethical dilemmas confronting the crematorium 
workers. This is evident from the opening scene, which is loosely adapted 
from Nyiszli’s account.148 While Hoffman retrieves Nyiszli from his 
quarters, several Sonderkommando members surround a bed where an 
old man lies unconscious, apparently dying. Although the man is clearly 
alive, Rosenthal casually orders one of the other men to “cover his head 
anyway.” Nyiszli enters and revives the man with an intravenous injec-
tion but is soon pushed away. Held back by Schlermer, Nyiszli looks on 
with a horrifi ed expression as Rosenthal smothers the unconscious Jew 
with a pillow, stating matter-of-factly, “What he wanted. That’s all.”149 
It is not until much later in the fi lm that the audience learns that the 
man had poisoned himself after cremating his own family a week be-
forehand. Only then does the apparently cold-blooded murder make 
sense. When Rosenthal later tells Nyiszli that “we’re not murderers,” 
the doctor displays some understanding and concedes, “I hadn’t been 
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here long enough.”150 This can be seen to refl ect Nyiszli’s comment in 
his memoir that “the purely human side of my nature was forced to ad-
mit that the [crematorium workers] had been right” to take the man’s 
life.151 However, Nyiszli’s conversation with Rosenthal in the fi lm omits 
any explicitly positive judgment, instead leaving the problem somewhat 
unresolved for the viewer to contemplate. The ambiguous act of kill-
ing a fellow victim that opens The Grey Zone later serves as the cata-
lyst for the fi lm’s most direct attempt to implicate the audience in the 
ethical dilemmas of the Sonderkommando, to be discussed in the next 
section. Nelson’s anti-redemptory, self-refl exive mode of representation 
positions viewers to maintain a critical distance from the “privileged” 
Jews he depicts, encouraging them to contemplate the emotionally and 
morally loaded question of what they would do themselves if confronted 
with the same extreme situation.152
“We Can’t Know What We’re Capable Of”: 
Toward a Suspension of Judgment?
In concluding his essay on the grey zone, Levi’s refl ection that “We are 
all in the ghetto” evokes the contemporary relevance of the Holocaust’s 
ethical dilemmas for his readers.153 Likewise, Nelson writes that his fi lm 
“tries to put its audience squarely in the position of having to face what 
these men faced: As an audience member you ask yourself, how would 
I have responded? What would I do to save my own life?”154 Nelson re-
veals an acute awareness of the tension between the Holocaust’s histori-
cal specifi city and universal signifi cance, noting that while the context 
of The Grey Zone is the Holocaust, “It’s a fi lm about being human. … 
This movie, while accurate to period in every way, must feel for the audi-
ence as though it’s happening now.”155 By asking the same self-refl exive 
question of his audience as Levi does, namely what would one do under 
the same circumstances, Nelson explores the issues of moral ambiguity 
and “compromise” in a particularly sophisticated way. The fi lmmaker’s 
direct confrontation with the problem of judgment can be viewed as 
evoking an understanding of the need to suspend moral evaluations of 
“privileged” Jews; nonetheless, his representation of these liminal fi g-
ures reveals that judgment is passed, albeit in a much more subtle man-
ner than in many other Holocaust fi lms.
On the subject of the Sonderkommando’s discovery of the girl who 
survived the gas chamber, Levi writes in his essay that “these slaves, de-
based by alcohol and the daily slaughter, are transformed; they no lon-
ger have before them the anonymous mass. … They have a person.”156 
Nelson’s representation of the efforts to save the girl communicates a 
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similar sentiment. The girl’s revival by Nyiszli ignites a glimmer of hope 
in some of the fi lm’s crematorium workers, not in terms of survival, but 
in terms of fi nding some means of dealing with their self-loathing and 
perhaps regaining a semblance of the “humanity” they feel they have 
lost. Rosenthal, who suffocated the old man in the fi rst scene, pleads 
with Nyiszli to “save her … you’ve gotta fucking save her!”157 Similarly, 
the quiet-spoken Hoffman, whose constantly nervous disposition makes 
him seem the youngest and most emotionally vulnerable of the crema-
torium workers, tells the girl, “I pray to God we save you.”158 However, 
there is no sense of heroism and redemption here akin to Schindler’s List. 
Before the “privileged” Jews can fi nd a way to rescue the girl, Mühsfeldt 
discovers her. When Mühsfeldt asks Nyiszli if he believes he can redeem 
his past behavior “with the life of this one girl,” the doctor answers, “I 
don’t pretend.”159 While explicitly dismissing any hope of absolution, the 
implication remains that Nyiszli may require this judgment.
In Schindler’s List, the girl in the red dress is positioned as the symbol 
of hope, innocence, and tragedy, who instigates the redemptory trans-
formation of Schindler—the audience surrogate. On the other hand, the 
young girl in The Grey Zone becomes, to some degree, the audience sur-
rogate herself and the medium through which the dehumanized cre-
matorium workers confront their ethical dilemma. In previous scenes 
depicting the journey to Auschwitz inside a cattle car, the process of 
deception in the undressing room, and the entry into the gas chambers, 
the camera briefl y adopts the point of view of the girl who, signifi cantly, 
remains speechless in her role as observer throughout the fi lm. Just be-
fore the revolt breaks out, the girl is left alone in a room with Hoffman, 
whom she previously witnessed beating a man to death for refusing to 
surrender his watch. The two prisoners stare at each other through a 
wall of chain mesh, perhaps symbolizing the obstacles to understanding 
one another. After a prolonged pause, Hoffman nervously ventures over 
to her “side of the fence,” as he seemingly feels compelled to explain his 
extreme situation:
I used to think so much of myself. … What I’d make of my life. … We can’t 
know what we’re capable of, any of us. … How can you know what you’d do 
to stay alive until you’re really asked? I know this now … for most of us, the 
answer is anything.160
Hoffman’s slow monologue is punctuated by pauses that seem ill-fi tting 
alongside the fi lm’s otherwise fast-paced exchanges. In this sequence, 
the fi lm’s hitherto realist mode of representation breaks down.
While Hoffman’s monologue is spoken, a slow-motion image of work-
ers pulling gold teeth from the mouths of naked corpses is followed by a 
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close-up shot of an anonymous crematorium worker crying hysterically 
as he rocks back and forth. The fi lm then moves back in time to show the 
old man whom Rosenthal suffocated in the fi lm’s opening scene strain-
ing at a furnace. Hoffman’s contemporary voiceover explains that the 
man had taken poison a week after placing the bodies of his entire family 
inside the ovens. Hoffman then explains the manner of the man’s sub-
sequent death to the girl: “We smothered him with his own pillow, and 
now I know why. You can kill yourself. That’s the only choice.”161 This 
traumatized admission may be interpreted as invoking a notion similar 
to Langer’s concept of choiceless choices. Indeed, Hoffman’s monologue 
is arguably the most pivotal passage in the fi lm. In one sense, the spoken 
words of the “privileged” Jew amount to what might be seen as a con-
fession. More importantly, Hoffman’s self-refl exive question concerning 
what one would do to stay alive in extreme circumstances confronts the 
fi lm’s viewers with the dilemma of how they themselves might behave 
in the same situation. Nonetheless, the fi lm fi nishes by making some 
tentative suggestions about what one’s behavior in such circumstances 
would be.
Tormented by the daily activities of the Sonderkommando, Hoffman 
asks the girl (and, by extension, the audience): “You can hear me, can’t 
you?” When the girl motions with a subtle nod of her head, Hoffman 
breathes a sigh of relief and almost manages a smile. He repeats the 
words, “I thought so,” revealing a highly restrained appeal to audience 
emotion.162 This appeal is repeated just before Hoffman and Rosenthal 
are shot in the aftermath of the revolt. Lying face down awaiting execu-
tion, the two men briefl y reminisce about their homes and families, dis-
covering that they could have been neighbors. Their smiles quickly fade 
as they remember their imminent deaths. Referring to their attempted 
rescue of the girl, Rosenthal tries to comfort Hoffman and himself with 
the proposition, “We did something,” to which his companion agrees 
with a simple “Yes.”163 Both men are then killed. The fi nal moments of 
these characters’ lives are perhaps intended to refl ect the statement in 
Lewenthal’s manuscript that “so long as man [sic] is able to do anything, 
has the energy, can undertake risks, so long does he believe that by his 
conduct he may achieve something.”164 Even Langer concedes that the 
Holocaust “so threatens our sense of spiritual continuity that it is ago-
nizing to imagine or consent to its features without introducing some af-
fi rmative values to mitigate the gloom.”165 While Nelson appears to end 
The Grey Zone with a positive judgment of the crematorium workers 
who are killed because of their attempted revolt, he deploys subtle tech-
niques to represent Nyiszli in a somewhat negative manner. By the end 
of the fi lm, the audience is positioned against identifying with Nyiszli.
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As the only surviving Jewish character in the fi lm, Nyiszli is an anom-
aly. Indeed, Nyiszli comments in his memoir that “the fact that I had 
come away with my life gave me neither comfort nor joy.”166 The ambig-
uous nature of the character’s survival in The Grey Zone is epitomized 
in Mühsfeldt’s closing comment to him: “You will continue with your 
work … because that’s what the living do. We will have saved each other 
then. We needn’t save anyone else!”167 Accordingly, Nyiszli’s survival 
through cooperating is represented without evoking audience empathy. 
Nelson portrays the prisoner doctor hiding under his dissecting table 
wearing a bloodied lab coat during the rebellion.168 When Mühsfeldt 
informs him that he is to live and continue with his experiments, the 
doctor retches violently. In contrast to Spielberg’s representation of the 
“Schindler Jews,” Nelson does not romanticize Nyiszli’s survival—even 
though one of the producers of The Grey Zone, Avi Lerner, wanted a “he-
roic story” with a “happy ending” that focused on “the one guy who did 
get away.”169 As the girl is forced to look on while the remaining crema-
torium workers are executed, Nyiszli, dressed in a clean, black suit and 
tie, coolly smokes a cigarette and watches the proceedings with interest. 
Surrounded by SS offi cers, the terrifi ed girl seems to glance at Nyiszli 
and quickly look away. The “privileged” Jew displays no emotional reac-
tion to the girl, watching from a distance as she is shot by Mühsfeldt.170 
Thus Nelson’s representation of Nyiszli ends by implying that he has 
“compromised” himself.
Whereas Spielberg offers a “happy” ending, Nelson resists the closure 
of most mainstream feature fi lms. In what equates to the antithesis of 
Spielberg’s redemption of Goldberg, Nelson omits Nyiszli’s lengthy ac-
count of his subsequent survival of Auschwitz and several other camps, 
along with his optimistic concluding remark in his memoir that, after be-
ing reunited with his family, he was resolved to rebuild their lives: “Life 
suddenly became meaningful again.”171 This is replaced in the fi lm by 
a single caption referring to Nyiszli’s later death, the death of his wife, 
and the unknown fate of his daughter. Unlike Schindler’s List, The Grey 
Zone does not end with the triumphant continuation of life beyond the 
Holocaust, but with a sequence of shots portraying exhausted cremato-
rium workers continuing their labor, although these images are stylized 
in a form that deviates from the majority of the fi lm. The slow-motion, 
almost surrealist, images of the workers attached to the replacement 
Sonderkommando show them cremating their predecessors. This vi-
sual element is accompanied by the young girl’s disembodied narrative 
voiceover, a technique that Charles Affron identifi es as a subtle means 
of provoking audience sentiment through a “pathos of absence.”172 Fo-
cusing on the continuation of the extermination process, the girl’s voice 
describes her own incineration by the new crematorium workers:
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We settle on their shoes and on their faces, and in their lungs, and they be-
come so used to us that soon they don’t cough, and they don’t brush us away. 
At this point they’re just moving. Breathing and moving, like anyone else still 
alive in that place. And this is how the work continues.173
The girl’s unsentimental narration refl ects the comment in Nyiszli’s 
memoir that “life soon resumed its normal course. … [The new squad] 
would get used to all this before long.”174 More importantly, the fact 
that the girl as audience surrogate literally merges in fi re and ash with 
the massacred crematorium workers connotes a similar merging of the 
Sonderkommando members with the fi lm’s viewers. The tenuousness 
of this connection between audience and “privileged” Jew is indicative 
of the fi lm’s critical distancing of the viewer and discouragement of em-
pathic identifi cation, yet at the same time, the girl’s monologue can be 
read as another limited appeal to audience emotion.
Through Nelson’s minimalist approach to affecting audience senti-
ment and rigorous exploration of the complexities of Jewish behavior 
in extremis, The Grey Zone can be seen to move toward the suspension 
of judgment recommended by Levi. The anti-redemptory discourse of 
the fi lm provides a complex and nuanced engagement with the ethi-
cal dilemmas of “privileged” Jews. Nonetheless, the subtle presence of 
certain positive and negative judgments in Nelson’s fi lm again points 
to the inevitability of taking a moral position when portraying these 
liminal fi gures. Drawing on Levi’s concept of the grey zone and the is-
sue of “privileged” Jews in his essay on teaching the Holocaust through 
visual culture, David Bathrick asks: “Can one visualize as an artist 
creatively, or for that matter perceive, a traumatic circumstance and 
at the same time resist the ‘need to judge?’”175 In whatever way this 
question is answered, qualifi cations are required. Fiction fi lms repre-
sent “privileged” Jews through considerably different means than writ-
ten memoirs, historical writing, and documentaries, yet despite their 
distinct approaches to depicting the past, the fi lms of both Spielberg 
and Nelson reveal a crucial reliance on testimony and history. An open-
ing legend of The Grey Zone establishes that it “addresses true events,” 
which are “based in part on the eyewitness account of Dr. Miklos Ny-
iszli,” whereas Spielberg’s fi lm is validated by the on-screen presence of 
actual Schindlerjuden in its fi nal scene.176 While both fi lmmakers make 
claims—to varying degrees—of historical and moral authority by their 
use of survivor testimony and representation of historical situations, 
they utilize their resources in very different ways.
The clear-cut judgment of “privileged” Jews in Spielberg’s fi lm un-
derlines the importance of Levi’s acknowledgment of (and call to others 
to acknowledge) the fraught ethical issues involved in attempting to rep-
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resent the experiences of “privileged” Jews. This is not to suggest that 
mainstream narratives are completely incapable of offering a nuanced 
representation of these liminal fi gures. While a certain ambivalence can 
be found in the CBS television movie Playing for Time (1980), which 
portrays a group of women who hold positions in the Auschwitz prisoner 
orchestra, the audience is nonetheless provided with a virtuous protago-
nist with whom to identify.177 Indeed, Schindler’s List also briefl y evokes 
the moral ambiguity inherent in the situations of “privileged” Jews, al-
though this is quickly displaced by Spielberg’s employment of humor, 
heroism, and sentimentality.
Nelson’s emotional and intellectual distancing of the audience, on the 
other hand, allows The Grey Zone to lean more toward the suspension of 
judgment required by Levi. Through the fi lmmaker’s merging of chron-
ologically separate events, inclusion of fi ctional characters, and concen-
tration on the ethical dilemmas that “privileged” Jews faced, The Grey 
Zone refl ects Doneson’s aforementioned preference for faithfulness to 
the Holocaust’s historical “essence” over literal “accuracy” of “precise 
detail.”178 The use of an unconventional mode of fi ctional characteriza-
tion as opposed to traditional Hollywood tropes seems to grant a height-
ened potential for portraying “privileged” Jews in a nuanced manner. 
Nelson’s fi lm also reveals that the judgments of source texts may be re-
sisted, as in his innovative use of Nyiszli’s memoir and Levi’s essay. How-
ever, as was the case for Levi’s writings examined in chapter 1, an analy-
sis of The Grey Zone suggests that a suspension of moral judgment may 
be impossible. The question posed to the audience through Hoffman’s 
monologue—namely, “What would you have done?”—is a rhetorical one, 
and reveals the paradox of judgment intrinsic to Levi’s grey zone. In di-
rectly engaging with the ethical dilemmas of “privileged” Jews, Nelson 
and his audience are caught between the impossibility and inescapabil-
ity of passing judgment, the idea with which this book concludes.
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CONCLUSION
“AND WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE?” 
NEGOTIATING THE PARADOXICAL BIND
R
The Holocaust did not pronounce the death of ethics, but it did prove that 
ethics is immensely vulnerable, that it can be misused and perverted, and 
that no simple reaffi rmation of pre-Holocaust ethics, as if nothing had hap-
pened, will do any more. Too much has happened for that, including the fact 
that the shadow of Birkenau so often shows Western religious, philosophical, 
and ethical traditions to be problematic.
—John K. Roth, Ethics During and After the Holocaust: In the Shadow of 
Birkenau
Even though the far-reaching implications of the Holocaust have 
caused many scholars to take little for granted when refl ecting on eth-
ics, I do not argue that the event has propelled humanity into an ethical 
abyss. It would perhaps be too easy to exclaim “Enough!” and banish 
the Holocaust from human history and discourse, into some transcen-
dental realm that is beyond all hope of understanding. Yet the necessity 
of continued efforts to represent and—to whatever extent possible—
comprehend the magnitude of the event and the extreme experiences 
it entailed counterbalances any claim that the Holocaust is fundamen-
tally impossible to come to grips with. Drawing on Primo Levi’s aver-
sion to Manichean allegories and his warning against moral judgment, 
Shoshana Felman writes that “the moral implications of the Holocaust 
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are such that our task today is to fi nd ways, precisely, to rearticulate 
the question of ethics outside the problematic—and the comfort—of a 
judgment that can be delegated to no human tribunal.”1 While replete 
with unresolved tensions, shifting meanings, and contradictions, the 
value of Levi’s attempt to do this in his writing on the grey zone is clear. 
The common tendency to judge “privileged” Jews according to clear-cut 
moral distinctions reveals that the problems of judgment and represen-
tation are ongoing.
The fi eld of philosophy has recently granted the Holocaust substantial 
attention, although the vast majority of texts have focused on subjects 
other than the behavior of victims. Major themes include the “ordinari-
ness” of the perpetrators who committed this extraordinary evil, the 
utter incomprehensibility of this evil, and the theological problems asso-
ciated with the existence of God amidst such evil. The contemporary phi-
losopher Giorgio Agamben appropriates Levi’s concept of the grey zone 
in his call for a radical revision of how ethics is conceived in the wake 
of the Holocaust. While Agamben does not focus on “privileged” Jews 
in his discussion of what he perceives as the disintegration of an ethics 
founded on human dignity, he does briefl y dwell on the liminal fi gures of 
the Sonderkommandos. Meditating, albeit somewhat abstractly, on the 
grey zone, Agamben notes a crucial obstacle to any attempt at under-
standing—namely, the problem of judgment: “The unprecedented dis-
covery made by Levi at Auschwitz concerns an area that is independent 
of every establishment of responsibility, an area in which Levi succeeded 
in isolating something like a new ethical element.”2 However, Agam-
ben’s blurring of persecutors and the persecuted in his characterization 
of the grey zone as a realm in which “victims become executioners and 
executioners become victims” clearly signals a departure from Levi’s 
ideas.3 As Dominick LaCapra points out in his critique of Agamben’s 
work, Levi’s grey zone raises “the question of the existence and extent 
of problematic—at times more or less dubiously hybridised—cases, but 
it does not imply the rashly generalized blurring or simple collapse of all 
distinctions, including that between perpetrator and victim.”4
In popular culture in particular, but also in other areas, the glorifi ca-
tion of victims and demonization of perpetrators arguably remains the 
dominant paradigm of Holocaust refl ection and representation. Given the 
immense suffering of the victims and the invariably enigmatic nature of 
perpetrator and collaborator behavior, this is perhaps understandable, 
but a Manichean framework is also dangerous. Many contemporary uni-
versity students whom I have met still share these clear-cut ideas about 
“good” and “evil” in relation to the Holocaust; nonetheless, they are 
open to (and interested in) the ambiguities of the grey zone. Such ambi-
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guities need not be taboo. Cultural and historical representations—and 
the continued scholarly criticism of these—play an important role in 
mediating the emotionally and morally fraught issue of “privileged” 
Jews. With this in mind, this book has explored the interconnected prob-
lems of representation and judgment in relation to these victims. Con-
stituting an intrinsically important, frequently overlooked, and hastily 
judged facet of the Holocaust, the issue of “privileged” Jews needs to be 
traversed with care and sensitivity, and I hope that this study takes one 
of many steps toward a more complex and nuanced understanding of 
“privileged” Jews’ experiences.
Debates over Holocaust representation are ongoing. Alvin H. Rosen-
feld has recently warned of the devastating impact of cultural misrepre-
sentations such as Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List, which he sees as 
contributing to “the end of the Holocaust” in public consciousness.5 The 
prioritization of “authentic” or “faithful” representations over “false” 
or “simplistic” ones (although it is diffi cult to defi ne exactly what these 
categories involve) can be justifi ed by pointing to the danger of misrep-
resentations leading to “an incipient rejection of the Holocaust rather 
than its retention in historical memory.”6 Indeed, Ronald Aronson con-
tends that language “must be rethought in light of both the massive 
masking and distorting functions it assumed during the Holocaust, and 
its weakness in rendering what happened.”7 The paucity of language, 
or what Lawrence L. Langer describes as “the inadequate mediating ef-
forts of the world,”8 is particularly evident in attempts to represent the 
ethical dilemmas of “privileged” Jews.
On the other hand, Libby Saxton’s dismissal of the notion of the “lim-
its of representation” informs her recent argument, which I believe has 
considerable merit, that depictions of the Holocaust on fi lm can be the 
“object and vehicle of ethical inquiry.”9 At the same time, I would argue 
that Saxton’s contention that “to articulate moral limits or interdictions 
on representation can become a strategy for evading a properly ethical 
confrontation with the event” does not encompass the diffi culties in-
herent in the representation of “privileged” Jews.10 Indeed, it is the ar-
ticulation and investigation of the limit of judgment that enables one to 
understand the possibilities for representing these liminal fi gures in the 
fi rst place. The obstacles to, and potentialities of, Holocaust representa-
tion are interconnected. While admitting that “completely resolving the 
uncertainties and ambiguities” of the behavior of “privileged” Jews in 
the ghettos—and, by extension, the camps—is impossible, Martin Dean 
emphasizes the need for nuanced refl ections on their extreme situa-
tions: “Reconstructing the dilemmas of those caught in the Nazi trap 
and attempting to understand their perception is now more important 
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than engaging in further harsh moral criticism of Jewish responses to 
this unprecedented threat.”11
In its contribution to the debates over Holocaust representation, 
this book has highlighted the need for continuing (re)evaluations of 
the limits and the possibilities of portraying “privileged” Jews. The in-
troduction outlined their extreme situations and explored the crucial 
juncture between judgment and representation that underpins various 
interpretations of, and controversies over, their behavior. I suggested 
that the ethical dilemmas faced by “privileged” Jews challenge, if not 
undermine, traditional notions of heroism, dignity, and choice, and pose 
considerable obstacles for the analyst (and the artist) in the continual 
search for understanding. Taking into account the problems raised by 
Levi’s paradigmatic essay on the grey zone, I then analyzed the limit 
of judgment in Levi’s writings, Raul Hilberg’s work, and in examples 
of documentary and fi ction fi lms. The analysis revealed that the con-
ventions deployed by survivors, historians, and fi lmmakers frequently 
infl uence the ways in which they convey judgment.
In response to the frequent tendency to appropriate, often uncriti-
cally, the concept of the grey zone for purposes other than to engage 
with the issue of “privileged” Jews, chapter 1 returned to Levi’s original 
concept. Undertaking a close analysis of Levi’s work and infl uences, the 
chapter exposed the paradox of judgment at the center of his concep-
tualization of the grey zone. This paradox consists of an irresolvable 
tension between the grey zone being simultaneously an indecipherable 
realm and a moral spectrum, revealing that Levi himself could not ab-
stain from judging those he argues should not be judged. Through his 
use of literary analogies and other devices, Levi judges, albeit in a nu-
anced manner, the “privileged” Jews he represents.
The close reading of Hilberg’s work in chapter 2 revealed that he 
judges “privileged” Jews in diverse ways, both explicit and implicit, 
depending on the analytic framework employed in his representation. 
The various techniques used in Hilberg’s seminal text, The Destruction 
of the European Jews, position Jewish leaders as cogs in the “machin-
ery of destruction,” while Hilberg’s tripartite analysis in Perpetrators, 
Victims, Bystanders constructs a moral spectrum of culpability along 
which individual Judenrat offi cials are placed. Hilberg’s work is char-
acterized by a certainty that judgment can be made; he seldom refl ects 
on the choiceless choices confronted by “privileged” Jews. His intense 
engagement with the diary of Adam Czerniakow is also replete with 
moral judgment—even though he seems to empathize with the Jewish 
leader at times. The crucial importance of Hilberg’s controversial work 
and persona is further evident in the mediatory position he fi lls between 
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Levi’s writings and Holocaust fi lm, particularly through his crucial in-
fl uence on, and presence in, Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah.
While a considerable literature has recently explored the representa-
tion of the Holocaust in fi lm, this book provides the fi rst analysis of how 
“privileged” Jews are portrayed in the medium. Chapter 3 investigated 
the ways in which documentary fi lmmakers convey judgments accord-
ing to the modes of representation they adopt. By positioning Hilberg 
and his judgments within the frame, Lanzmann’s Shoah reveals that 
the possibilities for the depiction of “privileged” Jews in fi lm differ con-
siderably from those in Hilberg’s history. Indeed, Lanzmann’s editing 
technique can be seen to challenge Hilberg’s negative evaluation of Cz-
erniakow’s state of knowledge and behavior. Nonetheless, implicit judg-
ments are constructed in Shoah through the juxtaposition of continued 
anti-Semitism on the part of perpetrators and what Lanz mann portrays 
as the perpetual suffering of surviving members of the Sonderkomman-
dos. Lanzmann’s employment or rejection of certain fi lm techniques 
was compared and contrasted with more conventional Holocaust docu-
mentaries, principally Tor Ben-Mayor and Dan Setton’s Kapo. Engag-
ing directly with the issue of “privileged” Jews, the expository mode 
of representation in Kapo, which relies on an authoritative narrative 
voiceover, an emotive musical score, and the inclusion and problematic 
use of archival footage, results in clear-cut judgments. The more self-
conscious, open-ended aspects of Lanzmann’s Shoah, on the other hand, 
which seem at times to eschew adopting a clear assertive stance, appear 
to reveal some potential to approach a suspension of judgment in docu-
mentary fi lm.
In the fi nal substantive chapter, I argued that the exposure of the 
image in self-refl exive representations of “privileged” Jews has the po-
tential to provide a particularly nuanced representation. Even so, the 
preoccupation of many mainstream fi lms with themes of resistance and 
rescue frequently results in the behavior of these fi gures being marginal-
ized. Spielberg uses humor and sentimentality to construct binary oppo-
sitions between several of his characters in Schindler’s List. The fi lm’s 
main “privileged” fi gure, Marcel Goldberg, is judged negatively in order 
to emphasize Schindler’s exploits and then redeemed by the German 
rescuer’s virtuous deeds. On the other hand, several recent fi ction fi lms 
reject Spielberg’s redemptory aesthetic. Through a sophisticated emo-
tional and intellectual distancing of the audience; a fl exible adaptation 
of sources; an unconventional portrayal of unsympathetic, fi ctionalized 
characters; and a rejection of Hollywood tropes such as sentimentality, 
Tim Blake Nelson’s The Grey Zone captures the “essence” of the unprec-
edented ethical dilemmas that confronted “privileged” Jews. Counter to 
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Levi’s skepticism of the possibility of representing these liminal fi gures 
on fi lm, I argued that Nelson’s dramatization of members of the twelfth 
Auschwitz Sonderkommando depicts their traumatic experiences in a 
nuanced manner and approaches the suspension of judgment that Levi 
requires—even though, as a close analysis of the fi lm revealed, a subtle 
form of judgment remains.
While the subject of “privileged” Jews has often been considered ta-
boo and no study has previously focused specifi cally on the problem of 
judgment in representations of their experiences, “privileged” Jews ap-
pear, to varying degrees, in Holocaust representations of all kinds. There 
are therefore many potential avenues of future research. Indeed, despite 
the intense controversies surrounding Judenrat offi cials of Eastern Eu-
ropean ghettos, continued calls have been made for a comprehensive 
account of Jewish leaders.12 The analysis of Hilberg’s work and several 
fi lms highlighted major examples of representations of “privileged” 
Jews in historical writing, documentaries, and fi ction fi lms; however, 
there are many other depictions within these genres that deserve criti-
cal attention. Likewise, many more histories and fi lms will undoubtedly 
be produced in future years that engage with notions of moral ambigu-
ity and “compromise” in relation to victim behavior. Particularly signifi -
cant is the explicit engagement with the issue of “privileged” Jews in a 
growing number of fi ction fi lms. The fact that the most recent feature 
of this kind, Stefan Ruzowitzky’s The Counterfeiters, won widespread 
critical acclaim and the 2008 Academy Award for best foreign language 
fi lm perhaps signifi es—or has even resulted in—an increased interest 
in the ethical dilemmas that “privileged” Jews confronted during the 
Holocaust. Filmmakers’ expectations of their audience and audiences’ 
expectations of fi lms are subject to constant readjustment, rendering 
any discussion of the representation of “privileged” Jews in continual 
need of reappraisal.
The examination of the treatment(s) of “privileged” Jews can also be 
extended to other genres. An exploration of how judgments are passed 
in written survivor testimonies other than Levi’s can extend further the 
fi ndings of chapter 1,13 whereas an analysis of the role of the interviewer 
in Holocaust video testimonies reveals that judgments of “privileged” 
Jews are constructed in considerably different ways from those high-
lighted in this book.14 Other forms of representation beyond the scope of 
the present discussion include literature, visual art, theater, and Holo-
caust monuments and museums. Furthermore, while this book analyzes 
the representation of Jews who held “privileged” positions during the 
Holocaust, it must be kept in mind that in the camps, Jewish inmates 
comprised a minority of prisoner-functionaries. The judgment and rep-
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resentation of “privileged” prisoners of the Nazis in general is also an 
important area of future research.
Expressing sentiments akin to Levi, and even gesturing to the para-
dox of judgment central to the grey zone, Saul Friedländer writes:
In the face of simplifi ed representations of the past, the historian’s duty is 
to reintroduce the complexity of discrete historical events, the ambiguity of 
human behavior, and the indeterminacy of wider social processes. The task is 
daunting, especially given the diffi culty of conciliating the nuanced results of 
scholarship and the necessary reference to historical, moral, and philosophi-
cal categories.15
I noted earlier that Yehuda Bauer’s attitude toward the behavior of 
“privileged” Jews in Rethinking the Holocaust (2001) is somewhat more 
sympathetic than Hilberg’s, yet this was not the fi rst time he addressed 
the issue. In an essay written in the 1980s, he asks: “Have we a moral 
right to consider this subject? Is there not an insufferable pretentious-
ness in our discussion which pronounces judgment, gives a verdict on 
these Judenrat Councils …?” Bauer acknowledges the problem of judg-
ment here and the potential need to suspend it, but he points out that 
judgment cannot be lightly cast aside—that it is, indeed, inevitable. He 
goes on to write that “this is just where the trouble lies: if we seriously 
intend to refrain from passing judgment, we must stop studying these 
events entirely, for every historian judges where he will or not [sic], 
through the very selection of the facts which he recounts.”16 The para-
doxical impossibility and inevitability of judging “privileged” Jews can 
thus be considered paramount in addressing the ways in which histori-
ans (and others) represent them. Bauer continues by proclaiming that: 
“The responsibility is terrible. We have no right to judge; nobody autho-
rized us to do so: we judge without being appointed for the task, because 
we have no alternative.”17 Just as scholars and artists will and should 
continue to represent the circumstances and behavior of “privileged” 
Jews, judgments of these fi gures will undeniably follow.
In approaching the ethical dilemmas of “privileged” Jews such as 
Salmen Lewenthal, with whom this book began, even such a nuanced 
and sophisticated concept as the grey zone cannot satisfy its own re-
quirements of suspending judgment. In the case of the Sonderkomman-
dos, for instance, it would seem impossible to completely fulfi ll Levi’s 
dictum that we “meditate on the story of ‘the crematorium ravens’ with 
pity and rigour, but [let] a judgement of them be suspended.”18 The need 
to imagine the unimaginable, represent the unrepresentable, and judge 
those who should not be judged has been shown to cause fundamental 
and unresolved problems for Levi and many others. The simultaneous 
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impossibility and inevitability of judgment may be termed a paradoxical 
bind in which Levi himself was entangled. Indeed, I opened this book 
with the qualifi cation that my own judgments might well impinge on 
the analysis undertaken. Other readers or viewers of the texts examined 
may also be located within this bind, which is most evident when con-
sidering the self-refl exive but nonetheless rhetorical question asked of 
the audience by Nelson’s fi lm: “What would you have done in the same 
situation?”
How then are we to understand the experiences of “privileged” Jews? 
Perhaps one approach is to refl ect on the choiceless choices of these lim-
inal fi gures with, to use Levi’s words, “pity and rigour,” and to continu-
ously ponder the unanswerable question of what we ourselves might 
have done if faced with their extreme situation. Following this line, 
Günther Anders’s 1961 poem entitled “What Would You Have Done?” 
self-consciously addresses the problem of attempting to comprehend the 
experiences of the Sonderkommandos and would seem a fi tting note 
with which to end:
Did you busily scrape the dust of friends and relatives
out of the oven?
And did you cart the wagon through the snow
to the ash heap of those who were burned?
Was the word meant for you: “You will live as long
as the oven smokes,
For you are needed?”
Covered with such dust, did your mouth
give the report in barracks language?
That extra soup, was it for the work of your shovel?
And the double ration for the sweat you shed?
And was the word for you: “Only late, at some unknown time,
After the coal comes the collier, too?”
Not you, not I. We remain untested.
Thus you may scrape the ovens every night,
And, in your dreams, at his side, push the wagon.
But you cannot grasp a jot of what was in the man’s mind,
only that now and then he looked up, as if he were
thinking,
“And what would you have done?”19
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